Curl, Joseph. "Bush Signs Intelligence Orders." Washington Times, 28 Aug. 2004. [http://www.washingtontimes.com]
Curl, Joseph. "Bush Signs Intelligence Orders." Washington Times, 28 Aug. 2004. [http://www.washingtontimes.com]
On 27 August, 2004, President Bush signed a executive order "to expand the power of the CIA director.... [T]he president temporarily granted to the CIA director many of the functions of [the 9/11] commission-proposed national intelligence director." According to a senior administration official, the move gives "the CIA director temporary authority over budgetary issues at the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Reconnaissance Office....
Bush signed another executive order creating "a new National Counterterrorism Center (NCC) tasked with enhancing information sharing among intelligence agencies. That order says the center will 'serve as the primary organization in the United States government for analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the United States government pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism.' The CIA director -- whom the order designates as the president's principal adviser on intelligence matters -- will appoint the NCC director, with the approval of the president, and oversee the new agency."
[CIA/00s/04/Gen; CIA/DCIs/Gen; DNI/NCTC; Reform/00s/04/Debate]
Current Digest
of the Post-Soviet Press, 29 Dec. 1999, 25-26, carries condensations
of two articles from the Russian press:
1. Maksim Yusin, Izvestia, 1 Dec. 1999, says that "the spy scandal between Russia and the US hasn't come about by accident.... Foreign agents ... are kept under surveillance for months, sometimes years. And if the fact of their discovery is shouted from the rooftops, you can be sure it's because the political leadership gave orders to that effect."
2. Sergei Sokut, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 1 Dec. 1999, 1-2, notes that according to "sources," the arrest of Cheri Leberknight "was the result of a lengthy FSB [Russian Federal Security Service] counterintelligence operation."
[Russia/99/U.S.Spy]
Current Digest
of the Post-Soviet Press, 23 Feb. 2000, 22-23, carries condensations
of three articles from the Russian press:
1. Maksim Yusin, Izvestia, 22 Jan. 2000, says that this "conflict could have been avoided had there been any such desire.... Someone simply ordered this up for political reasons ... (a presidential election [in Poland] is coming up)."
2. Igor Korotchenko, Nexavisimaya gazeta, 22 Jan. 2000, 1-2, notes that "with the Polish Republic now a member of NATO, the Warsaw stations of Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) and Chief Intelligence Administration (GRU) will be operating in an environment of greatly intensified counterintelligence measures.... In all likelihood, leads on Russian intelligence operatives in Warsaw were provided by a Western special service -- the CIA or [Britain's] Secret Intelligence Service, for example -- that has a mole either in Yasenevo [SVR headquarters in southwestern Moscow] or in one of the SVR's European stations."
3. Igor Korotchenko, Nexavisimaya gazeta, 25 Jan. 2000, 1, reports the reciprocal expulsion of nine Polish diplomats by the Russian authorities.
[OtherCountries/Poland]
Currer-Briggs,
Noel. "Some of Ultra's Poor Relations in Algeria, Tunisia, Sicily and
Italy." Intelligence and National Security 2, no. 2 (Apr. 1987):
274-290.
The author worked on breaking "German double-Playfair military, SS and police hand-ciphers" at both Bletchley Park and in the Mediterranean theater of operations from the autumn of 1941 to the summer of 1944. The article is based on personal recollections; there are no footnotes.
[Sexton misspells the author's name as "Currier-Briggs" and misdescribes the article as involving "an American Sigint unit in the Mediterranean in 1942-1943."]
[UK/WWII/Med]
Currier, Prescott.
"My 'Purple' Trip to England in 1941." Cryptologia 20,
no. 3 (Jul. 1996): 193-201.
The author was a member of the team that traveled, Purple machine in hand, to GC&CS at Bletchley Park in January 1941. He argues that the trip was a great success: "Even though we did not in fact bring back an Enigma, we brought back all the information we really wanted and there was never any question that anyone was holding anything from us."
[WWII/Magic/Coop]
Curry, Jack C. The Security Service, 1908-1945: The Official History. London: Public
Record Office, 1999.
West, The Spectator, 2 Oct. 1999, notes that this work was written at the end of World War II and only now has been declassified and released to the PRO. Curry prepared "a comprehensive history tracing MI5's origins back to before the first world war.... [This] is a candid chronology of MI5's inability to cope with German spies before the second world war, and Soviet spies generally."
[UK/Overviews/90s]
Curry, Richard
O. "The Union as It Was: A Critique of Recent Interpretations of the
'Copperheads.'" Civil War History 13 (1967): 25-39.
[CivWar]
Curry, Richard
O., and F. Gerald Ham. "The Bushwhackers' War: Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency
in West Virginia." Civil War History 10, no. 4 (Dec. 1964):
416-433.
By early September 1861, northwestern Virginia was in Union hands, but "guerrilla bands were fashioning an indigenous resistance movement" that would challenge Union control. "[T]he war in western Virginia changed into a bitter internecine struggle in which guerrilla tactics were ingeniously devised and brilliantly executed."
The article ties together contemporaneous reports with narrative to follow this war within a war. In the end, the authors conclude that "the real military and political advantages gained by the Confederacy in waging guerrilla war were minimal." The Union forces retained control of the main lines of communication and elections went forward in furtherance of the statehood movement.
[CivWar][c]
Curts, Bob. "U.S.
Grant Goes to Shiloh: More Thoughts on Warning and Surprise." Naval
Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 5, no. 1 (Winter 1989): 5-8.
[CivWar]
Curts, Bob. "A
Warning That Worked: The British Foil Napoleon's Grab for Three Fleets."
Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 9, no. 2 (Apr. 1993):
9-12.
[UK/Historical][c]
Curts, Bob. "Was
Admiral Layton Too Hard on Himself? Some Thoughts on Warning and Surprise."
Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 3, no. 3 (1987): 4-5.
[WWII/PearlHarbor]
Cushman,
Jack. "Space Shuttle Explosion Throws Military Programs into Disarray."
Defense Week, 3 Feb. 1986, 2-4. [Petersen]
[Recon/Sats/Arts]
Cushman, John H., Jr. "Panel Describes Long Weakening of Hussein Army." New York Times, 11 Jul. 2004. [http://www.nytimes.com]
"The Senate's report on prewar intelligence about Iraq, which asserts that warnings about its illicit weapons were largely unfounded and that its ties to Al Qaeda were tenuous, also undermines another justification for the war: that Saddam Hussein's military posed a threat to regional stability and American interests. In a detailed discussion of Iraq's prewar military posture, the report cites a long series of intelligence reports in the decade before the war that described a formerly potent army's spiral of decay under the pressures of economic sanctions and American military pressure."
[GenPostCW/00s/03/04/Committee]
Cuthbert, Norma
B., ed. Lincoln and the Baltimore Plot, 1861, from Pinkerton Records
and Related Papers. San Marino, CA: Huntington Library, 1949. [Petersen]
[CivWar]
Cutler, Richard. Counterspy: Memoirs of a Counterintelligence Officer in World War II and the Cold War. Washington, DC: Brassey's, 2004.
According to Periscope 26.1 (2004), the author "describes his career with the super-secret X-2 counterintelligence branch" of OSS and "his postwar counterespionage work with its successor, the War Department's Strategic Services Unit (SSU)." Cutler "provides an insightful overview of OSS operations during the war." He also worked in counterespionage in Berlin in the early postwar years.
OSS Society Newsletter (Winter 2004-2005), says that Cutler "offers a rare firsthand account of the secret war against Hitler and the postwar competition with the Soviets for German intelligence assets."
For DKR, AFIO WIN 35-04 (27 Sep. 2004), this is a "remarkable account of espionage during the hot war and the beginning of the Cold War." The author "sets out previously unpublished case histories of double agents in Berlin and gives details of recruitment, missions, methods and the fates that followed from success or failure."
Bath, NIPQ 21.2 (Jun. 2005), comments that "[w]e learn little about counterintelligence tradecraft from the stories Cutler tells about agent handling, but a great deal about the attitudes of the conquered Germans and of life in Berlin in the immediate post-war devastation."
To Ruffner, Studies 49.3 (2005), this "is an invigorating account"; it "is not only good reading, but also perhaps the only firsthand account of X-2 operations in Berlin at the dawn of the Cold War. The author provides "an excellent introduction to this confusing period. A keen observer during his travels throughout Europe, he provides insights into life during and after the war and how the local population reacted to the American presence."
West, IJI&C 19.2 (Summer 2006), finds that the author's "value lies in his matter-of-fact descriptions of his agents, and the successes, failures, he experienced." His "version of the famous CICERO case ... is deeply flawed.... But this episode is a rare example in Cutler's narrative of straying frpm his own first-hand experience."
[GenPostwar/40s/Gen; WWII/OSS/Indiv]
Cutler, Robert. "Intelligence as Foundation for Policy." Studies in Intelligence 3, no. 4 (Fall 1959): 59-71.
"Describes, from the viewpoint of President Eisenhower's Special Assistant for National Security, how the National Security Council and its subordinate boards use current and estimative intelligence in the formulation of policy."
[GenPostwar/Policy/Thru79]
Czajkowski, Anthony
F. "Techniques of Domestic Intelligence Collection." Studies
in Intelligence 3, no. 1 (Winter 1959): 69-83. In Inside CIA's Private
World: Declassified Articles from the Agency's Internal Journal, 1955-1992,
ed. H. Bradford Westerfield, 51-62. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1995.
The focus here is on gathering information from U.S. businesspeople, scientists, and academicians with contacts or who travel in denied areas, and from refugees who have settled in the United States. The article was written while this activity was still handled by Contact Division of the old Office of Operations. There are some good, common-sense thoughts about information elicitation expressed here.
[CIA/C&C/Tradecarft][c]
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