Deutch, John.
Deutsch, Harold C.
1. "Clients of Ultra: American Captains." Parameters 15 (Summer 1985): 55-62.
The author discusses the attitudes of major U.S. commanders toward the Ultra intelligence. Patton may have made the best use of the material.
2. "Commanding Generals and the Uses of Intelligence." Intelligence and National Security 3, no. 3 (Jul. 1988): 194-260.
Deutsch surveys the use made of intelligence during World War II by nine commanders, eight Allied and one German. This is one of those articles that should be on the "must read" list of anyone interested in the use of intelligence.
3. "The Historical Impact of Revealing the Ultra Secret." Parameters 7, no. 3 (1977): 16-32.
4. "The Influence of Ultra on World War II." Parameters 8, no. 3 (Dec. 1978): 2-15.
This and the immediately preceding article should be read together, as they deal with two aspects of the same problem: assessing the impact of Ultra (and intelligence generally) on World War II. Deutsch makes clear his belief that the intelligence factor must be an important factor in discussing the history of the war. He wrote at that time that the then-new Ultra revelations would be more likely to impact the "why" questions of the war than the "what" questions. Thirty years later that still looks like a good analysis.
[UK/WWII/Ultra; WWII/Gen]
Deutsch, Harold C. The Conspiracy Against Hitler in the Twilight War. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press; 1968.
From publisher: "This is the first detailed account in English of the German anti-Nazi plot of September 1939 - May 1940, a conspiracy which involved the services of Pope Pius XII as in intermediary. Much new information is presented, and the book puts the whole story of the German resistance movement in a clearer light than has been possible before. Much of the account is based on the testimony of over fifty witnesses whom Professor Deutsch interviewed or interrogated, comprising virtually all the participants or observers who survived the period. He also had access to previously unavailable French and Belgian documents as well as to diaries and other private material."
[WWII/Eur/Germany/Resistance]
Deutsch, Harold C. "Sidelights on the Redl Case: Russian Intelligence on the Eve of the Great War." Intelligence and National Security 4, no. 4 (Oct. 1989): 827-828.
This presents a few stray "facts" concerning the Russian spy in Austria-Hungary in 1913. The information comes from the author's interviews with "leading First World War figures in 1938."
[Russia/Historical/Redl]
Deutsch, James I. "'I Was a Hollywood Agent': Cinematic Representations of the Office of Strategic Services in 1946." Intelligence and National Security 13, no. 2 (Summer 1998): 85-99.
"In 1946,... three Hollywood feature films were released that dramatized the agency's operations during World War II: O.S.S. (Paramount Pictures[)], 13 Rue Madeleine (Twentieth Century-Fox), and Cloak and Daggers (Warner Bros. Pictures). Although officials in the War Department w[e]re often disturbed by many of technical details that these three films revealed about the military, the intelligence establishment generally benefited from the the largely positive publicity and box-office success that these films received."
[GenPostwar/40s]
Deutsche Welle. "German Intelligence Admits to Spying on Charities in Afghanistan." 7 Dec. 2008. [http://www.dw-world.de]
According to a report published in Der Spiegel, the BND "has admitted covert surveillance ... in the Afghan capital" of the communications of the Bonn-based relief organization Welthungerhilfe. " The BND had told Welthungerhilfe it had scrutinized at least 2,000 e-mails, fax messages and telephone conversations from the Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO) between October 2005 and April 2008."
[Germany/00s]
de Valk, Giliam. Dutch Intelligence: Towards a Qualitative Framework for Analysis, with Case Studies on the Shipping Research Bureau and the National Security Service (BVD). Rotterdam: BJu Legal Publishers, 2006.
Peake, Studies 51.1 (Mar. 2007), finds that the author's "study is impressively documented," but the conclusions point to "outcomes [that] are standard measures in most services." In addition, de Valk "has yet to validate his approach using an extensive database."
[Analysis/Gen]
Devereux, Tony.
Messenger Gods of Battle. Radio, Radar, Sonar: The Story of Electronics
in War. London: Brassey's, 1991.
Herman, I&NS 7.2, takes issue with the author's conflating of "electronic warfare" and "electronics in war" and his inclusion of sonar in his subject. Nevertheless, the reviewer notes that, for those new to the subject, the book is "a good exposition of physical principles and the technological history."
[Overviews]
De Villemarest,
Pierre. Le Coup d'Etat de Markus Wolf: La guerre secrete des deux Allemagnes.
Paris: Stock, 1991.
[Germany/East/Wolf]
De Villemarest,
Pierre. GRU -- Le plus secret des services sovietiques, 1918-1988.
Paris: Stock, 1988.
Rurarz-Huygens, IJI&C 3:1: "[F]rom its beginning the GRU was solely an intelligence gathering organization and not like the KGB, an instrument of internal repression.... While ... admirable in bringing to light many interesting facts about the GRU's history, [this book] does not place the GRU within the Soviet power structure."
[Russia/MI]
Devine, Jack. "An Intelligence Reform Reality Check." Washington Post, 18 Feb. 2008, A17. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
In this Op-Ed piece, the former acting DDO finds little to like in the intelligence reform of 2004. "It has been three years since the intelligence community was reorganized with passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act in December 2004, and the results are not encouraging. In fact, the leadership issue has become even more muddled.... [T]he 'reform' legislation that grew out of Sept. 11 ... needs to be fully reassessed -- and soon....
"The legislation simply didn't give the DNI the budgetary muscle needed to lead the intelligence community, and it created a troublesome confusion here and abroad regarding precisely who is in charge. Today, the DNI has become what intelligence professionals feared it would: an unnecessary bureaucratic contraption with an amazingly large staff."
[DNI/08; Reform/00s/08]
Devine, Jack. "Tomorrow's Spygames." World Policy Journal 25, no. 3 (Fall 2008): 141-151. [http://www.mitpressjournals.org]
The former CIA ADDO takes a look at what he thinks the next 25 years will bring in the intelligence arena. For instance, he suggests that in response to the future's "more complex, interconnected environment, the American intelligence community will enter a period of consolidation as various agencies are further centralized under the leadership of a future secretary of intelligence." This is a good read, whether you agree or disagree with Devine's projections.
[GenPostCW/00s/Gen; Overviews/U.S./00s]
Devlin, Larry. Chief of Station, Congo: Fighting the Cold War in a Hot Zone. New York: Public Affairs, 2007.
Lawrence Raymond Devlin died 6 December 2008. Joe Holley, "Larry Devlin, 86; CIA Chief of Station, Congo," Washington Post, 13 Dec. 2008, B5.
Clark comment: This is an invigorating read about a curious corner in the Cold War, written by a man who lived it closely. There is certainly plenty of Devlin's opinion on U.S. foreign policy of the era spread about in his memoir, but such does not represent more than momentary pauses in the narrative of the story he unfolds. This was neither the first nor the last time that officers (whether CIA or State Department) in the field and Washington had different views of developing situations. Devlin writes an easily read brand of English, introduces his colleagues and the Congolese leaders with both candor and sensitivity, and seeks to put to rest canards directed at the CIA institutionally and him personally for such actions as Lumumba's death and Mobutu's coup. It is, perhaps, easy at this late date to wonder "who cares" about these actions of long ago; it is, however, even easier to agree with Devlin's deepseated belief that it really did matter at the time. I am grateful that fate placed Larry Devlin in the Congo at this juncture as Africa began to move beyond its previous colonial existence.
EAB, AFIO WIN 06-07 (12 Feb. 2007), notes that when the author arrived in the Congo in 1960, there was "no central authority ... and local strongmen were struggling for power.... Devlin devotes a large portion of the book refuting his or the agency's part in Lumumba's death." Similarly, a Publisher's Weekly reviewer (via Amazon.com) finds that the author uses his last chapter for "a point-by-point refutation of his or the agency's involvement in Lumumba's death.... Devlin's straightforward, plainly written approach ... lends credence to his assertion of innocence."
For Cassilly, IJI&C 21.1 (Spring 2008), "this is the first report written exclusively from the CIA's point of view and, as such, a valuable contribution to the history of the time.... [A]s the Cold War recedes further, the time may soon arrive for a reexamination of the situation in a less emotional context. When doing so, Devlin's book will be required reading, if perhaps not the final word."
Rogers, CIRA Newsletter 32.1 (Spring 2007) and Intelligencer 15.2 (Fall/Winter 2006-2007), calls Chief of Station, Congo "an important piece of history about the United States' skirmishes with the Soviet Union and other Communist countries during the Cold War as specifically played out in the Congo.... The Congo experience is a textbook lesson on how CIA can and should work with the Department of State, and how Department of State diplomats can use effectively intelligence resources."
See Scott Shane, "Memories of a C.I.A. Officer Resonate in a New Era," New York Times, 24 Feb. 2008, for the journalist's interview of the 85-year-old Devlin at his home in Virginia.
[CA/Africa/Congo; CIA/60s/Gen & Memoirs]
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