Darling, Arthur B.
Darling, Arthur B.
1. "The Birth of Central Intelligence." Studies in Intelligence 10, no. 2 (Spring 1966): 1-19.
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/author-combine.htm: "Describes the emergence, during 1944-46, of support for a central intelligence organization, reflecting battles for control among the military, State Department, and the FBI and awareness that a congressional probe of the Pearl Harbor intelligence failure would create pressures for an effective organization."
2. "Central Intelligence Under Souers." Studies in Intelligence 12, no. 1 (Winter 1968): 55-74.
3. "DCI Hillenkoetter: Soft Sell and Stick." Studies in Intelligence 13, no. 1 (Winter 1969): 33-56.
4. "Origins of Central Intelligence." Studies in Intelligence 8, no. 3 (Summer 1964): 55-94.
5. "With Vandenberg as DCI." Studies in Intelligence 12, no. 3 (Summer 1968): 79-98.
6. "With Vandenberg as DCI (Part II)." Studies in Intelligence 12, no. 4 (Fall 1968): 73-94.
[CIA/40s/Gen]
Darling, Arthur
B. The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of Government, to 1950.
University Park, PA: Penn State Press, 1990.
According to Surveillant 1.2, Darling's history of CIA, released to the National Archives in November 1989, "describes how the State Department, FBI and armed services hampered the CIA in its infancy by bickering about authority over covert activities and other operations. Written in 1953, the history was deemed 'controversial' and fell into disfavor with DCI Dulles, who limited access to it."
Theoharis, AHR, Apr. 1993, notes that Darling's account is "[f]ar more detailed and comprehensive than the reports published in 1976 by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities." This work is "a major contribution to the literature on the origins and evolution of the CIA. It is not, however, the definitive history, and its value to specialists is limited by its research base and partisanship."
For Grose, FA 70.2, the Darling history is an "authoritative account of the bureaucratic struggles that led in 1947 to the establishment of the CIA, and the ensuing battles for turf among the military services, the State Department and the controversial new agency."
Lowenthal says this "somewhat dry bureaucratic history" is enhanced by an "interesting discussion of the role and function of intelligence."
MacPherson, I&NS 10.2, comments on the "rather dense and sometimes confusingly structured text," and notes that "[t]he authority and autonomy of the first three DCIs ... remained restricted by outside opposition and obstruction." The Dulles-Jackson-Correa review was presented by Darling as essentially hostile to the concept of a centralized intelligence system.
Thomas Powers, NYRB (13 May 1993) and Intelligence Wars (2004), 295-320, sees Darling providing "a thorough account of the founding of the Office of Policy Coordination, the CIA's covert arm, whose chief was to be named by the Secretary of State and approved by the National Security Council, so long as he was 'acceptable' to the Director of Central Intelligence."
Pforzheimer, http://www.cloakanddagger.com/dagger/ciabib.txt, does not recommend this book, because "it really doesn't measure up to a desired standard," an assessment that seems overly harsh given the broad utility of Darling's work.
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