Daranciang, Nelson. "Accused Spy in Pretrial Hearings." Star-Bulletin (Honolulu), 10 Jan. 2009. [http://www.starbulletin.com]
Daranciang, Nelson. "Accused Spy in Pretrial Hearings." Star-Bulletin (Honolulu), 10 Jan. 2009. [http://www.starbulletin.com]
On 9 January 2009, a federal court in Honolulu heard pretrial motions in the criminal trial of Noshir Gowadia on charges "of selling secrets about the B-2 bomber to China, trying to sell military secrets to other countries, money laundering and making false statements. His trial is scheduled for April."
[SpyCases/U.S./Other]
Darcy, Mary. "Parole Boston, Countersign St. Patrick." Newsletter of the
Revolutionary War Bicentennial Commission, Committee of Correspondence
8 (Mar. 1968) and 9 (Jun. 1969). [Petersen]
Hercules Mulligan
[RevWar]
Dareini, Ali Akbar, ed.. The Rise and Fall of the Pahlavi Dynasty: Memoirs of Former General Hussein Fardust. New Delhi: Motilal Babarsisass, 1999.
Peake, Studies 50.3 (Sep. 2006) and Intelligencer 15.2 (Fall-Winter 2006-2007), identifies Fardust as "a childhood friend" of the Shah and "one of the few non-family members Reza trusted throughout his life." He later headed "the Special Information Bureau, an organization akin to Britain's Joint Intelligence Committee.... At one point he was also deputy chief of the SAVAK ... and was responsible for its reorganization.... There are several chapters on Iran's intelligence services in which their organization and operations are described in greater detail than in any other English-language source."
[OtherCountries/Iran]
Darling, Donald.
1. Secret Sunday. London: William Kimber, 1975.
According to Constantinides, Darling headed MI9's Gibralter operations 1940-1944. He "is good at describing how an E&E operation was conducted and is quite informative on embassy-intelligence relations."
2. Sunday at Large. London: William Kimber, 1977.
Constantinides finds this to be a "pleasant collection of anecdotes from Darling's days on Gibralter." Darling's stories show "the big and little events in an intelligence officer's life."
[UK/WWII/Med & Services/MI9]
Darnton,
John. "The Spy for a Spy Showdown: Russia Expels Four, So Does Britain."
New York Times, 18 May 1996, A4.
[UK/PostCW]
Darrock, Michael,
and Joseph P. Dorn. "Davis and Goliath: The OWI and Its Gigantic Assignment."
Harper's, Feb. 1943, 225-237. [Winkler]
[WWII/PsyWar]
Data: Magazine of Military RDT&E Management. Editors. "Aerial Reconnaissance." 10 (Apr. 1965), 7-41. [Petersen]
[Recon/Imagery]
Data: Magazine of Military RDT&E Management. Editors.
1. "Reconnaissance and Surveillance." 11, no. 4 (1967): 6-10. [Petersen]
2. "Reconnaissance and Surveillance." 12 (Apr. 1967): 11-63. [Petersen]
[Recon/Sats]
Daubney, David, et al., eds. How Is Canada Changing after September 11th? Montreal: Les Editions Themis, 2002.
[Canada/PostCW]
Daugherty, Anne. Creation of NIMA. Occasional Paper No. 9. Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, 2001.
AFIO WIN 20-01, 21 May 2001, quotes reviewer Joe Mazzafro as calling this paper "a well written 23 page tract plus numerous interesting appendices that traces establishment of NIMA in 1996.... Besides seeing how much time it took to get NIMA established, I was also struck how the process changed and shaped NIMA from what was originally envisioned."
[MI/NIMA]
Daugherty, William
E., and Morris Janowitz. A Psychological Warfare Casebook. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1958.
In particular, see Daugherty's article on "U.S. Psychological Warfare Organizations in World War II," pp. 126-136.
[WWII/PsyWar]
Daugherty, William J. "Approval and Review of Covert Action Programs since Reagan." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 17, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 62-80.
"Since the Reagan years, the covert action approval and review processes have been such that (a) there is no possibility of a 'rogue' operation by the CIA, and (b) lawyers are present at every stage to insure that constitutional requirements, federal statutes, executive orders, and internal agency regulations are fully complied with."
[CA; Oversight/00s]
Daugherty, William J. "Behind the Intelligence Failure in Iran." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 14, no. 4 (Winter 2001-2002): 449-484.
This article reflects an excellent understanding of both high-level policy concerns and policy-executing actions in Washington and Tehran, and is recommended reading for anyone wanting a no-frills look at what went wrong (and why) for the United States in Iran in 1978-1979. Daugherty finds that the roots of Washington's problems lie "in reasons reflective of previous policy decisions, routine bureaucratic actions having nothing to do with Iran per se, and the inherent difficulty of understanding the crisis itself. Nonetheless, even when these external causes are dissected, the final result remains unchanged: The intelligence community did not serve the President well."
[GenPostwar/70s/Iran]
Daugherty, William J. Executive Secrets: Covert Action and the Presidency. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2004.
Clark comment: Although the author works much too hard in making his point that covert action is a tool of U.S. Presidents, not just of the CIA, this is a fine book of great value to any future discussion of the role of covert action in the making and implementing of American national security policy. It is, however, terribly thin on discussion of the Presidents since Reagan, an effect no doubt of the fact that Daugherty knew too much for the CIA to clear any references to unacknowledged actions. If I were teaching a national security or intelligence-related course at this time, Executive Secrets would be of great assistance.
Periscope 26.1 (2004), notes that the author "provides an overview of the nature and proper use of covert action as a tool of presidential statecraft and discusses its role in transforming presidential foreign policy into reality." For Brown, I&NS 20.4 (Dec. 2005), the author's "approach is logical and lucid." He argues that covert action operations represent "viable foreign policy options" undertaken at the direction of the President. This "is a very timely and useful examination of a controversial, but necessary[,] aspect of foreign policy."
Peake, Studies 50.2 (2006), notes that in examining "covert action policies and operations in each administration from Truman to Clinton," the author "shows that the level of activity varied more with international turmoil of the moment than with the party in power." Daugherty argues that covert action will "continue as an instrument of presidential policy when conventional methods short of war are unsuccessful," and he "provides ample justification for this position while illuminating this contentious topic with facts. This is a fine textbook and a valuable contribution."
[CA/00s; GenPostwar/Policy/00s]
Daugherty, William
J. "A First Tour Like No Other." Studies in Intelligence, Spring 1998, 1-45. Studies in Intelligence: 45th Anniversary Special Edition, Fall 2000.
The author was a first-tour CIA Directorate of Operations officer who was among those taken hostage at the U.S. Embassy in Teheran. This is a highly readable account of Daugherty's 444 days of captivity, most of it in solitary confinement. If you care about the human side of the hostage situation, this is a good place to begin.
[GenPostwar/70s/Iran]
Daugherty, William J. In the Shadow of the Ayatollah: A CIA Hostage in Iran. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001.
According to Bath, NIPQ 18.1, most of this work "deals with Daugherty's 444-day incarceration, much of which was in solitary confinement, and his intensive interrogation." However, the author opens with some stagesetting chapters, including one entitled "Intelligence Failure." He "finds that the problems lay more in policies in Washington than failures in the field.... Washington's lack of concern was made clear by the low priority it assigned to collection on Iran."
Stempel, American Diplomacy 8.3 (2003), says that this "book is well-written, well-organized, and concise. The author's balanced account is informative, direct, and clear. Though one often wishes for more depth on certain points, the book is not a definitive history of the hostage crisis, but rather an excellent individual effort to put the crisis into the context of American life at the time."
[GenPostwar/70s/Iran]
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