CSIS Task Force on Homeland Security. Meeting the Challenges of Establishing a New Department of Homeland Security: A CSIS White Paper. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2002. Available at: http://www.csis.org/features/hamrefinalpaper.pdf.
From "Preface": "We firmly believe that it is in the interest of all Americans for the creation of a new Department of Homeland Security to succeed. America remains vulnerable to catastrophic terrorism. Too many of the security procedures instituted since September 11, 2001 have provided too little security often because of the lack of a central, coordinated framework for efficient government action. The President's proposal has the promise to improve this situation enormously. But in our view, important issues must be clarified and resolved if the initiative is to realize its full potential and America is to become more secure. We also believe the plan is missing some key pieces that need to be addressed."
CTK. "Czech Civilian Intelligence To Be Reinforced by 46 New Employees." Ceskenoviny, 17 Mar. 2008. [http://www.ceskenoviny.cz]
On 17 March 2008, the Czech government approved the plan of Interior Minister Ivan Langer to reinforce the civilian intelligence service (UZSI) by adding seven new experts to the intelligence anti-terrorist section, and another 39 to the section dealing with energy, economic, and IT security.
Cubbage, T.L., II. "The German Misapprehensions Regarding Overlord: Understanding Failure in the Estimative Process." Intelligence and National Security 2, no. 3 (Jul. 1987): 114-174.
The author notes that "[t]he Germans certainly expected the Grosslandung; and yet, the critical details of their expectations simply were wrong." His follow-on analysis addresses the "ten very common factors ... [that], alone and in combination, formed significant blocks to the ability of the Germans to perceive correctly the Allied intentions."
Cubbage, T.L., II. "The Success of Operation Fortitude: Hesketh's History of Strategic Deception." Intelligence and National Security 2, no. 3 (Jul. 1987): 327-346.
The reference in the article's title is to an unpublished manuscript by Col. Roger Fleetwood Hesketh, "FORTITUDE: A History of Strategic Deception in North Western Europe -- April, 1943 to May, 1945." The author calls this "the definitive history of how the deception Operation Fortitude South was accomplished."
Cubbage, T.L., II. "Westmoreland vs. CBS: Was Intelligence Corrupted by Policy Demands?" Intelligence and National Security 3, no. 3 (Jul. 1988): 118-180.
Cull, Nicholas J. The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Gregory, NWCR 62.2 (Spring 2009), says this is "a well written account grounded in twelve years of archival research and more than a hundred interviews with practitioners" and "will be the gold standard in scholarship on USIA." The author "brings a scholar's discipline, a wealth of empirical evidence, and arm's-length perspective to his analysis." Nevertheless, he provides "critical judgments on USIA's successes and failures." On the downside, he "gives (as he recognizes) disproportionate attention to Washington, USIA's directors, and broadcast media."
Cull, Nicholas John. Selling War: The British Campaign against American "Neutrality" in World War II. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.
Rawnsley, I&NS 12.2, comments that the author reminds readers that "the sustained British propaganda" using "every conceivable method -- overt and covert --" had, by Pearl Harbor, "created a climate where the idea of involvement might flourish.... This is a populist history, a readable story elegantly written." For Kearney, Air & Space Power, this is an "enlightening, informative, and important" work. The author "skillfully ... documents the information campaign that our ally waged from 1937 through 1941."
[UK/WWII/Overviews; WWII/Gen & Psywar]
Cullather, Nick. "Bombing at the Speed of Thought: Intelligence in the Coming Age of Cyberwar." Intelligence and National Security 18, no. 4 (Winter 2003): 141-154.
"The intelligence community should share the historicists' concerns" that the wired military ("Battlespace") "tailors perception and decision to suit military requirements. In the mass of documentation on the RMA [Revolution in Military Affairs], there is little indication that the virtual battlespace will be visible to the president, cabinet, congress, or indeed any civilian."
Cullather, Nicholas. Operation PBSUCCESS: The United States and Guatemala, 1952-1954. Washington, DC: History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1994. [Available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB4/cia-guatemala5_b.html] Also published as: Nick Cullather, Secret History: The CIA's Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999).
Clark comment: This is the declassified and redacted version of the history written by the author while a member of the CIA's history staff. It was released in 1997, along with other CIA documents on the Guatemalan operation.
Grandin, The Nation, 22 May 2000, views the work as "a fascinating play-by-play account of the CIA's most well-known secret operation.... Limited by its exclusive reliance on CIA documents, Secret History contributes little to the debate as to whether President Eisenhower acted primarily to defend the economic interests of the United Fruit Company ... or to stem the growing influence of Communists in the Guatemalan government."
On the other hand, Ching, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 42.1 (Spring 2000), sees the author "downplay[ing] the role of the United Fruit Company," and supporting the view that "[a]nticommunism drove U.S. policy." Additionally, Cullather views the overthrow of Arbenz as the result of "an internal military coup," rather than a reflection of the effects of PBSUCCESS. Overall, the reviewer is positive about Cullather's work, referring to "a short, crisp, fact-based narrative" and "lucid and intriguing conclusions."
Gambone, Journal of Military History, 64.1 (Jan. 2000), highly recommends this work, calling it "a lucid account of the perceptions and subsequent actions of a host of players." Nevertheless, the author "offers little in the way of new insights into the fundamental motives and concerns of the Intelligence community." Weis, Choice, Feb. 2000, sees this as "a well-written and cogent narrative." In addition, Cullather "is excellent at placing the story in its larger Cold War context and in discussing the myriad workings of bureaucratic politics, both inter- and intra-agency."
For Montesclaros, H-War, H-Net Reviews [http://www.h-net.org], Jul. 2008, this book "is concise, detailed, and eminently readable, although some may find the redacted portions a minor distraction.... Perhaps Cullather's greatest contribution to the existing literature is his portrayal of all aspects of the operation from the perspective of the frontline CIA case officers who worked the details.... [The author] notes that psychological operations were particularly effective in Guatemala and contributed largely to the operation's success. Thus, covert paramilitary operations ... was just one element of power employed in the strategy for PBSUCCESS."
See also, Anna Kasten Nelson, "History with Holes: The CIA Reveals Its Past," Diplomatic History 22, no.3: 503-508.
Cullen, Peter M. "The Role of Targeted Killing in the Campaign against Terror." Joint Force Quarterly 48 (1st Quarter 2008): 22-29.
The author concludes that "a carefully circumscribed policy of targeted killing can be a legal, moral, and effective tool in a counterterror campaign. Procedures to guide the proper implementation of a U.S. policy of targeted killing are proposed."
Cullop, Charles Painter. Confederate Propaganda in Europe, 1861-1865. Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Press, 1969.
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