Colitt, Leslie. Spy Master: The Real-Life Karla, His Moles, and the East German Secret Police. New York: Addison-Wesley, 1995.
Clark comment: This book chronicles the exploits of Markus Wolf, head of the Main Intelligence Administration (HVA) of the East German Ministry of State Security (HfS/Stasi). It is perhaps indicative of something in our end-of-the-century culture that the master (arguably) of the spy masters of most of the last half century has to be compared to a fictional character.
Chambers calls Spy Master a "useful biography of Wolf" that "brings some useful information on East and West German intelligence operations and cases. A bit amorphous in places. Colitt seems to have fallen for Wolf's legendary charm." Click for Chambers' full review.
According to Mapother, WIR 15.1, "this book is illuminating when it talks about the former GDR but no better than popular reporting when it turns to the Federal Republic.... Espionage junkies will discover ... many lively summaries of Wolf's best cases." The author's explanation of the Günter Guillaume affair and its impact on the political fortunes of Willy Brandt "introduces dubious speculation." Overall, however, Colitt "has presented Wolf's achievement well."
Surveillant 4.3 finds particularly interesting "Wolf's descriptions of how he recruited, trained and introduced long-term sleeper agents into the stream of East German refugees fleeing to the West, and his careful infiltration of the western power structure ... which eventually caused the downfall of the Willy Brandt government." It is bothersome to Unsinger, IJI&C 10.1, that the author failed to pay much attention to "two very crucial areas where the HVA had considerable influence -- the support of terrorists and technology transfer." He concludes that this is an interesting book, but much of its information "can be found elsewhere."
Coll, Steve [Washington Post]
Colley, David. "'Shadow Warriors': Intelligence Operatives Waged Clandestine Cold War." VFW, Veterans of Foreign Wars Magazine, Sep. 1997, 24-30.
The author mentions briefly the activities of a number of military units, with some focus on CIC and ASA units, in the early years of the Cold War in Europe. The stories of covert activities lack detail.
Collier, Basil. Hidden Weapons: Allied Secret or Undercover Services in World War II. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1982. Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword, 2006. [pb]
From publisher: The author "throws fresh light on the low priority given to Intelligence between the wars; the tendency of ministers and senior officials to rely less on intelligence reports than their own individual hunches; the failure to foresee the invasion of Norway; why, even with the aid of Enigma it was impossible to turn the scales in Crete, and why the Americans, though privy to some of Japans most closely guarded secrets, allowed the Pearl Harbor attack to take them by surprise."
Collier, Michael W. "A Pragmatic Approach to Developing Intelligence Analysts." Defense Intelligence Journal 14, no. 2 (2005): 17-35.
The author argues that "intelligence analysis is first and foremost a science," but hastens to add that there is a "need for analysts to use creativity, imagination, and innovation in their work." He "suggests that the research problem or question should determine which analytic methods are used."
Collier, Richard. Ten Thousand Eyes. New York: Dutton, 1958. London: Collins, 1958.
Pforzheimer calls Ten Thousand Eyes a "well-written account of the French Resistance agent networks," an appraisal concurred in by Constantinides.
Collin, Richard O., and Gordon L. Freedman. Winter of Fire. New York: Dutton, 1990.
Surveillant 1.2: "An account of the first major terrorist crisis for the Reagan administration: the kidnapping of NATO staff officer General James Dozier, in Italy."
Collins, Anne. In the Sleep Room: The Story of the CIA Brainwashing Experiments in Canada. Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys, 1988.
In a review in I&NS 5.1, Whitaker seems to take Collins' book at face value, calling it "a very accomplished piece of work." The reviewer does note that much of the story of Canadian psychiatrist Ewan Cameron "has already been told" in John Marks' Search for the "Manchurian Candidate" (1979). Clark comment: I would add that if this particular instance of bureaucratic paranoia interests you, Marks' book is better done if only because it lacks Collins' lament of jingoistic outrage.
Collins, B.B. Diplomatic Security Service -- Partner in National Security. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 1992.
Surveillant 3.2/3 notes that the Diplomatic Security Service is the "Department of State's security operational arm." This book follows the Service's "evolution from quiet beginnings to today's partner in national policy."
Collins, Denis, with the International Spy Museum. SPYING: The Secret History of History. New York: Black Dog & Leventhal, 2004.
Peake, Studies 49.2 (2005), comments that this is a "coffee-table book, based on the exhibits found in the immensely popular Washington, DC, International Spy Museum." However, "its subtitle claims far more than its content delivers"; and, in fact, "the museum has produced a disappointing book." The book "contains far too many errors of fact, both historical and contemporaneous."
Collins, Eamon. Killing Rage. New York: Granta Books, 1997.
According to West, History 26.1, the author was a Provisional Irish Republican Army informant who switched sides in 1985.
Collins, Frederick L. The FBI in Peace and War. New York: Putnam's, 1943. New York: Ace Books, 1962. [pb]
Collins, Frederick W. "In Defence of the CIA." Round Table 57 (Jan. 1967): 115-121.
Collins, John M. [COL/USA (Ret.)] "Assassinations & Abductions: Viable Foreign Policy Tools?" U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 130, no. 4 (Apr. 2004): 66-67.
"President George W. Bush and future presidents may perceive a need for greater flexibility than present rules of engagement allow, but all presidents should carefully calculate potential benefits and liabilities before they seriously contemplate assassination or abduction as a tool of U.S. foreign policy, because possible penalties for miscalculation could be calamitous."
Collins, John M. [COL/USA (Ret.)]
1. America's Small Wars: Lessons for the Future. Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1991.
2. Green Berets, Seals, and Spetsnaz: U.S. and Soviet Special Military Operations. Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1987. [Russia/MI]
3. Special Operations Forces: An Assessment, 1986-1993. Washington. DC: National Defense University Press, 1994.
4. "Roles and Functions of U.S. Special Operations Forces." Special Warfare 6, no. 3 (Jul. 1993): 22-27. [Gibish]
5. "Where Are Special Operations Forces?" Joint Force Quarterly 2 (Autumn 1993): 7-16. [Gibish]
Collins, Lance, and Warren Reed. Plunging Point: Intelligence Failures, Cover-ups and Consequences. Sydney. Australia: HarperCollins, 2005.
Peake, Studies 50.1 (Mar. 2006), finds that the "first third of [this] book discusses how intelligence should work today and how it operates in fact, which is to say, corrupted in its application by national leaders of ... America, Australia, Britain, Canada, and New Zealand.... The next third of the book is a historical review of intelligence as it evolved" among those nations after World War II. The authors seem "a bit distracted by how spy novels have shaped reality.... But overall it is a good summary. The last third of the book considers intelligence in war, ways to spot upcoming failures, and where the threat is likely to originate.... Personal bitterness aside, Plunging Point gives an interesting picture of how at least some of our allies view the intelligence profession."
Collins, Richard. "Army Counter-Intelligence Operations." Army Information Digest, Sep. 1964, 8-14. [Petersen]
Collins, Sean, and Stephen McCombie. "Stuxnet: The Emergence of a New Cyber Weapon and Its Implications." Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 7, no. 1 (Apr. 2012): 80-91.
"This paper examines Stuxnet's forerunners, Stuxnet in detail, its target, and its implication for critical infrastructure. Whatever the cost to create Stuxnet, it was far less than the cost of a traditional military attack. Future versions of Stuxnet may be used by nation states, terrorist groups, hacktivists and cyber criminals to achieve their own goals. In the future, cyber weapons may not be as restrained as Stuxnet. This malware has started a new arms race, and has created serious implications for the security of critical infrastructure worldwide."
Collins, Steven. "Army PSYOP in Bosnia: Capabilities and Constraints." Parameters, Summer 1999, 57-73. [http://www.carlisle.army.mil]
"The principal tool available for the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) to influence attitudes in Bosnia has been military psychological operations (PSYOP) forces, and most of the PSYOP forces accessible to NATO are in the US Army. The contribution of these forces has been laudable, but there have been many missed opportunities as well as misunderstandings over the last three and a half years regarding what PSYOP can and cannot do. This article examines the performance of PSYOP forces in Bosnia, offering recommendations on how to improve this vital part of the US contribution." (Footnotes omitted)
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