Cohen

 

Cohen, David. The CIA's Evolving Analytical Program. Working Group on Intelligence Reform Series, Monograph No. 12. Washington, DC: Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, 1994.

[Analysis/Gen; CIA/C&C/DI][c]

[Cohen, David.] "Mr. David Cohen: Speaker, CIRA Luncheon, 13 May 1996." CIRA Newsletter 21, no. 2 (Summer 1996): 3-6.

Text of speech by the CIA's Deputy Director for Operations (DDO) to the Central Intelligence Retirees' Association. Cohen's thrust here is to convey "a general sense of the current direction of the Directorate of Operations."

[CIA/C&C][c]

Cohen, Edmund. "The CIA and the Declassification of History." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 12, no. 3 (Fall 1999): 338-345.

Cohen reviews some of the successes in and the obstacles to the CIA's declassification effort.

[RefMats/Release]

Cohen, Eliot A. Commandos and Politicians: Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978.

[MI/SpecOps]

Cohen, Eliot A. "'Only Half the Battle': American Intelligence and the Chinese Intervention in Korea, 1950." Intelligence and National Security 5, no. 1 (Jan. 1990): 129-149.

Clark comment: The author suggests that the intelligence failure that allowed China's entry into the Korean conflict in November 1950 to catch U.S. and U.N. forces off-guard was part of a larger operational failure. There certainly was some flawed analysis work at both the Theater and Washington levels, but some of those mistakes resulted from "data distorted and concealed by an ingenious and well-disciplined foe." Petersen call this an "outstanding article" that "presents a balanced and well-documented appraisal of the intelligence failure attending Chinese intervention."

[GenPostwar/50s/Korea][c]

Cohen, Eliot A., and John Gooch. Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War. New York: Free Press, 1990.

Wirtz, I&NS 6.3, says that the authors "move beyond the traditional analyses of military disaster by demonstrating how the performance of military organizations influences the outcome of battle.... [They] offer extraordinarily keen insights into some well-known events," including Pearl Harbor, the Chinese intervention in the Korean war, and the Yom Kippur war.

[Analysis/Surprise; GenPostwar/50s/Korea; Israel/YomKippur; WWII/PearlHarbor]

Cohen, Hillel. Good Arabs: The Israeli Security Agencies and the Israeli Arabs, 1948-1967. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2010.

According to Peake, Studies 55.1 (Mar. 2011) and Intelligencer 19.1 (Winter-Spring 2012), the author documents and describes "in detail specific objectives, individual recruitments, and agent-informer handling methods" in the use of informers to monitor the Arab population in Israel.

[Israel/Overviews]

Cohen, Paul. "The Police, the Home Office and Surveillance of the British Union of Fascists." Intelligence and National Security 1, no. 3 (Sep. 1986): 416-434.

The author surveys some of the insights about the activities of Special Branch and MI5 contained in the Home Office materials released to the Public Record Office about the activities of Sir Oswald Mosley's British Union of Fascists in the 1930s.

[UK/Interwar/30s]

Cohen, Raymond. "Israeli Military Intelligence before the 1956 Sinai Campaign." Intelligence and National Security 3, no. 1 (Jan. 1988): 100-140.

Until 1956, confidence in the work of Israeli military intelligence "was as yet far from unshakable. A number of intelligence failures in 1953 and 1954 affected the morale and credibility of the service.... The new chief of military intelligence, Colonel Yehoshafat Harkabi, who took over in May 1955, faced the task of rehabilitating the service at the very time that relations between Israel and Egypt began a seemingly inexorable slide into war."

[Israel/Overviews]

Cohen, Raymond. "Threat Assessment in Military Intelligence: The Case of Israel and Syria, 1985-86." Intelligence and National Security 4, no. 4 (Oct. 1989): 735-764.

"During the ten-month period September 1985-June 1986 the Israeli Army was placed on heightened alert on at least five separate occasions as a result of forebodings of a possible Syrian attack.... In response to Israel's heightened states of alert the Syrian Army itself took precautionary measures and tension rose dangerously." Why, then, did war not result? This is the interesting question with which Cohen plays provocatively.

[Analysis/Estimative; Israel/Surprise][c]

Cohen, Richard. "Anatomy of a Failure." Washington Post, 15 Sep. 2001, A27. [http:// www.washingtonpost.com]

"It is the first obligation of the [U.S.] government ... to protect the people of the United States. It is fair to say [in the wake of 9/11] that the government failed in that obligation.... The intelligence failures that produced ... horrific consequences were ... bipartisanly arrived at.... What's missing, key members of Congress told me, are the human assets that might have brought some warning about what was being planned."

[Terrorism/01/WTC]

Cohen, Sam. "Ted Hall: A Soldier from Venona." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 11, no. 3 (Fall 1998): 351-365.

Cohen knew Hall from their days working on the Manhatten Project at Los Alamos, New Mexico.

[SpyCases/U.S./Bomb/Gen]

Cohen, Sheldon I. "Security Clearance Changes and Confusion in the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004." Journal of National Security Law & Policy 1, no. 2 (2005): 527-535.

Title III of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 "reorganized the entire national security clearance system, although the subject received practically no attention in public discussion during the 9/11 Commission hearings. Because this change was not fully explored in either the House or Senate hearings or during floor debate, Title III includes contradictory provisions concerning the assignment of responsibilities for security clearance policies and procedures."

[Reform/00s/04/Act]

Cohen, Stan. The General and The Texas: A Pictorial History of the Andrews Raid, April 12, 1862. Missoula, MT: Pictorial Histories Pub., 1999.

From publisher: In "[o]ne of the most famous commando-type raids of the Civil War ... [t]wenty Union soldiers and two civilians hijacked a train. Their mission -- to head north and destroy bridges, rails and rolling stock on the Western & Atlantic Railroad connecting Atlanta and Chattanooga. As the Raiders headed north, Confederates commandeered several engines, including the 'Texas,' and the great locomotive chase was on."

[CivWar/Union/Andrews]

Cohen, Stan, and Don DeNevi, with Richard Gay. They Came to Destroy America: The FBI Goes to War against Nazi Spies and Saboteurs Before and During World War II. Missoula, MT: Pictorial Histories Publishing, 2003.

EAB, AFIO WIN 25-03, 27 Jun. 2003, says that this work "covers the German subversion networks in the Eastern U.S. during the years leading up to" World War II and "German U-boat intelligence operations and subsequent FBI round-ups and trials of German would-be spies" as the country went to war.

Doerries, JIH 6.2 (Winter 2006-2007), finds this to be "a rather impressive collection of photographs and documents relating to German agents and their actual and planned activities in and against the U.S. prior to and in the course of World War II.... The illustrations are generally of high quality and the texts reproduced are readable.... To be used even more effectively in college history courses, publisher and authors would be well advised to correct a few printing errors, add some footnotes with information concerning the most relevant archival holdings and, most of all, include a name index."

[WWII/Eur/Ger/Ops]

Cohen, Stuart A. "Myths About Intelligence." Washington Post, 28 Nov. 2003, A41. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

This is an attempt to straightened out a bent perception of the nature of the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) concerning Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The author was acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council (NIC) when the NIE was published. He states: "I believed at the time the estimate was approved for publication and still believe now that we were on solid ground in reaching the judgments we did."

[GenPostar/00s/03/Congress]

Cohen, William S. [Sen.; R-ME]

1. "Congressional Oversight of Covert Actions." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 2, no. 2 (Summer 1988): 155-162.

The then-SSCI member (later Secretary of Defense) argues in favor of the "48-hour rule" on notification of Congress regarding covert actions. He also discusses some of the oversight problems involved in such activities.

2. "Congressional Oversight of Covert Actions: The Public's Stake in the Forty-Eight Hour Rule." Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 12, no. 2 (Spring 1989): 285-302.

[CA/80s; Overviews/Legal/Gen; Oversight/To90s][c]

Cohen, William S. [Sen.; R-ME] and George J. Mitchell [Sen.; D-ME] Men of Zeal: A Candid Inside Story of the Iran-Contra Hearings. New York: Viking Penguin, 1988.

Petersen notes that this book is "based on Congressional hearings" and "discusses CIA involvement." See also, Johnson, IJI&C 2.4 (1988).

[GenPostwar/80s/Iran-Contra]

 

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