De - Deb

 

Deac, Wilfred P. "Amy Elizabeth Thorpe: WWII's Mata Hari." World War II. [http://www.historynet.com/wwii/blamyelizabeththorpe/]

This is a fast and breezy walk-through of some of the espionage sexploits attributed to Amy Elizabeth Thorpe Pack Brousse (BSC's code name "Cynthia") before and during World War II.

See H. Montgomery Hyde, Cynthia (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1965) or Cynthia: The Spy Who Changed the Course of the War (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1965).

[UK/WWII/BSC]

Deacon, Richard [Donald McCormick].

Deady, Timothy K. "Lessons from a Successful Counterinsurgency: The Philippines, 1899-1902." Parameters 35, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 53-68.

The author provides a "brief review" of the Philippine Insurrection of 1899-1902, examines "the strategic and operational lessons of America’s successful campaign," considers "the belligerents’ policy goals, strategies, and their centers of gravity," and identifies "lessons applicable for winning today’s counterinsurgencies."

[Historical/U.S./ToWWI; MI/SpecOps]

Deakin, Frederick William [Sir]. The Embattled Mountain. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971.

"Sir William Deakin, the historian and founding Warden of St Antony's College, Oxford, who died on Saturday aged 91, led the first British military mission to Tito's headquarters." The codename for the mission was "Operation Typical," and it consisted of "a six-man joint SOE-Military Intelligence" team. In leading this mission, Deakin "thereby playing a salient, if enduringly controversial, role in Churchill's decision to abandon the Royalist Cetniks in favour of the Communist Partisans." http://www.telegraph.co.uk, 25 Jan. 2005.

According to Constantinides, the author's story includes "a number of anecdotes or items of intelligence interest."

[WWII/OSS/Yugo]

Deakin, Frederick William [Sir], and G. Richard Storry. The Case of Richard Sorge. New York: Harper & Row, 1966. London: Chatto & Windus, 1966.

According to Pforzheimer, this "account of a leading Soviet [GRU] agent in China and Japan" prior to and during early World War II is written by "two distinguished Oxford scholars" and is based on documents and interviews.

Constantinides says this "is by and large an accurate account." The authors "conclude that they cannot prove or disprove" Schellenberg's assertion that Sorge was connected with German intelligence. See Walter Schellenberg, The Labyrinth: Memoirs of Walter Schellenberg (New York: Harper, 1956).

Writing in 1999, Warren Frank, IJI&C 13.1, notes that this work continues to be "the best and most balanced study of this important Soviet spy."

Bath, NIPQ 20.1, comments that the authors "provide[] a scholarly debunking of some the myths" that had arisen about Sorge.

[Russia/WWII/Sorge][c]

Dean, Joshua. "Intelink: The Real Secret Spy Network." Government Executive, Apr. 2000, 64-67.

Includes comments from director of the Intelink Management Office James Peak and from Intelligence Systems Secretariat head and deputy, Steve Schanzer and Fred Harrision, from whom the idea of a private, classified Internet is said to have originated.

[GenPostwar/00s/Gen]

Deane, Hugh. "The Cold War in Tibet." Covert Action Information Bulletin 29 (Winter 1987): 48-50.

Petersen: "Critical account of CIA support for Tibetan rebels in the 1950s and 1960s."

[CA/Asia; CIA/50s/Gen; CIA/60s/Gen]

Dear, Ian. Escape and Evasion, Prisoner of War Breakouts and the Routes to Safety in World War Two. London: Cassell, 1997.

[UK/WWII/Services/MI9]

Dear, Ian. Sabotage and Subversion: Stories from the Files of the SOE and OSS. London: Arms and Armour, 1996.

Shryock, IJI&C 12.2, notes that the book is more weighted toward SOE's activities than OSS' and more toward Europe than elsewhere. The book is only a "modest" success. Although the author "provides an abundance of stories of high adventure in hostile territory," the book suffers from organization problems. Basically, "[t]here is a confusing lack of causal and chronological order" within the book and within its individual chapters. Dear writes in a "rambling style," with "irrelevant detail" and "dull statistics."

[UK/WWII/Services/SOE; WWII/OSS/Gen]

Dear, James. American Covert Action. Austin, TX: Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of Texas, 1976.

[CA/To80s]

de Arcangelis, Mario. Electronic Warfare: From the Battle of Tsushima to the Falklands. Poole, Dorset, UK: Blandford, 1985.

Dearth, Douglas H. Strategic Intelligence and National Security: A Selected Bibliography. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College Library, 1992.

[RefMats/Bibs/Gen]

Dearth, Douglas, and R. Thomas Goodden, eds. Strategic Intelligence: Theory and Application. 2d ed. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1995.

[Overviews/90s]

Deavours, Cipher A.

DeBardeleben, Joan, and John Hannigan, eds. Environmental Security and Quality After Communism. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994.

[GenPostwar/NatSec/Environment]

Debatto, Dave. Our Generals Don't Even Know Who We Are: How Incompetence, Inattention, and Inefficiency Within U.S. Military Intelligence Has Left America More Vulnerable Than Ever. Nashville, TN: WND/Cumberland Books, 2006.

From publisher: The author, "a former U.S. Army counterintelligence special agent and army instructor who served in Iraq in 2003 during Operation Iraqi Freedom," argues that "the current U.S. Army CI [counterintelligence] force is impotent, demoralized, ineffective, and in poor shape to confront the current growing terrorist threat to the nation." In addition, "the generals have no training or understanding of the abilities of the CI personnel under their command, and they simply refuse to learn." Debatto "offers concrete, easy-to-implement solutions for getting this critical component of the U.S. military branch back on track."

[MI/CI]

De Benouville, Guillain. The Unknown Warriors: A Personal Account of the French Resistance. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1949.

[WWII/Eur/Resistance/Fr]

De Beus, J.G. Tomorrow at Dawn. New York: Norton, 1980.

According to Constantinides, this is the story of how Col. Hans Oster, a senior Abwehr officer, provided the Dutch military attaché in Berlin, Major Sas, information on Hitler's plans to attack in Western Europe after destroying Poland. When the initial warnings were not borne out, the warnings lost credibility and deception was suspected.

[WWII/Eur/Ger]

Debo, Richard K. "Lockhart Plot or Dzerzhinski Plot." Journal of Modern History 43, no. 3 (1971): 413-439.

[Russia; UK/WWI/Lockhart]

DeBose, Brian. "House OKs Intelligence Reform Bill." Washington Times, 8 Dec. 2004. [http://www.washingtontimes.com]

On 7 December 2004, the U.S. House of Representatives approved the Intelligence Reform Act, "a comprehensive overhaul of the nation's intelligence community."

[Reform/00s/04/Debate]

DeBose, Brian. "House Passes Overhaul of Intelligence." Washington Times, 9 Oct. 2004. [http://www.washingtontimes.com]

"The House passed legislation to overhaul the nation's intelligence agencies [on 8 October 2004]. It includes several immigration reforms deemed controversial by House and Senate Democrats, and that could complicate negotiations between the two chambers.... The bill creates a national intelligence director with budget authority over nonmilitary intelligence agencies, a national counterterrorism center and a joint intelligence community council."

[Reform/00/04/Debate]

DeBrosse, Jim, and Colin Burke. The Secret in Building 26: The Untold Story of America's War against the U-Boat Enigma Codes. New York: Random House, 2004.

Seamon, Proceedings, Apr. 2004, notes that Building 26 on the National Cash Register campus in Dayton, Ohio, was where "the electromechanical giants that would help decipher Germany's complex Enigma code" were produced. While "the authors make a determined effort to explain the inner workings of Bombes, the average reader may have a tough time digesting unfamilar details.... But it will be worth the trouble."

For Kruh, Cryptologia 29.2 (Apr. 2005), "[t]his excellent book is highly recommended."

[WWII/Atlantic & Magic]

Return to D Table of Contents

Return to Alphabetical Table of Contents