Chan, Steve.
"The Intelligence of Stupidity: Understanding Failures in Strategic
Warning." American Political Science Review 71, no.1 (Mar. 1979): 171-180.
Chan, Steve.
"The Intelligence of Stupidity: Understanding Failures in Strategic
Warning." American Political Science Review 71, no.1 (Mar. 1979): 171-180.
[Analysis/Failure]
Chandler, David
G., and James Lawton Collins, Jr., eds. The D-Day Encyclopedia. New
York: Simon & Schuster, 1994.
Surveillant 3.6 calls this an "impressive military history work" the scope of which is mostly "far afield" from intelligence. However, Sexton notes that there are "informative entries discussing the importance of Signals Intelligence and ULTRA."
[RefMats; WWII/D-Day]
Chandler,
Robert W. War of Ideas: The U.S. Propaganda Campaign in Vietnam. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1981. [Wilcox]
[Vietnam/Gen]
Chandler,
Stedman, and Robert W. Robb. Front-Line Intelligence. Washington, DC: Infantry Journal Press, 1946.
Pforzheimer: "Although outdated, a readable primer to prepare officers to be combat '2's.'"
[MI/Army/Overviews]
Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. "7 Spaniards Killed In Iraqi Ambush." Washington Post, 30 Nov. 2003, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
"More than a dozen insurgents ambushed and killed seven Spanish intelligence officers on [29 November 2003] on a highway near [Latifiya,] south of Baghdad.... Spain's defense minister, Frederico Trillo, said in a televised address that the soldiers, from the country's National Intelligence Center, had eaten lunch in Baghdad and were 'on their way to carry out reconnaissance in the area.'"
CNN, "Spain: Intelligence Agents 'Assassinated' in Iraq," 29 Nov. 2003 [http://www.cnn.com], adds that Spain's defense minister said in his "brief, grim statement" that "[s]even agents of the National Intelligence Center have been assassinated. An eighth has survived."
[MI/Ops/Iraq; OtherCountries/Spain]
Chang, Jung. and Jon Halliday. Mao: The Unknown Story. London: Jonathan Cape, 2005.
Peake, Studies 50.2 (2006), finds that "the dominant theme" of this book is "Mao’s self-centered lifelong pursuit of power, the steps he was willing to take to achieve and keep it, and his distaste for the peasant.... An essential element in both acquiring power and keeping it was a reliable security service. The authors blend Mao’s actions toward this end throughout the book, and they describe his mercurial relationship with Kang Sheng."
[China/Gen]
Chang, Laurence,
and Peter Kornbluh, eds. The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962. A National Security
Archive Documents Reader. New York: The New Press, 1992.
Surveillant 3.1 identifies this as a "collection of formerly secret documents" that is "more document reproduction ... than text." According to FILS 11.6, there are some CIA documents here, but the "lion's share are of Department of State, White House, and Defense Department origin."
See Laurence Chang, et. al. (National Security Archive Staff), eds., The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: Guide and Index, 2 vols. (Alexandria, VA: Chadwyck-Healey, 1990). See also McAuliffe, ed., CIA Documents (1992).
[GenPostwar/60s/MissileCrisis]
Channell, Ralph Norman [CAPT/USN (Ret.)]. "Intelligence and the Department of Homeland Security." Strategic Insights 1, no. 6 (Aug. 2002). [http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/aug02/homeland2.asp]
"How should this new department be organized to utilize existing intelligence assets and to generate new sources and types of intelligence? The U.S. military's recent experience, especially in organizing for joint warfare, might be a place to turn for some lessons."
[Terrorism/DHS/02]
Channel, Norm [CAPT/USN (Ret.)] "Naval Intelligence in South Vietnam." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 20, no. 2 (Jun. 2004): 11-13.
The focus here is on events in 1964-1965.
[Vietnam/Gen]
Chant, Christopher.
The Encyclopedia of Code Names of World War II. London: Routledge
& Kegan Paul, 1986. New York: Methuen, 1987.
[WWII/RefMats]
Chapman, Bert. Researching National Security and Intelligence Policy. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2004.
From advertisement: This work "examines and annotates the rich variety of unclassified print and electronic sources available to users studying the formulation of national security policy in the U.S. and throughout the English-speaking world."
Howard, Air & Space Power Journal 19.3 (Fall 2005), says that this work "is a veritable cornucopia of sources and ratings of their effectiveness. What may prove even more useful is the extent of each chapter’s documentation. These endnotes, which attest to the author’s thoroughness, include Web sites and e-mail addresses where appropriate. The book’s user-friendliness also helps a great deal."
[RefMats/Guides/U.S.]
Chapman, Guy.
The Dreyfus Case. New York: Reynal, 1955.
[France/Historical]
Chapman,
John W.M. "No Final Solution: A Survey of the Cryptologic Capabilities
of German Military Agencies, 1926-1935." Intelligence and National
Security 1, no. 1 (Jan. 1986): 13-47.
[Germany][c]
Chapman, John
W.M. "Pearl Harbor: The Anglo-Australian Dimension'" Intelligence
and National Security 4, no. 3 (Jul. 1989): 451-460.
"[T]here seems to be no intrinsic reason on the British side, even less than on the Australian side, for there to be any cover-up surrounding the British role in Allied intelligence co-operation against Japan in connection with the attack on Pearl Harbor."
[WWII/FE/Pac/Australia & PearlHarbor][c]
Chapman, John W.M. "Signals Intelligence Cooperation among the Secret Intelligence Services of the Axis States, 1940-41." Japan Forum (1991): 231-256.
[WWII/Eur/Ger & FE/Pac/Japan]
Chapman, John W.M. "Tricycle Recycled: Collaboration among the Secret Intelligence Services of the Axis States, 1940-41." Intelligence and National
Security 7, no. 3 (Jul. 1992): 268-299.
This article is somehow passing strange. It includes some interesting Axis-states source materials that "throw light at least on the broader context of the intelligence collaboration, in which Popov [Tricycle] played a very minor role." This is true, but the focus here is on the "context," not on the Tricycle case per se.
[WWII/Eur/Ger&FE/Pac/Japan; WWII/PearlHarbor/Tricycle][c]
Chapman, Robert D. "Lies, Torture, and Humanity." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 20, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 188-194.
This is a review article on Goldman, ed., Ethics of Spying (2006), but is worth a read on its own for Chapman's take on a number of related issues.
[Overviews/Ethics]
Chapman, Robert
D. "Reflections on Terrorism: A Sideline View." International
Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 12, no. 2 (Summer 1999):
207-226.
In commenting on someone's else statement about terrorists, Chapman says, "There's truth to that." The same might be said for this article. Yes, there is truth here, but just how far does the insight of Chapman's "truth" extend? I don't know, but there are some disturbing (meaning disturbing to conventional thinking) thoughts put forward. If that effect was the author's goal, he has achieved it.
[Terrorism/90s]
Chapman, Robert D. "Remembering the Polish Underground." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 19, no. 4 (Winter 2006-2007): 746-752.
The author reviews briefly the CIA's support of the Polish underground organization Wolnosc i Niezawislosc (WiN -- Freedom and Independence) in the early 1950s, as well as events surrounding the Warsaw Uprising of 1944.
[CIA/50s/Gen; OtherCountries/Poland/WWII & CW]
Chapman, Robert D. "You Gotta Know When to Hold." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 11, no. 2 (Summer 1998): 221-239.
Although much of this review article concerns Fursenko and Naftali, "One Hell of a Gamble" (1997), the author also comments on Lyman Kirkpatrick's report on the Bay of Pigs operation. He finds that "[s]ome of what Mr. Kirkpatrick wrote is correct but much is not.... Mr. Kirkpatrick should have known better. That being so, a question of motivation creeps into any critique of his report."
[CIA/90s/98/BoP]
Chappell, F.
R. Wellington Wings: An RAF Intelligence Officer in the Western Desert.
Somerton, Somerset: Crecy Books, 1992.
Orange, I&NS 9.3: Did a Wellington night-bomber squadron in Egypt in 1942 "need a comparatively elderly [32] schoolteacher, entirely ignorant of aviation, as an 'intelligence' expert?... The answer emerges ... in this absorbing book as Chappell progresses ... to ... respected authority." The book was "first published by William Kimber in 1980 and re-appears in a slightly corrected edition.... [The] tone throughout is sensible and sensitive."
[UK/WWII/ME]
Chappell,
John D. Before the Bomb: How America Approached the End of the Pacific
War. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1997.
Giangreco, NWCR, Spring 1998, calls this a "fine work" that "fleshes out our knowledge of the environment in which all life-and-death decisions had to be made in 1945."
[WWII/FE/Pac/Bomb]
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