Eagle, Kenneth L. "Prior Restraint Enforced Against the Publication of Classified Material by CIA Employee." North Carolina Law Review 51 (Mar. 1973): 865-874.
Discusses Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decision affirming an injunction to enforce Victor Marchetti's secrecy agreement with the CIA.
Eagleburger, Lawrence S. "Unacceptable Intervention: Soviet Active Measures." NATO Review 31, no. 1 (Apr. 1983): 6-11.
Eaker, Ira C. "Control of U.S. Intelligence." Air Force Times 38 (29 Aug. 1977): 17-18. [Petersen]
Earle, John. The Price of Patriotism: SOE and MI6 in the Italian-Slovene Borderlands during World War II.. Lewes, UK: Book Guild, 2005.
Stafford, I&NS 20.3 (Sep. 2005), finds this to be "a small gem of a book." It is about "the SOE agents and British liaison officers sent into Slovenia." The postwar fate of the Slovene agents "makes somber reading -- and explains the book's title." The author also "throws instructive light on the internecine fighting that took place along the disputed border [with Italy] between Italian non-communist Osoppo partisans and the pro-communist Garibaldini."
Earley, P. Christopher, and Soon Ang. Cultural Intelligence: Individual Interactions Across Cultures. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003.
Clark comment: This work is not about Intelligence as a discipline, but rather about a concept for achieving positive interactions across cultures. However, the relationship between some of the ideas presented and the perceived need for greater cultural knowledge and sensitivity in Intelligence Community collection and analysis has led to its inclusion here.
According to Riva, Studies 49.2 (2005), this work "provides a framework for understanding cultural adaptation complexities that confront both organizations and individuals. Intelligence Community managers, course developers, and trainers will gain insight into how to develop culturally intelligent officers by integrating behavioral, cognitive, and motivational facets into courses with significant cultural elements. In addition, it presents practical ideas for designing and refining cross-cultural training that can improve analysis of the performances of individuals, groups, and organizations operating in foreign cultural milieus."
Earnest, Peter, with Suzanne Harper. The Real Spy's Guide to Becoming a Spy. New York: Abrams, 2009.
Peake, Studies 53.4 (Dec. 2009) and Intelligencer 17.2 (Winter-Spring 2010), notes that this "is a serious book aimed at those who may at some point in their formative years consider becoming an intelligence officer." It "answers questions often asked but seldom answered in one place. Students, teachers and parents will find it useful."
Earnest, Peter, and Maryann Karinch. Business Confidential: Lessons for Corporate Success from Inside the CIA. New York: AMACOM, 2011.
Peake, Studies 55.4 (Dec. 2011) and Intelligencer 19.1 (Winter-Spring 2012), finds that this book "is both a career memoir and a bold challenge to rethink some of the frequent criticisms leveled at the CIA. Whether the book presents new material and ideas is for business readers to decide. But, at a minimum, it makes a strong argument that the intelligence profession has much in common with the way corporate America does business."
Easter, David. "British Intelligence and Propaganda during the 'Confrontation,' 1963-66." Intelligence and National Security 16, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 83-102.
"The 1963-66 'Confrontation', or undeclared war between Britain, Malaysia and Indonesia, provides a good example of a successful counter-insurgency campaign. Indonesia's attempt to break up the Malaysian federation by sponsoring a guerrilla movement in Borneo was decisively defeated.....
"Ultimately Britiain's victory in the Confrontation was due to the ability of Commonwealth soldiers ... to contain and drive back the Indonesian guerrillas, and the political instability ... which brought down Sukarno. But good intelligence enabled Britain to deploy its limited military resources for the greatest effect. And when a political opening appeared in Indonesia in October 1965, Britain used propaganda against the supporters of Confrontation."
Easter, David. "British and Malaysian Covert Support for Rebel Movements in Indonesia during the 'Confrontation,' 1963-66." Intelligence and National Security 14, no. 4 (Winter 1999): 195-208.
Aid to the dissidents, especially rebel groups in the outer islands, was "one of the very few tools that Britain could use against [Djakarta's] Confrontation campaign.... [Nevertheless,] Britain's aims in supporting the rebels were cautious and limited."
[CA/Indonesia; GenPostwar/CW/I&NS; UK/Postwar/Counterinsurgency/Gen]
Easter, David. "GCHQ and British External Policy in the 1960s." Intelligence and National Security 23, no. 5 (Oct. 2008): 681-706.
"For GCHQ as an organization[,] the 1960s were a difficult decade. Decolonization, military withdrawal from East of Suez and financial crises all adversely affected its operations....Yet although GCHQ was weakened[,] it remained a powerful Sigint organization.... [It] continued to produce valuable intelligence for British policymakers in the 1960s."
Easter, David. "'Keep the Indonesian Pot Boiling': Western Covert Intervention in Indonesia, October 1965-March 1966." Cold War History 5, no. 1 (Feb. 2005): 55-73.
From author's abstract: "This study examines the role played by the West in the destruction of the Indonesian communist party, the PKI, and the removal of the radical Indonesian president, Sukarno, in 1965-66.... The article assesses the impact of Western covert intervention and concludes that Western propaganda may have encouraged the mass killings of the communists."
Easterbrook, Frank H. "Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges and the Production of Information." Supreme Court Review (1981): 309-365.
This article mostly concerns nonintelligence issues, but the author also discusses the Frank Snepp case in which Snepp's secrecy agreement with the CIA was upheld.
Eberstadt, Nicholas. "Where Did the CIA Go Wrong?" National Review, 10 Jun. 1991, 31-34.
This article criticizes CIA estimates of the Soviet economy as too high. Three general problems in terms of the methods used for estimates are identified: the use of official Soviet statistics, the method by which the CIA values Soviet output, and a lack of tests and external challenges to these estimates.
1. The KGB: Death and Rebirth. Westport, CT: Praeger/Greenwood, 1994.
Surveillant 4.1: This is the story of the post-1989 KGB. The author "insists that the KGB, if it died at all, has been reborn in the new independent state."
2. "KGB in Transition: The Bakatin Interregnum." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 6, no. 3 (Fall 1993): 327-338.
Ebon, Martin. The Soviet Propaganda Machine. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1987.
Campbell, FA 66 (Spring 1987), says "[t]his book is for the general reader, one relatively uninformed about the Soviet propaganda effort. It contains quite a mixture.... The author's points are generally on the mark, although some of them misfire, and he tends to give the Soviets too much credit for effectiveness."
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