Jack Davis

 

Davis, Jack. "The Challenge of Managing Uncertainty: Paul Wolfowitz on Intelligence-Policy Relations." Studies in Intelligence 39, no. 5 (1996): 35-42.

This article is based on the author's interview of and other contacts with Ambassador Paul D. Wolfowitz in late 1994 and early 1995. The focus is the interface between analysts and policymakers. "Wolfowitz believes effective management of uncertainty and related challenges to sound decisionmaking requires close cooperation between policy and intelligence officers."

[Analysis/Critiques][c]

Davis, Jack. The Challenge of Opportunity Analysis. Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1992.

[Analysis/Gen][c]

Davis, Jack. "Combating Mind-Set." Studies in Intelligence 36, no. 5 (1992): 33-38.

"Analytic procedures and practices, herein called tradecraft [emphasis in original], that do not ensure against or otherwise combat mind-set put the resultant assessments at high risk of either being wrong or being unread."

[Analysis/T&M]

Davis, Jack. "Improving CIA Analytic Performance: Analysts and the Policymaking Process." Occasional Papers 1, no. 2. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, The Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, Sep. 2002.

"The present paper addresses the challenge of establishing effective analyst-policymaker relations.  It reviews five post-mortem critiques: (1) Douglas J. MacEachin, 'Tradecraft of Analysis,' U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads: Agendas for Reform (1995); (2) Adm. David Jeremiah (R), Intelligence Community’s Performance on the Indian Nuclear Tests (1998); (3) CIA, Office of Inspector General, Alternative Analysis in the Directorate of Intelligence (1999); (4) Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (1998); (5) Working Group on Intelligence Reform of the National Strategy Information Center, The Future of US Intelligence (1996)."

[Analysis/Gen; GenPostwar/Policy/00s]

Davis, Jack. "Improving CIA Analytic Performance: DI Analytic Priorities." Occasional Papers 1, no. 3. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, The Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, Sep. 2002.

"The present paper addresses the challenge of establishing priorities among competing uses of analytic resources (for example, current trend reporting vs. customized “action” analysis vs. in-depth studies).  It reviews five post-mortem critiques: (1) Douglas J. MacEachin, 'Tradecraft of Analysis,' U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads: Agendas for Reform (1995); (2) Adm. David Jeremiah (R), Intelligence Community’s Performance on the Indian Nuclear Tests (1998); (3) CIA, Office of Inspector General, Alternative Analysis in the Directorate of Intelligence (1999); (4) Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (1998); (5) Working Group on Intelligence Reform of the National Strategy Information Center, The Future of US Intelligence (1996)."

[Analysis/Gen]

Davis, Jack. "Improving CIA Analytic Performance: Strategic Warning." Occasional Papers 1, no. 1. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, The Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, Sep. 2002.

"The present paper addresses the challenges of strategic warning.  It reviews five post-mortem critiques: (1) Douglas J. MacEachin, 'Tradecraft of Analysis,' U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads: Agendas for Reform (1995); (2) Adm. David Jeremiah (R), Intelligence Community’s Performance on the Indian Nuclear Tests (1998); (3) CIA, Office of Inspector General, Alternative Analysis in the Directorate of Intelligence (1999); (4) Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (1998); (5) Working Group on Intelligence Reform of the National Strategy Information Center, The Future of US Intelligence (1996)."

[Analysis/Warning]

Davis, Jack. "Intelligence Analysts and Policymakers: Benefits and Dangers of Tensions in the Relationship." Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 6 (Dec. 2006): 999-1021.

This article addresses "general patterns of tensions between intelligence analysts and policy officials in order to provide context for public assessment of the Iraq-Al Qaeda incident when the public record is more complete and enhance understanding of similar future instances of tension."

[Analysis/Gen]

Davis, Jack. "The Kent-Kendall Debate of 1949." Studies in Intelligence 35, no. 2 (Summer 1991): 37-50. Studies in Intelligence 36, no. 5 (1992): 91-103.

Davis, Jack. "A Policymaker's Perspective on Intelligence Analysis." Studies in Intelligence 38, no. 5 (1995): 7-15.

This article is based on the author's interviews in 1991-1993 with Ambassador Robert D. Blackwill. As summed up by Davis, Blackwill's belief is that, "to meet their responsibilities in promoting the national interest, intelligence professionals have to become expert not only on substantive issues but also on serving the self interest of policy professionals by providing specialized analytic support." Blackwill assessed DI analysts thusly: "They were experts on their subjects. They were responsive to my needs. And they did not leak my confidences to the press." Nevertheless, policymakers "do not as a rule know what intelligence analysts can do for them."

[Analysis/Critiques][c]

Davis, Jack. "Sherman Kent and the Profession of Intelligence Analysis." Occasional Papers 1, no. 5. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, The Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, Nov. 2002.

"Of the many individuals who paved a pathway for the development of intelligence analysis as a profession, [Sherman] Kent stands out -- both for his own contributions to analytic doctrine and practice, and for inspiring three generations of analysts to build on his efforts to meet changing times....  If intelligence analysis as a profession has a Founder, the honor belongs to Sherman Kent. This essay: (1) sketches Kent’s pre-CIA background, (2) tries to capture his colorful personality, (3) catalogues his contributions to the profession, (4) sets out his main analytic doctrines, and, finally, (5) outlines some of the unresolved challenges he left for later generations."

[Analysis/T&M/Kent]

Davis, Jack. "Sherman Kent’s Final Thoughts on Analyst-Policymaker Relations." Occasional Papers 2, no. 3. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, The Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, Jun. 2003.

"In a series of post-retirement [post-1967] lectures in training courses for CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency analysts, Kent addressed two recurring challenges in analyst-policymaker relations -- providing warning and analyzing intentions -- that he argued needed fresh examination by each new generation of practitioners.... While he admitted, in his final recorded thoughts on the issues, that his generation had found no failsafe formulas to ensure effective ties, he did point to the general paths that he believed needed to be taken."

[Analysis/T&M/Kent]

Davis, Jack. "Strategic Warning:  If Surprise is Inevitable, What Role for Analysis?." Occasional Papers 2, no. 1. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, The Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, Jan. 2003. [https://www.cia.gov/library/kent-center-occasional-papers/vol2no1.htm]

"Strategic warning addresses perceived dangers in broad[] terms, in order to inform policymaker decisions on general security preparedness.... [T]he challenge of strategic warning is to help policy officials decide -- in advance of specific indicators of danger -- which of the many plausible general threats to US security interests deserve concerted defensive and preemptive preparations."

[Analysis/Warning]

Davis, Jack. "Tensions in Analyst-Policymaker Relations: Opinions, Facts, and Evidence." Occasional Papers 2, no. 2. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, The Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, Jan. 2003.

"Over the decades, influential policymakers, including those who have expressed general satisfaction with DI analytic support, have been critical of DI performance on individual issues central to their policy agendas.  As a rule, the criticism reflects some mixture of the hardball politics of policymaking and pointed tradecraft issues."

[Analysis/Gen]

Davis, Jack, and L. Keith Gardiner. Analytic Support for Peace Talks: An Intelligence Monograph. Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1992.

[Analysis/Gen][c]

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