Drachman, Edward
R., and Alan Shank. Presidents and Foreign Policy: Countdown to Ten Controversial Decisions. Ithaca, NY: SUNY Press, 1997.
Drachman, Edward
R., and Alan Shank. Presidents and Foreign Policy: Countdown to Ten Controversial Decisions. Ithaca, NY: SUNY Press, 1997.
Clark comment: The authors offer a case study of one major decision for each president from Truman to Clinton. It is possible to argue that there are better potential cases for each president than the ones selected for study, but those chosen are interestingly fitted into the authors' novel countdown approach. The cases presented are:
1. Truman's decision not to extend diplomatic recognition to the PRC.
2. Eisenhower's decision to oppose the British-French-Israeli Suez invasion.
3. Kennedy's decision to support the Bay of Pigs invasion.
4. Johnson's decision to end the U.S. escalation of the Vietnam War.
5. Nixon's decision to order the Cambodian incursion.
6. Ford's decision to intervene in Angola.
7. Carter's decision to boycott the 1980 Moscow Olympics.
8. Reagan's decision to bomb Libya.
9. Bush's decision to end the Gulf War.
10. Clinton's decision to use the U.S. military to restore Aristide as Haitian president.
Larson, APSR 92.1, appreciates the authors' efforts to "present more objective criteria" than is normally the case in decision-making evaluation. Their evaluation scheme "seems plausible and reasonable on the face," but "it does not always work well when applied to specific cases." Nevertheless, "the case studies are well researched, concise, and provocative."
[GenPostwar/Issues/Policy; and by case study topic, as appropriate]
Dragonette,
Charles N. "The Birth of COMINT." Naval Intelligence Professionals
Quarterly 11, no. 2 (Apr. 1995): 16.
During the Russo-Japanese War, The Times of London correspondent established a wireless relay station on shore and chartered a merchant ship to take him closer to the action. In addition to transmitting news ashore, The Times personnel began to base news stories on analysis of intercepted transmissions -- not the content, because messages were ciphered, but on the basis of rudimentary "traffic analysis" techniques. The activity took place from 14 March to 18 April 1904, when the ship left because of complaints from both belligerents. This article has no footnotes or other sourcing.
[UK/Historical][c]
Draitser, Emil. "Hunting for Interwar European Diplomacy Secrets: Tradecraft of Dmitry Bystrolyotov." Journal of Intelligence History 6, no. 2 (Winter 2006-2007). [http://www.intelligence-history.org/jih/journal.html]
From abstract: This article concentrates on "a member of the 'Flying squad,' a mobile group of Soviet undercover operatives in interwar Europe," in connection with "one of [Bystrolyotov's] most successful operation[s] -- his recruitment of a retired Swiss Army officer and adventurist[,] Rossi de Ry."
[Russia/Interwar]
Drake,
Jessica. "NRO Worries that Techniques in Yugoslavia May Have Been Exposed."
Aerospace Daily, 9 Jul. 1999.
NRO Director Keith Hall said on 8 July 1999 that the NRO "debuted several important capabilities during the NATO air campaign against Yugoslavia [Operation Allied Force], but is concerned that some of its techniques may have been exposed to potential adversaries."
[MI/Ops/90s/Kosovo; NRO/99]
Drake, Richard. "The Italian Parliamentary Reports on the Mitrokhin Archive." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 20,no. 2 (Summer 2007): 344-356.
"By viewing the Red Brigades as a Soviet device, rather than as the product of Italy's historic revolutionary culture..., the majority commissioners [of the Italian Parliamentary Commission] produced a report that lacked an effective connection with the political and ideological culture primarily responsible for Italian terrorism."
[OtherCountries/Italy/PostCW]
Draper, Theodore.
A Very Thin Line: The Iran-Contra Affair. New York: Hill and Wang,
1991.
In Lowenthal's view, Draper "does not achieve his goal of complete objectivity, but this is a very useful account of the complex series of operations." Luxenberg, WPNWE, 17-23 Jun. 1991, says that the book contains "nothing much that is new or startling about either the Iran arms sale or the Reagan administration's secret resupply of the contras in defiance of Congress." Nevertheless, Draper "has written a readable and detailed narrative that ... may be the standard reference for anyone who does not wish to go to the source documents."
[GenPostwar/80s/Iran-Contra]
Draper, Theodore. "Is the CIA Necessary?" New York Review of Books, 14 Aug. 1997, 5.
[CIA/90s/97/Gen]
Dravis, Michael
W. "Storming Fortress Albania: American Covert Operations in Microcosm,
1949-54." Intelligence and National Security 7, no. 4 (Jan.
1992): 425-442.
This article breaks no new ground on the Albanian operation, and the author's strong distaste for covert action leads him astray analytically when he goes beyond the bounds of that effort. Nonetheless, the more focused presentation is a decent brief retelling of the main thrust of the Albanian operation. The author sees the action as of British origin, with the Americans being brought in "for financial and operational reasons." But "bitter wrangling between the British and Americans ... seriously compromised the effectiveness of the program." Of course, the operation was seriously compromised by Kim Philby's presence as the SIS liaison in Washington. In the end, "the Albanian project did not meet either of the criteria by which covert actions are judged successful: policy objectives were not achieved, and American complicity was publicly exposed."
[CIA/40s; CA/Eur][c]
Drechsler, Donald R. "Reconstructing the Interagency Process after Iraq." Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 1 (2005): 3-30.
From abstract: "Cultural, structural and bureaucratic barriers between the Department of State and the Department of Defense prevented effective integration, particularly in the postwar planning phase of Operation 'Iraqi Freedom'. In contrast, the postwar planning in Kosovo, under the PDD 56 interagency coordination process, could have served as a useful template for the political-military planning process.... Iraq demonstrated that partial State-Defense integration ... was insufficient for an undertaking of this magnitude."
[MI/Ops/00s/Iraq/05; OtherAgencies/State/Gen]
Dreisziger, N.F.,
ed. Mobilization for Total War. Waterloo, Ontario: University of
Waterloo, 1981.
[MI/Overviews]
Drell, Bernard. "Intelligence Research -- Some Suggested Approaches." Studies in Intelligence 1, no. 4 (Fall 1957): 79-95.
The object of "intelligence research is not encyclopedic information; it must be limited to information that answers questions of intelligence interest.... [N]o one method is appropriate to all kinds of intelligence research. Techniques and methods must be adapted to the problem, its scope, its urgency, and to the nature of the evidence."
[Analysis/Gen]
Drendel, Lou. SR-71 Blackbird in Action. Carrollton, TX: Squadron/Signal Publications, 1982. [Robarge]
[Recon/Planes]
Dreux, William
B. No Bridges Blown. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971.
http://www.cloakanddagger.com/dagger: This is the "[s]tory of an OSS Jedburgh operative in France in WWII" and is "one of the few books ever written about the Jeds by a Jed."
[WWII/OSS/France]
Dreyfus,
Suelette. "Spies in the 'Forests.'" The Independent (UK),
22 Nov. 1999. [http://www.independent.co.uk]
Two U.S. Defense Department papers, published at the 1997 and 1998 Text Retrieval Conference (TREC), show that the U.S. government has built a working prototype of softwar, called "Semantic Forests," "that analyses voice transcripts and other documents in order to allow intelligent searching for specific topics. The software could be used to analyse computer-transcribed telephone conversations."
[NSA/90s/99]
Dreyfus,
Suelette. "This Is Just Between Us (and the Spies)." The Independent
(UK), 15 Nov. 1999. [http://www.independent.co.uk]
The U.S. National Security Agency was granted a patent on 10 August 1999 for "a system of automatic topic spotting and labelling of data. The patent officially confirms for the first time that the NSA has been working on ways of automatically analysing human speech. The NSA's invention is intended automatically to sift through human speech transcripts in any language. The patent document specifically mentions 'machine-transcribed speech' as a potential source."
[NSA/90s/99]
Dreyfuss, Robert.
"Company Spies: The CIA Has Opened a Global Pandora's Box by Spying
on Foreign Competitors of American Companies." Mother Jones,
June 1994, 16-19, 66-68. [CIABASE]
[CIA/90s; GenPostwar/Issues/Econ]
Dreyfuss, Robert. "The Pentagon Muzzles the CIA: Devising Bad Intelligence to Promote Bad Policy." American Prospect 13, no. 22 (16 Dec. 2002): 26-29. [http://www.prospect.org]
[CIA/00s/02]
Dreyfuss, Robert.
"Risky Business." New Republic, 5-12 Jan. 1998, 18-20.
The author discusses the CIA's National Resources Division, the use of nonofficial cover, Diversified Cover Officers, and collection of economic intelligence with the cooperation of U.S. businesses. The conclusion: "[T]he risks outweigh the benefits." Beyond the threat that such activities raise for American businesspeople overseas, "it is difficult to make the case that matters relating to economic competitiveness are serious enough to national security that they justify illegal, clandestine methods."
[CIA/C&C/DO; GenPostwar/Issues/Econ]
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