Coon, Carleton S. North Africa Story: An Anthropologist as OSS Agent, 1941-1943. Ipswich, MA: Gambit,1980.
Chambers feels that Coon "manages to get a handle on the harsher aspects of OSS in the field that others have avoided." Constantinides notes that the work "discusses the wide range of activities Coon had to perform and shows U.S. intelligence in the early stage of learning its craft."
Coon, Thomas F. "New York City and DIO-3ND in World War II." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 11, no. 1 (Winter 1995): 7-8.
The author offers a personal feel for the people and activities of the Third Naval District Naval Intelligence Office.
Cooper, Barry. CFIS : A Foreign Intelligence Service for Canada. Calgary: Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, 2007. At: http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/CFIS.pdf.
"Canada's post-Cold War enemies are hidden, and Canada's diplomatic and military allies have remained economic competitors. On those grounds alone, Canada needs a Foreign Intelligence Service, CFIS, with a mandate similar to that given CSIS in the area of domestic or security intelligence."
Cooper, Chester L. "The CIA and Decision-Making." Foreign Affairs 50 (Jan. 1972): 223-236.
Petersen identifies the author as a "former CIA officer."
Cooper, Chester L., et al. The American Experience with Pacification in Vietnam: An Overview, Volumes I-III. Arlington VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 1972. [Ahern]
Cooper, H. H. "English Missions." Studies in Intelligence 5, no. 2 (Spring 1961): A43-A50.
Deals with the 18 years of clandestine work in England by John Gerard, S.J., beginning with a covert landing on the beach in 1588.
Cooper, H.H.A. "Terrorism and the Intelligence Function." In International Terrorism in the Contemporary World, eds. Marius H. Livingston, Lee Bruce Kress, and Marie G. Wanek. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1978.
Petersen: "Same title in Chitty's Law Review 73 (Mar. 1976)."
Cooper, H.H.A. Terrorism: A Multicultural Perspective. Washington, DC: Defense Nuclear Agency, 1986. [Petersen]
Cooper, H.H.A., and Lawrence J. Redlinger. Catching Spies: Principles and Practice of Counterespionage. Boulder, CO: Paladin, 1988. New York: Bantam, 1990. [pb]
For Peake, IJI&C 4.1, it is a "depressingly flawed book." The authors "often use the wrong terminology and inaccurate definitions, coupled with trite analogies and erroneous basic concepts." Catching Spies "contains different distortions [than Making Spies] and atrocious errors of fact." There is an "under supply of merit ... in both books." Chambers notes that this is a "popular account" and is "horribly verbose."
Cooper, H.H.A., and Lawrence J. Redlinger. Making Spies: A Talent Spotter's Handbook. Boulder, CO: Paladin, 1986.
Peake, IJI&C 4.1: "[E]xamples of the authors' lack of grasp of their subject abound."
Cooper, H.H.A., and Lawrence J. Redlinger. Terrorism and Espionage in the Middle East: Deception, Displacement, and Denial. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen, 2005.
According to Peake, Studies 51.2 (2007), "the authors argue that Israel ... is the actual sponsor of terrorism [in the Middle East] and elsewhere in the world.... The[ir] most outrageous example is that Israel ... was responsible for the bombing of Pan Am 103." The "level of scholarship and application of fuzzy concepts [that] has been achieved" by the authors "might be reason enough to skip this book, but its $170 price tag makes the decision a no-brainer."
Cooper, Jeffrey R. Curing Analytic Pathologies: Pathways to Improved Intelligence Analysis. Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Dec. 2005.
The author argues that "serious shortcomings" in U.S. intelligence "stem from dysfunctional behaviors and practices within [emphasis in original] the individual agencies and are not likely to be remedied either by structural changes in the organization of the community as a whole or by increased authorities for centralized community managers."
Cooper, Mathew. The Nazi War Against Soviet Partisans, 1941-1944. New York: Stein & Day, 1979. The Phantom War: The German Struggle Against Soviet Partisans, 1941-1944. London: MacDonald & Jane's, 1979.
According to Constantinides, this book "deals with German security policy in the USSR and the partisan war there, primarily from the German point of view.... There is ... little on the intelligence war, though that little and the author's general comments about the subject are correct."
Cooper, John. The Queen's Agent: Francis Walsingham at the Court of Elizabeth I. Cambridge, UK: Pegasus Elliot Mackenzie Publishers, 2013.
Peake, Studies 57.1 (Mar. 2013), finds that while the book "provides historical background that tracks Walsingham's rise to power and his life at Elizabeth's court," it "focuses on his role as spymaster." The author offers "a new interpretation of the Ridolfi plot," making "a plausible case that Walsingham, in conjunction with William Cecil (his boss) and the Queen, recruited Ridolfi as a double agent.... The Queen's Agent tells a famous story well, while adding some new ideas."
Cooper, Matthew. "An Unlikely Tough Guy: Tony Lake May Be Tweedy, But He Relishes Hardball." Newsweek, 3 Mar. 1997, 52.
DCI-nominee Lake is encountering difficulties with SSCI Chairman Richard Shelby on at least two fronts: His role in the White House's policy on ignoring Iranian arms shipments to Bosnia and the Asian money scandal surrounding contributions to President Clinton's election campaign.
Cooper, Philip J. By Order of the President: The Use and Abuse of Executive Direct Action. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002.
According to Buell, Perspectives on Politics 1.2, the author discusses national security directives (NSDs) among the presidential "power tools." Scholars "primarily concerned with presidential powers in foreign policy will learn from the chapter on national security directives, although they may find the linkage of NSDs to groupthink tenuous." A few caveats notwithstanding, Cooper's work "has enhanced the study of presidential power."
Coox, Alvin D. "Flawed Perception and Its Effect upon Operational Thinking: The Case of the Japanese Army, 1937-41." Intelligence and National Security 5, no. 2 (Apr. 1990): 239-254.
"[T]he flawed perceptions [in the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA)] and the ignorance of hotheads, Germanophiles and hysterics colored what should have been hard-headed thinking and crisis management. IJA plans of that era were consequently sketchy, broad, opportunistic and undistracted by detail."
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