Eh - Ek

 

Ehrenfeld, Rachel. Narcoterrorism. New York: Basic Books, 1990.

[Terrorism]

Ehrlich, Blake. The Resistance: France, 1940-1945. Boston: Little, Brown, 1965.

[WWII/Eur/Fr]

Ehrman, John.

1. "The Alger Hiss Case: A Half-Century of Controversy." Studies in Intelligence 10, no. 1 (Winter-Spring 2001): 1-13.

This is an excellent, readable review of the Hiss case and of the debate surrounding it.

2. "The Mystery of 'ALES': Once Again, the Alger Hiss Case." Studies in Intelligence 51, no. 4 (2007): 29-38. [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/index.html]

Over the years, there have been multiple occasions where authors invented scenarios showing that Hiss was not a spy and then did their best "to prove it through selective use of evidence, bending the facts, or filling in the blanks with unfounded speculation." Like the Kai Bird and Svetlana Chervonnaya effort in April 2007, "none of these alternative narratives holds up to serious examination."

[SpyCases/U.S./Hiss]

Eicher, David J. "Deploy the Skirmishers." Civil War Times 42, no. 5 (Dec. 2003): 16-17.

"In a war in which intelligence about enemy units ranged from very good to nonexistent, skirmish lines often had to serve as the eyes and ears of regiments or brigades on the march or when choosing fighting positions. Skirmishers were sent forward or along the flanks of moving bodies of troops to gauge the enemy and often to draw the fire that would lead to a general engagement.... Skirmishers ... often ended up fighting with no notice, running for their lives, or frantically communicating rapidly changing situations back to officers who accompanied the main body of troops."

[CivWar/Overviews]

Eickelman, Dale F.

1. "Intelligence in an Arab Gulf State [Oman]." In Comparing Foreign Intelligence: The U.S., the USSR, the U.K. & the Third World, ed. Roy Godson, 89-114. Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988.

2. And M. G. Dennison. "Arabizing the Omani Intelligence Services: Clash of Cultures?" International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 7, no. 1 (Spring 1994): 1-28.

Eilperin, Juliet. "GOP Says U.S. Gave China Nuclear Edge." Washington Post, 6 May 1998, A4. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Congressional Republicans will hold hearings to investigate President Clinton's decisions permitting aerospace companies Loral and Hughes to export satellites to be launched by Chinese rockets. The issue is whether the actions "allowed the Chinese to acquire technology to improve the accuracy of their nuclear missiles."

[CIA/90s/98/China]

Eilperin, Juliet. "Panel Unites to Expose Chinese Espionage." Washington Post, 25 May 1999, A4.

This article discuses Cox' leadership in producing a bipartisan document.

[SpyCases/U.S./China/99/Cox]

Eilperin, Juliet, and Vernon Loeb. "Weapons Lab Reforms Backed." Washington Post, 10 Jun. 1999, A4. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 9 June 1999, the U.S. House of Representatives "unanimously adopted several measures" that would "tighten security and counterintelligence at U.S. weapons labs, bolster export controls and call on the administration to consider transferring the nation's nuclear weapons programs outside the Energy Department."

[GenPostCW/90s/China/Jun99]

Eilperin, Juliet, and Dana Priest. "Sept. 11 Plot Likely Hatched in '98, Tenet Says." Washington Post, 19 Jun. 2002, A10.

[GenPostCW/00s/02/Congress]

Eisenberg, Daniel. "Bush's New Intelligence Czar." Time, 21 Feb. 2005, 32-35.

Given the vagueness of the legislation that established the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), John Negroponte's "ultimate authority over the nation's" intelligence apparatus, "including an estimated $40 billion annual budget,... is an open question."

[Reform/00s/05/DNI]

Eisenberg, Dennis, Uri Dan, and Eli Landau. The Mossad: Israel's Secret Intelligence Service -- Inside Stories. New York & London: Paddington, 1978.

Eisenberg, Dennis, Eli Landau, and Menahem Portugali. Operation Uranium Ship. New York: Signet, 1978.

Eisendrath, Craig. "Needed: More Intelligent Intelligence." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Nov./Dec. 1999, 22-25.

"The bombing [of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade] was simply one more destructive failure in a long string of U.S. intelligence failures. And it again offered proof that the U.S. intelligence system is badly in need of reform."

[GenPostCW/90s/ChiEmb/99]

Eisendrath, Craig, ed. National Insecurity: U.S. Intelligence After the Cold War. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2000.

From advertisement: "[T]en prominent experts describe, from an insider perspective, what went wrong with the U.S. intelligence system and what needs to be done to fix it."

Robert David Steele provides the following comments: "[T]his book brings together a series of chapters that are largely anecdotal (but reasoned) pieces from former foreign service officers recalling all the terrible things CIA did or did not do while they were in service.... The chapter by Richard A. Stubbing on 'Improving the Output of Intelligence: Priorities, Managerial Changes, and Funding' is quite interesting. There is a great deal of truth in all that is presented here."

Immerman, Choice, Sep. 2000, finds that this work's "diagnoses and prescriptions are predictable. American intelligence efforts historically did more harm than good.... [I]ntelligence collection ... targets should be limited and precise. The US should rely almost exclusively on technical intelligence and the reports of foreign-service officers..., covert operations should be abandoned, and the intelligence budget should be reduced.... The recommendations, while useful, add almost nothing new to the national debate."

For Pincus, Washington Monthly, Oct. 2000, this work is a mixed bag. He finds it difficult to imagine how, in the real world, intelligence activities might be based on "law and cooperation," as suggested in Sen. Tom Harkin's "Foreword." Similarly, it seems doubtful that the "politicization" of intelligence can be solved through making Congress an active partner in developing clandestine programs. On the other hand, some restructuring of intelligence along the line of the British system seems to be "a route worth pursuing." Broadly, however, this work can "make you think about the good and the bad [of intelligence] all over again."

[Overviews/U.S./00; Reform/00s/Gen]

Eisenhower, Dwight D. Crusade in Europe. New York: Doubleday, 1943.

[WWII/Eur/Gen; WWII/Eur/Bulge]

Eisenhower, Dwight D.

1. The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953-1956. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1963.

Petersen: "Internal security, Guatemala, Open Skies."

2. The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965.

Petersen: "Missile Gap, U-2, CIA and Allen Dulles."

[GenPostwar/50s]

Eisler, Peter. "Today's Spies Find Secrets in Plain Sight." USA Today, 31 Mar. 2008. [http://www.usatoday.com]

According to intelligence officials, "[t]he explosion of information available via the Internet and other public sources has pushed the collection and analysis of that material to the top of the official priority list in the spy world.... It's a challenging task, given the mountains of material to sift through.... The CIA has set up an Open Source Center ... where officers pore over everything from al-Qaeda-backed websites to papers distributed at science and technology symposiums, says Douglas Naquin, the center's director." Robert David Steele, "founder of OSS.Net, a commercial intelligence provider for private companies and the government," says that "[a]gencies still aren't investing enough in training and technology to use open sources,... so analysts lack language and computer skills, and many use outdated hardware and software that make searches slow or cumbersome."

[DNI/OSC/08; OpenSource]

Either, Eric. "Intelligence: The Secret War Within America's Civil War." Civil War Times, Apr-Mar. 2007. [http://www.historynet.com/magazines/civil_war_times/8188057.html]

A quick walk-through of balloon reconnaissance; Allan Pinkerton's spies; prisoners, deserters, and newspapers; slaves and free blacks; scouts, cavalry, and guerrilla units; signal towers used as intelligence posts; and the Army of the Potomac's Bureau of Military Information.

Ekpe, Bassey. "The Intelligence Assets of the United Nations: Sources, Methods, and Implications." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 20, no. 3 (Fall 2007): 377-400.

"[A]mple evidence shows that the UN already has well-established information and analysis systems." Yet, there is "a lack of criteria and clear definitions of an appropriate intelligence system for the organization." [footnot omitted]

[GenPostCW/Peacekeeping]

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