Cast - Cat

 

Castagna, Michael J. "Virtual Intelligence: Reengineering Doctrine for the Information Age." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 10, no. 2 (Summer 1997): 180-195.

Thematically, this article proceeds along the following line: "The information revolution has created an information-rich environment that is the essential enabler of the transparent battlefield.... As a result, the information revolution will allow timely and accurate intelligence to become a substitute for a large standing military force."

[GenPostwar/Issues/InfoWar][c]

Castaneda, Ruben. "Md. Man on Trial Over NSA Documents." Washington Post, 30 Nov. 2005, B5. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Kenneth W. Ford, Jr., who worked as a computer expert at NSA, is on trial in U.S. District Court in Greenbelt, Maryland, "on charges that he took national security documents without authorization. Ford is also accused of failing to inform a prospective private-sector employer, who required him to have a security clearance, that he was charged with taking the secret documents illegally."

[SpyCases/U.S./Other]

Castellan, Georges. Le réarmament clandestin du reich, 1930-35 vu par le 2e bureau de l'etat-major français. Paris: Plon, 1954.

[France/Interwar]

Castelli, Christopher J. "Pentagon Shakes Up Intelligence Directorate's Organization." InsideDefense.com, 24 Jul. 2008. [http://defensenewsstand.com/insider.asp?issue=07242008sp]

In a memorandum dated 18 June 2008, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence James R. Clapper, Jr., has restructured his office. The "jobs of the four deputy under secretaries of defense who work for Clapper" have been revamped. The "memo names [Larry] Burgess the deputy under secretary of defense for HUMINT, counterintelligence and security." The words "joint and coalition" are now part of the title of Lt. Gen. Rick Zahner, the deputy under secretary for joint and coalition warfighter support. "John Salvatori is the new deputy under secretary of defense for technical collection and analysis.... Betty Sapp is now the deputy under secretary of defense for portfolio, programs and resources." Clapper's memo is available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/usdi061808.pdf.

[MI/00s/08]

Castillo Armas, C. "How Guatemala Got Rid of the Communists." American Mercury 80 (Jan. 1955): 140-141. [Petersen]

[CIA/50s/Guat]

Castillo, Celerino, III. Powderburns: Cocaine, Contras, and the Drug War. Oakville, Ontario: Mosaic, 1994.

McGehee, CIABASE Update Report, Aug. 1997, says that this book, by a former DEA officer, "describes the use of CIA Contra supply planes to transport drugs to the United States."

[CIA/Accusations]

Castle, Timothy N. At War in the Shadow of Vietnam: U.S. Military Aid to the Royal Lao Government, 1955-1975. New York: Columbia University, 1993.

Surveillant 3.4 suggests that this book "will undoubtedly be the standard work on U.S. covert activity in Laos." It is a "very complete and balanced account" and is "scholarly, well-researched and attractive[ly] written." Wirtz, I&NS 11.4, adds that Castle's "concise outline of the secret war in Laos ... makes a welcome addition to the history of the Vietnam War."

In the same vein, Ford, I&NS 10.2, finds that Castle's "extensive research and ... synthesis of an impressive amount of primary source material" helps to untangle "the web of American bureaucracy and politics." The author details "the evolution and management of US military involvement in Laos.... Meticulously researched and presented, this book provides a glimpse into the murky world of covert military and intelligence operations and fills a glaring gap in the history of the wars in Indochina."

Tovar, IJI&C 8.3 ("B. Hugh Tovar was the CIA's senior representative in Laos from September 1970 until May 1973."), sees At War in the Shadow of Vietnam as "the best documented book on the Laos war yet to appear. Concise and readable, it raises many issues of importance to an understanding of the Laos sector of the Indochina conflict. On certain of those issues, however, the author and I are in substantial disagreement."

Tovar describes one area of disagreement as Castle's adopting of the position of senior U.S. military officers about the management of the war. In particular, Tovar argues, the CIA station chief did not "control" air operations in Laos. The "only sector of air resources in Laos which can rightfully be described as controlled by CIA" was the war-related operations of the Air America and Continental Air Service contractors. In addition, the CIA's field units worked closely with -- but did not control -- the Air Force's Forward Air Controllers, the Raven FACs. Tovar relates how, clearly more frequently than he and the ambassador would have liked, the experience was more one of begging for what U.S. air support they believed was necessary.

For Tovar, a "major weakness in At War in the Shadow of Vietnam is its failure to give adequate treatment to the war in regions of Laos other than Military Region II." But he softens that criticism by noting the implication of the book's subtitle -- that it is not a "[s]trictly speaking ... a history of the war." Overall, this book "is a very good reconstruction of a complex and not readily intelligible piece of American history."

[CIA/Laos]

Castle, Timothy N. One Day Too Long: Top Secret Site 85 and the Bombing of North Vietnam. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999.

Clark comment: I wonder whether there is any more story to tell about Site 85 than has already been in James C. Linder, "The War in Laos: The Fall of Lima Site 85," Studies in Intelligence 38, no. 5 (1995): 79-88?

Wirtz, IJI&C 12.4, notes that Site 85 "was an Air Force effort to conduct a clandestine operation deep in the enemy's rear that reflected the service's inexperience with this kind of activity.... Castle suggests ... that organizational imperatives, as much as the need to increase military effectiveness, drove the Air Force to deploy its radar in Laos." Regrettably, to the reviewer, Castle's "narrative deteriorates into a diatribe against incompetent officers..., bureaucratic inertia and obfuscation, and greedy Vietnamese and Laotian officials."

For De Groot, I&NS 16.1, the author tells "a fascinating story, but ... seems to have been carried away by its dramatic potential.... The book is impressively well researched, but in truth this often means that a good story gets smothered in unnecessary detail. A tale suited to a long article in a military history journal is transformed into an often tedious book of nearly 400 pages."

Leinbach, Air & Space Power Journal 22.1 (Spring 2008) finds that Castle "shows, in stark detail, that both Air Force leadership and the US ambassador to Laos bungled the evacuation [of the site], holding fast to the belief that evacuation was unnecessary even after the attack began."

[CIA/Laos]

Castle, Stephen. "Britain and US Monitoring All Global Messages." The Independent (UK), 28 Jan. 2000. [http://www.independent.co.uk]

According to a report for the European Parliament, written by researcher Duncan Campbell, "[a]lmost every modern form of communication, from satellites to the internet, is being intercepted by a multi-billion pound global surveillance operation dominated by the US and Britain."

[NSA/Echelon/00]

Castleman, John B. Active Service. Louisville, KY: Courier-Journal Co., 1917. [Petersen]

[CivWar/Conf/Intel]

Castro Hidalgo, Orlando. Spy for Fidel. Miami, FL: E.A. Seemann, 1971.

Pforzheimer says Castro Hidalgo was a high-ranking Cuban intelligence officer (DGI) who defected in 1969, and calls Spy for Fidel a "useful book on the Cuban service." According to Constantinides, Castro Hidalgo "provides first-hand information on the DGI's organization, training, personnel, modus operandi, and targets." However, the author "could have been more specific on dates of events and could have elaborated more on many events."

[LA/Cuba]

Catanzaro, Raimondo, ed. The Red Brigades and Left-Wing Terrorism in Italy. London: Pinter, 1991.

Cate, Charles V. "Counterintelligence for National Security." Studies in Intelligence 2, no. 4 (Fall 1958): 87-92.

Keying off Sherman Kent's tripartite scheme for considering intelligence matters, the author discusses counterintelligence as knowledge, activity, and organization.

[CI/To90s]

Cater, Douglas. "Chronicle of Confusion: U.S. Treatment of U-2." Reporter 22 (9 Jun. 1960): 15-17. [Petersen]

[CIA/60s/U-2]

Cathcart, Brian. Test of Greatness: Britain's Struggle for the Atomic Bomb. London: John Murray, 1994.

According to Twigge, I&NS 11.1, the author focuses on the development and testing of Britain's first nuclear weapon, and "atomic intelligence is given only cursory attention." Nevertheless, the "background of the Fuchs case and its repercussions within Britain [and the nuclear weapons program] are explored in some detail."

[UK/Postwar]

Return to C Table of Contents

Return to Alphabetical Table of Contents