Clas - Claz

 

Clauseen, Martin P., ed. The OSS-NKVD Relationship, 1943-1945. Vol. 8 of Covert Warfare series. New York: Garland, 1989.

http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usamhi/Bibliographies: 133 reprinted documents, including correspondence between W.J. Donovan and John R. Deane.

[WWII/OSS/Gen]

Clausen, Henry C., and Bruce Lee. Pearl Harbor: Final Judgement. New York: Crown Publishing, 1992.

Clark comment: This book is a centerpiece in the long-standing dispute over "who lost Pearl Harbor?" Clausen was the independent investigator appointed by Secretary of War Stimson to investigate the root causes of the Pearl Harbor disaster. The book is essentially the conclusions drawn years after the fact from Clausen's highly classified report.

Kruh, Cryptolog 14.2, argues that the author "convincingly debunks Pearl Harbor conspiracy theories." He "names the individuals he blames for the disaster and ... lists these individuals in terms of their culpability based on a scale from zero to ten. Heading this list are the Army and Navy commanders at Pearl Harbor." FILS 12.1 notes that Clausen's ranking of levels of guilt is performed "[p]erhaps with a little too much relish."

According to Robinson, Cryptolog 14.4, the "casual reader who lacks experience and understanding of the essential interaction that exists between intelligence information and operational activity, and some knowledge of the constraints imposed by security rules and procedures, will be misled." There is an "astonishing amount of bias, faulty judgment and an ignorance of the operational context of the times in which command decisions were being made.... The author, well stocked with preconceptions, repeatedly accuses Admiral Kimmel ... and others of lying when the problem is his own lack of knowledge of where these people are coming from."

To Beach, Proceedings 119.7 (Jul. 1993), this "book ... is a travesty ... [and] is flawed terribly." The "national leadership in Washington [Roosevelt, Marshall, Stark] ... failed utterly in its obligation to its armed forces." Pinaeu, Proceedings 119.7 (Jul. 1993), comments that Clausen's "investigative tactics were not above reproach." There are "several curiously uninformative footnotes ... and annoying bloopers abound." The author "slants evidence to cover Secretary [of War Henry] Stimson and General [George C.] Marshall on the basis of information that was stale in 1944." He also "echoes the fallacious At Dawn We Slept litany about U.S. unpreparedness."

Tolley, Proceedings 119.7 (Jul. 1993), believes that we should not "expect even a top trial lawyer to translate evidence into sound conclusions involving fields where he is largely ignorant and biased." Clausen's "understanding of general military affairs clearly was weak.... There are some good points to this book. A voluminous (157-page) appendix of background material is most informative and useful.... Also, the authors make it clear that the real villains in the Pearl Harbor debacle were an inadequate intelligence structure and lack of unified command -- plus a shortage of imagination and brillance on the part of all the principals."

Kaiser, I&NS 9.2, finds that Final Judgement "adds to our knowledge in several important respects." Clausen has produced a "highly readable book.... [M]uch of what he uncovered late in the war ... has been ignored.... Lawyers ... acquire the habit of working to prove a particular point.... Readers must therefore approach his account with caution." Neither Rusbridger and Nave nor Layton "have been able to prove that anyone had real information warning of a Pearl Harbor attack.... [T]he behavior of the Washington authorities suggests that they believed that they had given field commanders enough warning of impending hostilities, and for the most part, the record backs them up.... Th[e] evidence ... suggests that General Short simply did not regard an attack upon Hawaii as a serious possibility.... To the unbiased, reflective historian, five decades after the event, the Pearl Harbor attack exemplifies the difficult of anticipating surprise, the mistakes which individuals inevitably make, the ease with which governments fail to make use of available information, and the relative unimportance, in the long run, of winning the opening battle of a war."

Although not a review of Clausen's book, Michael Gannon, "Reopen the Kimmel Case," Proceedings 120.12 (Dec. 1994), 51-55, argues that the allegation that Admiral Kimmel "knew of and ignored advice regarding the direction and extent to which he should have ordered long-range air reconnaissance prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor is false -- and grounds to set it right exist."

[WWII/PearlHarbor/Gen][c]

Clauser, Jerome K. Intelligence Research and Analysis: An Introduction. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2008.

Peake, Studies 54.4 (Dec. 2010), and Intelligencer 18.2 (Winter-Spring 2011), notes that this "is an introductory text and covers basic techniques." However, it gives "a real world example of how the techniques and methods described are applied.... One might wish it were more detailed, but at least it is a start." For Wheaton, AIJ 30.1 (2012), the author "distinguishes himself by looking beyond tradecraft recipes toward more formal approaches such as game theory and Bayesian analysis."

[Analysis/T&M]

Clauser, Jerome K., and Elton S. Carter. The Design of an Intelligence Education: Assessment of Intelligence Educational and Training Requirements. State College, PA: H.R.B. Singer, 1965. [Petersen]

[RefMats/Teaching]

Clauser, Jerome K., and Sandra M. Weir. Intelligence Research Methodology: An Introduction to Techniques and Procedures for Conducting Research in Defense Intelligence. State College, PA: H.R.B. Singer, 1975. Washington, DC: U.S. Defense Intelligence School, 1976.

Watson, et al, Encyclopedia, p. xiii, says that this work "still stands as the definitive work in its discussion of the components of strategic intelligence."

[Analysis/T&M]

Clausing, Jeri. "Computer Intruders Apparently From Russia, Senate Panel Is Told." New York Times, 6 Oct. 1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]

Michael Vatis, who heads the FBI's National Infrastructure Protection Center, told the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology and Terrorism on 6 October 1999 that "[i]ntruders who stole sensitive information on Defense Department weapons during a widespread series of attacks on government and private computer networks are apparently based in Russia."

[GenPostwar/Issues/Infowar]

Clausing, Jeri. "New Fight over Encryption Rules." New York Times, 21 Sep. 1999. [http:// www.nytimes.com]

The Clinton administration's surprise change in "encryption policy may finally close the long-standing debate over export controls. But civil libertarians are bracing for a renewed fight with law enforcement agencies over access to the keys that can unscramble private data and communications."

[Cryptography/Encryption]

Claussen, Eileen. "Environment and Security: The Challenge of Integration. An Address to the Woodrow Wilson Center's Environment and Security Discussion Group." Environmental Change and Security Report 1 (Spring 1995): 40-43.

Claussen is Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Global Environmental Affairs at the National Security Council. Her remarks were made on 6 October 1994.

[GenPostwar/NatSec/Enviornment][c]

Clayton, Aileen. The Enemy Is Listening: The Story of the Y Service. London: Hutchinson, 1980. New York: Ballantine, 1982. [pb]

Clayton, Anthony. Forearmed: The History of the Intelligence Corps. Riverside, NJ: Macmillan, 1990. 1993. Forearmed: A History of the Intelligence Corps. London: Brassey's, 1993.

Surveillant 1.2 notes that this is the "authorized history of the British Army's Intelligence Corps." Watt, I&NS 9.4, calls Forearmed an "admirable and truly seminal account."

[UK/Overviews/MI]

Clayton, Ross, and Dan M. Haverty. "Modernizing Homeland Defense and Security." Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 2, no. 1 (2005). [http://www.bepress.com/jhsem/vol2/iss1/7]

[DHS/05]

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