Def

 

DeFalco, Ralph Lee, III. "Blind to the Sun: U.S. Intelligence Failures Before the War with Japan." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 16, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 95-107.

"U.S. intelligence collection [in the interwar period] was better than generally supposed. Despite the numerous obstacles..., much was known about the Imperial Japanese Navy. But American intelligence ... was basically a patchwork effort, and largely uncoordinated.... Personal feuds and personality conflicts in the peacetime armed services undercut the cooperation needed.... [A] certain national and technical arrogance and presumed racial superiority biased both reporting and analysis."

[Interwar/U.S.]

Defence Systems Daily. "Australia Shakes Up Defence Intelligence." 28 Oct. 1999. [http://defence-data.com]

Australian Defence Minister John Moore has announced the creation of a Defence Intelligence Board (DIB) "to oversee the provision of better intelligence to support Defence and Government decision making." In addition, an Australian Imagery Organisation (AIO) has been established. The AIO "will be responsible for the collection, interpretation and use of imagery to support Australia's strategic and national intelligence needs."

The DIB's functions include "[d]irection of the overall planning and management of Defence intelligence agencies -- the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD), the Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO), and the Australian Imagery Organisation (AIO).

Martin Brady, currently Acting Deputy Secretary Strategy, will head the DIB. Ron Bonighton, formerly Head, Systems Acquisition Division (Electronic Systems), Defence Acquisition Organisation, will be Director, DSD. Frank Lewincamp, formerly First Assistant Secretary, Resources and Financial Programmes, has been appointed Director, DIO. Chris Stephens will be Director, AIO.

[Australia/99]

Defense Analysis. Editors. "Intelligence." 3 (Jun. 1987): Entire issue.

[MI/Overviews]

Defense Intelligence Agency. 2012-2017 DIA Strategic Plan: One Mission. One Team. One Agency. 2011. At: http://www.dia.mil/about/strategic-plan.

Table of Contents
1. Foreword [by Ronald L. Burgess, Jr. (LTGEN/USA), D/DIA]
2. The Strategic Statement
3. The Strategic Environment
4. Goals and Objectives
5. Conclusion

[MI/DIA/10s]

Defense Intelligence Journal.

Defense News. Editors. "NRO's Secret Fund May be Even Bigger." 23-29 Oct. 1995, 2.

[NRO/90s/95]

Defense Science Board/Air Force Scientific Advisory Board Joint Task Force. Acquisition of National Security Space Programs. Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, May 2003. [http://www.fas.org/spp/military/dsb.pdf]

Steven Aftergood, "Military Space Programs in Disarray," Secrecy News, 5 Sep. 2003, notes that the DSB/AFSCB report finds that there are "systemic problems" in the U.S. military and national security space programs. This includes the conclusion that "the next generation spy satellite program, known as the Future Imagery Architecture, is 'technically flawed' ... and 'not executable.'"

[MI/Space; NRO/03; Recon/Sats/Arts]

DeForest, Orrin, and David Chanoff. Slow Burn: The Rise and Bitter Fall of American Intelligence in Vietnam. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990.

According to Surveillant 1.1, Slow Burn tells the story of a "CIA officer's creation of a spy network in Vietnam.... [He] describes the anxieties and frustrations of the final days of U.S. involvement." Petersen identifies the author as "a disillusioned CIA regional officer who personally handled defectors and agents."

Wirtz, IJI&C 4.2, notes that from November 1968 to Spring 1975, DeForest was a "CIA operations officer in the city of Bien Hoa.... [His] reminiscences are informative.... He provides a compelling description of a single CIA success amidst the general disaster that engulfed much of American intelligence during the war." This is a "useful contribution to the literature on the Vietnam war."

[CIA/Memoirs; Vietnam/Gen]

Defty, Andrew. "'Close and Continuous Liaison': British Anti-Communist Propaganda and Cooperation with the United States, 1950-51." Intelligence and National Security 17, no. 4 (Winter 2002): 100-130.

The author asserts that "the extent of cooperation between Britain and America in the field of anti-Communist propaganda was far greater than has previously been appreciated." The British Foreign Office's Information Research Department (IRD) produced "discreet propagenda" targeted on the free world; the CIA's "mighty Wurlitzer" focused on the Soviet Union and the Iron Curtain countries. Thus, "[i]n many respects British and American approaches to anti-Communist propaganda were complementary."

[CA/Eur; GenPostwar/ColdWar; UK/Postwar/IRD]

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