Dev

 

de Valk, Giliam. Dutch Intelligence: Towards a Qualitative Framework for Analysis, with Case Studies on the Shipping Research Bureau and the National Security Service (BVD). Rotterdam: BJu Legal Publishers, 2006.

Peake, Studies 51.1 (Mar. 2007), finds that the author's "study is impressively documented," but the conclusions point to "outcomes [that] are standard measures in most services." In addition, de Valk "has yet to validate his approach using an extensive database."

[Analysis/Gen]

Devereux, Tony. Messenger Gods of Battle. Radio, Radar, Sonar: The Story of Electronics in War. London: Brassey's, 1991.

Herman, I&NS 7.2, takes issue with the author's conflating of "electronic warfare" and "electronics in war" and his inclusion of sonar in his subject. Nevertheless, the reviewer notes that, for those new to the subject, the book is "a good exposition of physical principles and the technological history."

[Overviews]

De Villemarest, Pierre. Le Coup d'Etat de Markus Wolf: La guerre secrete des deux Allemagnes. Paris: Stock, 1991.

[Germany/East]

De Villemarest, Pierre. GRU -- Le plus secret des services sovietiques, 1918-1988. Paris: Stock, 1988.

Rurarz-Huygens, IJI&C 3:1: "[F]rom its beginning the GRU was solely an intelligence gathering organization and not like the KGB, an instrument of internal repression.... While ... admirable in bringing to light many interesting facts about the GRU's history, [this book] does not place the GRU within the Soviet power structure."

[Russia/MI]

Devine, Jack. "An Intelligence Reform Reality Check." Washington Post, 18 Feb. 2008, A17. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

In this Op-Ed piece, the former acting DDO finds little to like in the intelligence reform of 2004. "It has been three years since the intelligence community was reorganized with passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act in December 2004, and the results are not encouraging. In fact, the leadership issue has become even more muddled.... [T]he 'reform' legislation that grew out of Sept. 11 ... needs to be fully reassessed -- and soon."...

"The legislation simply didn't give the DNI the budgetary muscle needed to lead the intelligence community, and it created a troublesome confusion here and abroad regarding precisely who is in charge. Today, the DNI has become what intelligence professionals feared it would: an unnecessary bureaucratic contraption with an amazingly large staff."

[DNI/08; Reform/00s/08]

Devlin, Larry. Chief of Station, Congo: Fighting the Cold War in a Hot Zone. New York: Public Affairs, 2007.

Clark comment: This is an invigorating read about a curious corner in the Cold War, written by a man who lived it closely. There is certainly plenty of Devlin's opinion on U.S. foreign policy of the era spread about in his memoir, but such does not represent more than momentary pauses in the narrative of the story he unfolds. This was neither the first nor the last time that officers (whether CIA or State Department) in the field and Washington had different views of developing situations. Devlin writes an easily read brand of English, introduces his colleagues and the Congolese leaders with both candor and sensitivity, and seeks to put to rest canards directed at the CIA institutionally and him personally for such actions as Lumumba's death and Mobutu's coup. It is, perhaps, easy at this late date to wonder "who cares" about these actions of long ago; it is, however, even easier to agree with Devlin's deepseated belief that it really did matter at the time. I am grateful that fate placed Larry Devlin in the Congo at this juncture as Africa began to move beyond its previous colonial existence.

EAB, AFIO WIN 06-07 (12 Feb. 2007), notes that when the author arrived in the Congo in 1960, there was "no central authority ... and local strongmen were struggling for power." As the chaos grew, "Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba began courting the Soviets. Devlin received orders from Washington that Lumumba had to go. Within weeks Lumumba was not only out of power, but dead. However, Devlin devotes a large portion of the book refuting his or the agency's part in Lumumba's death."

A Publisher's Weekly reviewer (via Amazon.com) finds that the author uses his last chapter for "a point-by-point refutation of his or the agency's involvement in Lumumba's death.... Devlin's straightforward, plainly written approach ... lends credence to his assertion of innocence."

Rogers, CIRA Newsletter 32.1 (Spring 2007) and Intelligencer 15.2 (Fall/Winter 2006-2007), calls Chief of Station, Congo "an important piece of history about the United States' skirmishes with the Soviet Union and other Communist countries during the Cold War as specifically played out in the Congo.... The Congo experience is a textbook lesson on how CIA can and should work with the Department of State, and how Department of State diplomats can use effectively intelligence resources."

For Cassilly, IJI&C 21.1 (Spring 2008), "this is the first report written exclusively from the CIA's point of view and, as such, a valuable contribution to the history of the time.... [A]s the Cold War recedes further, the time may soon arrive for a reexamination of the situation in a less emotional context. When doing so, Devlin's book will be required reading, if perhaps not the final word."

See Scott Shane, "Memories of a C.I.A. Officer Resonate in a New Era," New York Times, 24 Feb. 2008, for the journalist's interview of the 85-year-old Devlin at his home in Virginia.

[CA/Africa/Congo; CIA/60s/Gen & Memoirs]

Devore, Ronald M. Spies and All That: Intelligence Agencies and Operations; A Bibliography. Los Angeles: California State University, Center for the Study of Armament and Disarmament, 1977.

Chambers says this is "more like a booklist." Rocca and Dziak note that the work contains 556 general intelligence selections, with brief annotations; it is "[u]sefully cross-indexed by subject." Constantinides comments that some of the author's recommendations indicate that his "knowledge is extensive rather than intensive."

Devries, Donald C. "Reserve Intelligence Support for Operation Allied Force." Joint Forces Quarterly (Spring 2000): 81-86.

[MI/Ops/Kosovo; MI/Reserves]

De Vries, Tity. "The Absent Dutch: Dutch Intellectuals and the Congress for Cultural Freedom." Intelligence and National Security 18, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 254-266.

"[T]he Dutch were almost completely absent" from the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF). "[T]he main explanation for the Dutch lack of interest in the CCF [is] to be found in Dutch society itself.... [P]ost-war Dutch writers and artists hardly had a deeply-rooted tradition of political engagement." At the same time, "Dutch political intellectuals lacked cultural interest."

[CA/Eur; OtherCountries/Netherlands]

Devroy, Ann, and Michael Isikoff. "The Bureau's New Chief: Tough and Fair." Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 26 Jul.-1 Aug. 1993, 33.

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