Cai - Cal

 

Cain, Frank.

Cain, John P. Counterinsurgency in Africa: The Portuguese Way of War, 1961-74. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1997.

Campbell, IJI&C 11.4, notes that this book "covers Portugal's counterinsurgency campaigns ... in three of its colonies: Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea." The author depends heavily on interviews with participants. "On the whole, Portuguese forces were seldom caught by surprise, suggesting that their intelligence system functioned efficiently."

[OtherCountries/Portugal]

Cain, John W. "Technical Factors in Aerospace Photography." Studies in Intelligence 6, no. 4 (Fall 1962): 1-8.

The author offers "insight into some of the technical factors involved in getting high-quality aerial photographs."

[Recon/Imagery]

Cain, Michael [LTCMR/USNR]. "Intelligence Support for the Fleet and Joint Warfighter." Officer, May 1998, 35-39.

The "highly experienced intelligence professionals" of the Naval Reserve Intelligence Command (NAVRESINTCOM) "are filling gaps left throughout the active force by DoD downsizing."

[MI/Reserves]

Caine, Philip D. Aircraft Down! Evading Capture in World War II Europe. Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1997.

According to Seamon, Proceedings, Nov. 1998, the author records six successful escapes that are "as suspenseful as most wartime fiction."

[UK/WWII/Services/MI9]

Cairncross, John. The Enigma Spy: An Autobiography. London: Century, 1997.

Grigg, Electronic Telegraph, 11 Oct. 1997, notes that this book is Cairncross' "posthumous apologia.... His version of events is, briefly, this. He was not the 'Fifth Man', indeed he maintains that the whole idea of a ring of five is fictitious. He never had anything to do with atomic secrets. Though at Cambridge he flirted for a time with Communism he never joined the party, and it was not for ideological reasons that he became a Soviet spy. His motive was simply to help Soviet Russia as the only force capable of defeating Nazi Germany, which he regarded as Britain's -- and civilisation's -- supreme enemy." The reviewer finds it difficult to credit Cairncross' "claim to have become a Soviet agent solely because, as a patriot, he was outraged by the policy of appeasement."

Similarly, Hoffman, IJI&C 12.2, signals his view of Cairncross' memoirs in the title to his review: "A Final Try at Deception." He concludes that Cairncross' "rather equivocal deprecation of his espionage is not likely to find widespread sympathy. His motives remain enigmatic and his contribution to the KGB understated."

[UK/SpyCases/Four]

Cairns, Donald W. "UAVs -- Where We Have Been." Military Intelligence, Mar. 1987, 18-20.

"Brief history of unmanned aerial vehicles" in U.S. military history, 1915-1972. [http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usamhi/RefBibs/intell/genmisc.htm]

[Recon][c]

Calabresi, Massimo. "The Bin Laden Capture that Never Was." Time, 20 Mar. 2000, 24.

A Presidentially approved plan for the CIA to help Pakistan organize a unit to slip into Afghanistan and capture Osama Bin Laden never got off the ground because of Pakistani footdragging.

[CA/Afgh; MI/Ops/Afgh; Terrorism/00]

Calabresi, Massimo. "The Mac that Shook National Security." Time, 14 Feb. 2000, 24.

Former DCI John M. Deutch "compose[d] 74 documents containing highly classified information ... on an unsecure Macintosh at his home."

[CIA/DCIs/Deutch]

Calder, James D., comp. Intelligence, Espionage and Related Topics: An Annotated Bibliography of Serial Journal and Magazine Scholarship, 1844-1998. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1999.

From publisher: This book "provides an annotated bibliography of more than 10,000 [Clark comment: There are 10,369 numbered entries in this work.] citations on intelligence, intelligence services, espionage, and related national or domestic security issues published in serial journal article form, mainly in English language sources, from 1844 onward. Many citations to journals in other languages are also cited. The majority of citations are annotated, but non-annotated titles contain information sufficiently clear to indicate the nature of the contents. Citations are arranged alphabetically by author, and all co-authors are indexed."

To Valcourt, IJI&C 13.4, this "annotated listing of nearly 11,000 articles on a broad range of intelligence topics" represents "a valuable addition to the ... field of Intelligence Studies."

Kruh, Cryptologia 24.3, comments that "[t]he effort necessary to research, select, annotate and organize 9,500 articles from about 1,000 journals covering a period of 154 years is almost unthinkable.... This book is a treasure of information."

For Aldrich, I&NS 17.1, Calder's "is among the best intelligence bibliographies yet produced....[It] is a great resource for the beginner and the intelligence expert alike."

Shpiro, JIH 1.1, finds that "[t]he meticulously-researched entries include dozens of well known journals," but also cover "numerous journals and sources which the average intelligence scholar may not be familiar with.... The book is easy to use and is not cluttered with mysterious acronyms or technical jargon. It does seem a pity, however, that the publishers did not include with the book a searchable version on CD-ROM."

[RefMats/Bibs/Gen&U.S./Gen]

Caldwell

Calhoun, Daniel F. Hungary and Suez, 1956: An Exploration of Who Makes History. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1991.

According to Aldrich, I&NS 9.3, Calhoun uses only "limited source material," and his "understanding of the day-to-day diplomacy is far inferior to that offered in the other studies now available." He gives only a "thin treatment of clandestine activities." Cahoun's "observations on the activities of Radio Free Europe are ... balanced and fairly well-informed."

[GenPostwar/50s/Gen; UK/Postwar/Suez]

Calhoun, Ricky-Dale. "The Art of Strategic Counterintelligence: The Musketeer’s Cloak: Strategic Deception During the Suez Crisis of 1956." Studies in Intelligence 51, no. 2 (2007): 47-58. [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol51no2/the-art-of-strategic-counterintelligence.html]

"[T]he British, French, and Israelis hid their preparations [for an attack on Egypt] in plain sight by allowing the Americans to see what they expected to see and thus led them to a false conclusion, then acted in an unexpected way. The strategic deception operation that enabled them to do so was multi-faceted and complex."

[GenPostwar/50s/Gen; UK/Postwar/Suez]

California Western International Law Journal. "Haig v. Agee (101 S. Ct. 2766): A Decisive Victory for Governmental Regulation of Americans in International Travel. 13 (Winter 1983): 144-167.

 [Overviews/Legal/Travel]

Callaghan, John, and Mark Phythian. "State Surveillance of the CPGB Leadership: 1920s-1950s." Labour History Review 69, no. 1 (Apr. 2004): 19-33.

[UK/Overviews/Related]

Callahan, Raymond. "No Real Surprise Here." Military History 8 (Oct. 1991): 74-79.

According to Sexton, the author discusses "four strategic surprises achieved by Axis forces...: the conquest of Norway, the thrust through the Ardennes, the invasion of Russia and the attack at Pearl Harbor. Each event is assessed in [a] context of extant intelligence and preconceptions."

[Russia/WWII/Gen; WWII/Eur/Bulge & PearlHarbor]

Callamari, Peter, and Derek Reveron. "China's Use of Perception Management." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 16, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 1-15.

"China successfully used perception management in manipulating press coverage of the EP-3 incident to avoid blame and a label of enemy of the United States.... China nurtured a preexisting belief in many quarters that the United States is an uncontrollable hegemon.... Through a constant flow of propaganda, Beijing altered the focus and blame for the EP-3/F-8 collision."

[GenPostCW/00s/01/China]

Callum, Robert. "The Case for Cultural Diversity in the Intelligence Community." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 14, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 25-48.

The author argues that "cultural homogeneity leads to predictable and preventable errors in analysis" and that "greater diversity will lead to improvements in analysis by lessening the impact of shared, common biases."

[GenPostCW/00s/Gen]

Callwood, June. Emma: The True Story of Canada's Unlikely Spy. Toronto: General Books, 1985. Emma: A True Story of Treason. New York: Beaufort, 1985.

[Canada]

Calvi, Fabrizio, and Olivier Schmidt. Intelligences secretes -- Annales de l'espionnage. Paris: Hachette, 1988.

Rurarz-Huygens, IJI&C 2.2: This book is "full of nonsense as far as the interpretation of facts goes," and its "documentation ... cannot ... withstand serious scrutiny."

[Overviews/Older]

  Calvocoressi, Peter.

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