Sarah-Jane Corke

 

Corke, Sarah-Jane. "The Eisenhower Administration and Psychological Warfare." Intelligence and National Security 24, no. 2 (Apr. 2009): 277-290.

This is a "Review Article" on works by Gati, Failed Illusions (2006); Osgood, Total War (2006); and Tudda, Truth Is Our Weapon (2006). However, the author's narrative on the subject makes it worth reading for its own sake.

[CA/PsyOps; GenPostwar/50s/Gen]

Corke, Sarah-Jane. "George Kennan and the Inauguration of Political Warfare." Journal of Conflict Studies 26, no. 1 (Summer 2006): 98-117.

[CA/To80s & PsyOps]]

Corke, Sarah-Jane. "History, Historians and the Naming of Foreign Policy: A Postmodern Reflection on American Strategic Thinking during the Truman Administration." Intelligence and National Security 16, no. 3 (Autumn 2001): 146-163.

The author argues that "by labeling US Cold War policy 'containment,' historians have simplified a complex phenomena to such an extent that there is very little correspondence between the word and the historical reality it purports to describe."

[GenPostwar/40s]

Corke, Sarah-Jane. U.S. Covert Operations and Cold War Strategy: Truman, Secret Warfare, and the CIA, 1945-53. London: Routledge, 2007.

Clark comment: Although this work suffers from some of the problems that arise when dissertations are converted into books (primarily that all events are construed to fit the writer's argument), it is nevertheless an interesting and useful presentation about the early years of the Cold War as they played out in the Truman administration.

For Daugherty, I&NS 25.1 (Feb. 2010), this "is an exceptionally informative work, impressively researched and cogently written." However, it "is not light reading... The work is quite detailed," and "omit[s] general explanatory background." It also "assumes the reader has at least a fair knowledge of American foreign policy and the world situation during the years covered."

Dujmovic, Studies 54.1 (Mar. 2010), says that readers will "find useful [Corke's] summary of the historiography of the Cold War," and "[s]he is excellent on the internal organizational and cultural divisions and feuds between the collectors of human intelligence ... and the covert action operators." However, the reviewer disagrees with the author with regard to "her repeated downplaying ... of the external Soviet or international communist threat in the development of US Cold War policies." Despite "some factual errors" and "careless mistakes," this work is still "a valuable contribution to the history of CIA's covert action mission."

[CA/To79; CIA/40s/Gen]

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