Consortium for the Study of Intelligence. The Future of U.S. Intelligence: Report Prepared for the Working Group on Intelligence Reform. Washington, DC: National Strategy Information Center, 1996.
Surveillant 4.2: The Consortium "has, for a number of years, hosted special 'Working Groups' on specific intelligence topics and has pulled the findings from those multi-year reports into this important document."
Consortium for the Study of Intelligence. Resource Reports on Intelligence for Teaching Faculty. Washington, DC: National Strategy Information Center, 1988. Rev. ed. Washington, DC: National Strategy Information Center, 1992.
Surveillant 3.1 calls the revised edition a "valuable guide for instructors teaching courses on intelligence or for use in personal research."
Constantine, G. Ted. Intelligence Support to Humanitarian-Disaster Relief Operations: An Intelligence Monograph. Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, December 1995.
The author's key findings are: (1) "Both policymakers and operators expressed a need for significantly greater intelligence on humanitarian emergencies issues"; and (2) "The Intelligence Community's level of commitment to providing intelligence for disaster relief operations is uneven and, with few exceptions, not commensurate with expressed consumer needs."
Constantinides, George C. Intelligence and Espionage: An Analytical Bibliography. Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1983. UB250Z99C66
Clark comment: This remains an important and interesting work. It covers over 500 mostly English-language titles with informed, substantively oriented annotations. Constantinides includes indices that cover author, subject, title, and intelligence category. However, the wealth of material that has come into the public domain since this work's publication (1983) makes it dated in terms of the full scope of available materials. The annotations for the works cited continue to be useful and largely relevant. The work's place in the field is recognized by Pforzheimer who calls it "arguably the most important work of its kind." Sexton sees it as an "essential research aid."
Constantinides, George C. "The OSS: A Brief Review of Literature." In The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II, ed. George C. Chalou, 109-117. Washington, DC: National Archives and Records Administration, 1992. Second printing, 2002.
An informed look at the material published on the OSS, up to 1991.
Constantinides, George C. "Security Slip-Ups: Ultra, Magic, Bigot & Other Secrets." In In the Name of Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Walter Pforzheimer, eds. Hayden B. Peake and Samuel Halpern, 173-195. Washington, DC: NIBC Press, 1994.
Constantinides, George C. "Tradecraft: Follies and Foibles." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 1, no. 4 (1986): 97-110.
Compendium of egregious lapses in tradecraft, across time and borders.
Conway, Maura. "Code Wars: Steganography, Signals Intelligence, and Terrorism." Knowledge, Technology and Policy (Special issue on "Technology and Terrorism") 16, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 45-62. Also in Technology and Terrorism, ed. David Clarke, 171-191. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2004.
From abstract: "The argument advanced here is that terrorists are unlikely to be employing digital steganography to facilitate secret intra-group communication as has been claimed. This is because terrorist use of digital steganography is both technically and operationally implausible. The position adopted in this paper is that terrorists are likely to employ low-tech steganography such as semagrams and null ciphers instead."
Conway, Patrick. "Red Team: How the Neoconservatives Helped Cause the Iraq Intelligence Failure." Intelligence and National Security 27, no. 4 (Aug. 2012): 488-512.
From abstract: "A WINPAC 'Red Team' analyst ... erroneously concluded the [aluminum] tubes were for a nuclear program.... After the attacks of September 11 and President Bush's embrace of regime-change, the Red Team tubes assessment began to become the official position of the Intelligence Community. In September 2002, the President cited the assessment publicly, forcing the Intelligence Community to adopt it as the majority position in the Iraq NIE. 'Exhibit A' in the case for war was thus the product of a Red Team and, as such, was essentially propaganda masquerading as intelligence."
Coole, Diana. "Agency, Truth and Meaning: Judging the Hutton Report." British Journal of Political Science 35, no. 3 (Jul. 2005): 465-485. [Marlatt]
Cooley, John K. Payback: America's Long War in the Middle East. New York: Brassey's (US), Maxwell Macmillan, Inc., 1991.
Surveillant 2.2: "Of particular interest ... [is the] examination of U.S. intelligence's lack of preparation for the Shah's fall and its ignorance of internal Iranian developments which gradually pulled the U.S. into the region." The article includes other items of intelligence interest.
Cooley, John K. Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism. Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 1999.
Meyer, Los Angeles Times, 16 Jan. 2000, comments that the author "[p]ossibly ... tries to explain too much, and ... his text is marred by errors that a good copy editor would have caught." Nevertheless, Unholy Wars asks salient questions and draws on an impressive body of sources."
For Fuller, NYT, 9 Jan. 2000, this work "ultimately disappoints.... Cooley is unable to conceal a powerful bias against anything that the C.I.A. touches.... [O]ne searches in vain for any balance.... More seriously, Cooley superficially attributes to Washington's 'holy war' in Afghanistan the emergence of most subsequent regional viciousness, ignoring the deep roots of most of these crises.... [In addition,] the book is carelessly put together, a kind of reportorial pastiche of details ... that constantly bounce back and forth over four decades."
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