Corni - Corz

 

Cornick, Martyn. "The BBC and the Propaganda War against Occupied France: The Work of Émile Delavenay and the European Intelligence Department." French History 8, no. 33 (1994): 316-354.

[WWII/PsyWar]

Cornick, Martyn, and Peter Morris, compilers. The French Secret Services: A Selected Bibliography. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1993. The French Secret Services. Vol. 6 in the International Organizations Series. Oxford: Clio Press, 1993.

[France/RefMats]

Cornioley, Pearl Witherington.

1. Ed., Kathryn J. Atwood. Code Name Pauline: Memoirs of a WWII Special Agent. Chicago: Chicago Review Press, 2013.

This is the author's memoir of service with SOE in France.

2. "Pauline." Lamotte-Beuvron: Imprimerie Autrive, 1996.

This is the French version, published previously, of the above memoir. Foot, I&NS 12.4, notes that this series of talks between "an Englishwoman far beyond the ordinary" and a French journalist certainly does not constitute an autobiography; nor does it substitute for a full-fledged biography. Nevertheless, Pearl Witherington Cornioley does describe her 18 months of field work with SOE in France. She was part of Maurice Southgate's "Stationer" circuit and, after Southgate's capture by the Germans, ran her own small resistance circuit.

3. See also, Carole Seymour-Jones, She Landed by Moonlight: The Story of Secret Agent Pearl Witherington; "the real Charlotte Gray" (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2013).

Peake, Studies 59.1 (Mar. 2015), finds that this work provides "much greater detail" than Cornioley's memoir, including "a great deal about [her] operational life in the resistance." Additionally, "there is more context on the conduct of the war as it affected the resistance."

[UK/WWII/SOE; Women/WWII/UK]

Cornish, Kimberley. The Jew of Linz. London: Century, Random House, 1998.

West, History 26.4, notes that the author "alleges that [philosopher Ludwig] Wittgenstein was a Marxist and identifies him as a central figure [the 'fifth man'] in the Cambridge spy ring: the talent spotter and recruiter.... The central thesis for The Jew of Linz is that virtually everything Philby and Blunt ever said regarding their controller should be disbelieved, unless it happens to support the author's interpretation. Alas, his research failed to take him to Moscow, where the KGB files tell quite a different story."

[UK/SpyCases/Debate]

Cornish, Paul. "Weapons and Equipment of the Special Operations Executive." In Special Operations Executive: A New Instrument of War, ed. Mark Seaman, 22-32. London: Routledge, 2005.

[UK/WWII/Services/SOE; WWII/OSS/Topics/Weapons]

Cornog, Douglas. Unconventional Warfare: A Bibliography of Bibliographies. Washington. DC: GPO, 1964. [Petersen]

[MI/SpecOps/Ref]

Cornwell, Susan. "UK Pressed for Answers as Third Spy Accused." Reuters, 18 Sep. 1999.

"Britain's opposition demanded an explanation from the government on [18 September 1999] after the third Briton [Robin Pearson, a lecturer at Hull University] in a week was unmasked as a spy for the old Soviet bloc.... [A] Home Office spokeswoman said [Home Secretary Jack] Straw did not plan a statement. She said Straw had first learned of the Pearson case last weekend."

[UK/SpyCases/99/Fever]

Corpora, Christopher A. "The Stone and Quarry: Intelligence Studies in a Dynamic Global Environment." American Intelligence Journal 25, no. 2 (Winter 2007-2008): 12-23.

The author suggests "ways for intelligence studies to become a fuller research program that reflects on the profession and its observers." He argues for "a broader, multidisciplinary approach that aims to test fundamental assumptions."

[RefMats/Teaching]

Correll, John T.  "War in Cyberspace."  Air Force Magazine, Jan. 1998, 32-36.

[GenPostwar/InfoWar]

Corson, William R. The Armies of Ignorance: The Rise of the American Intelligence Empire. New York: Dial Press/James Wade, 1977.

Petersen comments that this book is "[m]uch better than its title suggests." Focusing on the middle portion of this book, Constantinides notes that it "covers the political and legal bases, the struggles for control, the incessant political and bureaucratic quarrels and maneuvering, and the evolving relationships within the intelligence community and between it and the executive branch and Congress."

According to the NameBase reviewer, the "first half of this book is a history of U.S. intelligence from World War I up to the formation of the CIA in 1947, and the last 100 pages deal with the Revolutionary War up to World War I. This left about 200 pages in the middle that covered 30 years of CIA history.... Corson, an able academic historian and former intelligence professional..., brought his considerable experience and many inside contacts to bear on this discussion of intelligence issues."

[Overviews/U.S./Older]

Corson, William R. "Dossier on the CIA." Penthouse, Sep. 1971, 33-39.

Petersen: "Argues that CIA has exceeded its intended role."

[CIA/70s]

Corson, William R., and Robert T. Crowley. The New KGB: Engine of Soviet Power. New York: Morrow, 1985.

Evaluating this work's account of the Kalamatiano case (1918-1921), Foglesong, I&NS 6.1/180/fn. 2, says that the authors' "largely undocumented tale [pp. 47-64] includes glaring factual errors, makes assertions which are contradicted by records of the case, and involves a great deal of creative writing."

[Russia; WWI/U.S./Kalamatiano]

Corson, William R., Susan B. Trento, and Joseph J. Trento. Widows. New York: Crown, 1989.

Petersen says this ia an "[u]nreliable treatment of the [James] Kronthal, Paisley, Shadrin, and Sigler cases," while NameBase comments that "if the names John Paisley (134 pages), Nicholas Shadrin (155 pages), and Ralph Sigler (131 pages) don't mean anything to you, then [this book] might not be useful."

For Naftali, I&NS 6.1, Widows "betrays the hands of some embittered former intelligence officers ... [who] share the conviction that the Soviets had a high-level penetration in the US government in the 1960s and 1970s.... This book should be approached with care.... [T]here is no reason to believe that the authors have got the story right." Bagley, Spy Wars (2007), 299/fn.3, refers to the "basic errors and vacuous speculation" with regard to Shadrin contained in this work.

[CIA/Accusations]

Corum, James S. Fighting the War on Terror: A Counterinsurgency Strategy. St. Paul, MN: Zenith, 2007.

Longino, Proceedings 133.7 (Jul. 2007), says that the author "presents a well-researched and thought-provoking analysis of what must be done to respond and why" to a type of warfare in Iraq "that arguably took many military professionals by surprise."

[MI/SpecOps/00s; Terrorism/00s]

Corum, James S. [LTCOL/USAR (Ret.)] "On Airpower, Land Power, and Counterinsurgency: Getting Doctrine Right." Joint Force Quarterly 49 (2nd Quarter 2008): 93-97.

FM 3–24 keeps "the discussion of the various aspects of military operations in counterinsurgency ... to basic theory and guidelines. The doctrine was addressed to the strategic planner and operator and was not intended as a guide to the employment of specific technologies and tactics.... What the doctrine does stress is the need to understand the context of counterinsurgency and how airpower fits into that context."

[MI/AF/00s; MI/SpecOps/00s]

Corum, James S., and Wray R. Johnson. Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2003.

[MI/AF/SpecOps]

Corvo, Max. The OSS in Italy 1942-1945: A Personal Memoir. New York: Praeger, 1990.

Surveillant 1.1 comments that Corvo, who was "chief of OSS operations in Italy during the Italian campaign, details the work of the Italian Secret Intelligence Section, its relationship to other parts of the Intelligence Community, and the impact of its operations on postwar US-Italian relations." He reveals "several operations that have not been discussed publicly before." MacPherson, I&NS 6.3, calls this a "detailed, if sometimes myopic, narrative of the intelligence war in the Italian theatre." Although it is "lacking in analytical perspective," Corvo has made "a useful addition to the existing histories of the OSS and wartime Allied intelligence."

According to Ugino, MI 19.2, the book is an "'upclose and personal' look at how operations were planned and carried out.... Using first-generation Italian-Americans and Italian exiles, OSS built Italian SI into a first class intelligence gathering tool.... Corvo effectively draws a picture of the turf battle that emerged after World War II that would eventually give birth to the CIA.... The only criticism of Corvo's book is the lack of a concluding chapter to tie together lessons learned."

[WWII/Eur/Italy; WWII/OSS/OtherOps][c]

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