1. Defense Intelligence Journal. "Intelligence Analysis." 6, no 2 (Fall 1997): Entire issue.
1. John E. McLaughlin [CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence], "New Challenges and Priorities for Analysis," pp. 11-21.
Changes in the world around us and in the expectations of consumers "add up to a fundamental shift in the analytical priorities for CIA and others in the [Intelligence] Community.... Tapping into analytic expertise across the Community and coordinating on collection activity will be essential to overcome budget and personnel constraints."
2. William R. Grundmann [DIA Deputy Director for Intelligence Production], "Reshaping the Intelligence Production Landscape," pp. 23-33.
The "viability of the Intelligence Community will depend on the seamless integration of the separate intelligence organizations and the functional elements within those organizations." One problem area is that "[w]e are, increasingly, upping the pace of current intelligence production and allotting the commensurate level of analytic manpower to meet the requirements of continuous contingencies and crises. At the same time, we have incurred significant reductions in analytic resources as a result of funding cuts over the last five years."
3. Louis E. Andre [DIA Research Director for Intelligence Production], "Intelligence Production: Towards a Knowledge-Based Future," pp. 33-45.
To be prepared to participate in the ongoing information revolution, the intelligence production community needs to make a "concerted effort to find dramatically better ways to capture and distribute digitally the extraordinary and dynamic base of knowledge resident in our analytic corps."
4. Ronald D. Garst and Max L. Gross, "On Becoming an Intelligence Analyst," pp. 47-59.
The authors seek to describe the "set of talents, skills and personal characteristics required of the successful all-source intelligence analyst."
5. Robert D. Gourley, "Intuitive Intelligence," pp. 61-75.
In times of crisis, analysts "are expected to do what they have been taught their whole career to avoid; they must make rapid assessments of enemy intentions and well developed projections based on intuition." The author makes some suggestions on how analysts might be better prepared to respond to requirements for instananeous assessments.
2. Defense Intelligence Journal. "Counterintelligence." 4, no. 1 (Spring 1995): Entire issue.
1. Richard L. Haver, "The Ames Case: Catalyst for a National Counterintelligence Strategy," pp. 11-18.
There are "fundamental legal, organizational and managerial weaknesses" plaguing U.S. counterintelligence. These are "the lack of national authority and prestige, an outmoded organizational structure and lack of a unifying strategic concept to help manage and institutionalize inter-agency CI cooperation.... [S]ince Aldrich Ames' arrest, the Executive Branch ... has restructured and resubordinated the inter-agency staff responsible for managing US CI agencies." The National Counterintelligence Center (NACIC), created by Executive Order on 3 May 1994, "coordinates national-level CI activities." NACIC reports to the National Security Council (NSC) through the National Counterintelligence Policy Board (NACIPB), not to the DCI. This and other changes "are steps in the right direction"; but more needs to be done.
2. Kenneth A. Krantz, "Counterintelligence Support to Joint Operations," pp. 19- 27.
Krantz gives a quick overview of counterintelligence in the Defense Department and the services. He makes clear that the "four Services each treat CI differently" -- even to the extent of having different funding bases. "Too often in their 'stovepipe' world, CI organizations do not have to integrate their efforts with other Services, or within the joint structure." The author argues for greater "jointness" among the CI organizations."
3. David G. Major, "Operation 'Famish': The Integration of Counterintelligence into the National Strategic Decisionmaking Process," pp. 29-55.
Operation "Famish" was the FBI codename for a series of national security policy decisions implemented March-November 1986. Eighty KGB and GRU officers were ordered to leave the United States. Major's article examines "the interagency structure and process" through which the Operation "Famish" decisions were made.
4. M.E. Bowman, "Prosecuting Spies: An Uneasy Alliance of Security, Ethics, and Law," pp. 57-81.
"Historically, espionage prosecution was resisted due to the potential for public disclosure of national security information." In fact, "prosecution involving classified information is one of the most difficult undertakings of our legal system." The author identifies six basic issues which underlie the problems of espionage prosecution: the charges, discovery, the evidence, using classified information (the author discusses the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA)), defenses (diplomatic status, the national security standard, reliance on apparent authority, extra-territorial acts, promises), and sentencing. An earlier version of this article, "Prosecuting Spies: An Uneasy Alliance of Security, Ethics and Law," appears in American Intelligence Journal 11, no. 2 (1990): 29-39.
5. Dan Carter, "Marine Corps Counterintelligence in Somalia and Beyond," pp. 83-89.
In the Marine Corps, "all CI training and activities are oriented totally toward the tactical environment.... Additionally, Marine Corps CI has a distinctive tactical human intelligence (HUMINT) mission.... Marine Corps CI conducts ... HUMINT collection operations ... [to] assist the tactical intelligence collection effort in determining the enemy's order of battle ... and intentions.... Marine Corps CI is now expanding and defining its role in deception operations, information warfare, psychological operations and operational security."
6. Stephen D. Kelly, "Neglect and Trendiness," pp. 91-97.
The "weakness that predisposes the Intelligence Community to suffer from Ames-type episodes is a basic Community-wide neglect of CI and a culture of 'functional trendiness' that causes intelligence functions or disciplines to fall in or out of favor based on the current fashion or emphasis of the moment."
3. Defense Intelligence Journal. "Economic Intelligence." 10, no. 2 (Summer 2001): Entire issue.
1. Stephen P. Ferris and Gordon Livingston, "Economic Espionage as Neo-Merchantilism: National Security Implications," pp. 13-28.
"In a single-minded determination to increase national economic productivity and competitiveness, the basic objective of state-sponsored economic espionage resembles that.of classic merchantilism.... Economic espionage measures long-term success by enhanced market share for a nation's products and a favorable balance of trade. Rather than accumulating large reserves of gold bullion as in classical merchantilism, though, economic espionage ultimately seeks to increase national reserves of hard currencies and to improve the home currency's exchange rate with the U.S. dollar."
2. Mark S. James, "The 'Roaring Twenties,' Russian Style," pp. 29-40.
Much of the concern about Russian organized crime "has centered on [its] corrupting influence ... on various aspects of the Russian government and the subsequent potential for the loss of control of strategic weapons. A more certain and immediate threat, though, is the corrupting" effect, "if not an outright assault," on the U.S. economy "through the misuse of its regulated banking, alcohol, and tobacco industries."
3. William H. Drohan, "Narco-Merchantilism and the War on Drugs: Is Victory an Option?" pp. 41-52.
"Narco-merchantilism is likely to remain a threat to U.S. national security interests and those of other nations for years to come. The most promising approach to combating this opponent is to focus counterdrug efforts" on the traffickers' ability to maintain both their supply and demand, to move their products, to maintain operational and personal security, and to enjoy the proceeds of their actions.
4. Wesley R. Moy, "Economic Diplomacy: Unshook Amidst the New World Order?" pp. 53-65.
"What is needed in the economic policy area is [an] abiding design supported by pertinent, timely, and refined economic intelligence."
5. Mark A. Jensen, "Intelligence: An Economic Good," pp. 67-79.
"[A]s a product requiring the expenditure of effort [intelligence] should be treated as an economic good." However, this does not occur in practice; "[c]onsumers invariably ignore the costs associated with the production of intelligence.... Intelligence producers tend to operate with a similar mindset because the cost of collection seldom dawns on them."
6. David M. Keithly, "Out of Many Arises One Euro," pp. 81-93.
7. James J. Kohlhaas and James P. Peak, "The King Is Dead (or Is He?): The 'Demise' of E-Business," 95-101.
Return to D Table of Contents
Return to Defense Intelligence Journal