Cabaniss, H., Jr. "Espionage and Sabotage Legislation." California State Bar Journal 17 (May-Jun. 1942): 116-120. [Calder]
Cabell, Charles A., Jr. [BGEN/USAF (Ret.)], ed. A Man of Intelligence: Memoirs of War, Peace, and the CIA. Boulder, CO: Impavide Publications, 1997.
According to Peake, AFIO WIN 42-99 (23 Oct. 1999), Cabell held a succession of important Army Air Force and Air Force staff and intelligence positions before being named as DDCI (1953-1962) under Allen Dulles. Cabell devotes "[m]ore than 100 pages ... to his CIA service, and of particular interest here are his candid comments about the Bay of Pigs operation in which he was directly involved." Cabell's assessment of the reasons for the Bay of Pigs failure is "dispassionate," but he does not mince words either. This book "is a valuable contribution to the history of Air Force intelligence and the early years of the CIA."
[CIA/50s/Gen, 60s/BoP, & Memoirs; MI/AF/To89]
Cabell, Craig. Dennis Wheatley: Churchill's Storyteller. Staplehurst, UK: Spellmount, 2006.
Concerns the novelist's work in World War II.
Cabinet Office. National Intelligence Machinery. London: HMSO, 2001.
This is the September 2001 edition (previously published in 1993, 1996, and 2000) of the official description of the United Kingdom's intelligence and security structure. It was available at: http://www.official-documents.co.uk/document/caboff/nim/natint.htm, but that link is no longer valid [04/17/06]. Click for Table of Contents.
Cable, Larry. "Piercing the Mists: Limited and Ambiguous Conflicts." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 4, no. 1 (Spring 1990): 59-76.
Cable's article examines "the significant and qualitative alteration that might occur in both the formulation and execution of policy in situations involving actual or imminent insurgency, partisan guerrilla conflict, terrorism, and strategic special operations."
Cable, Larry E. Conflict of Myths: The Development of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War. New York: New York University Press, 1986.
Gibson, Library Journal (1986) (via Amazon.com), believes that the author "succeeds in showing that America's failure in Vietnam was the result of faulty military doctrine, not a loss of will." lesson from the past were too often "invalid, leading to an almost total misunderstanding of the struggle in Vietnam." This work is "well researched and well written," and it "strongly challenges the idea that the United States could have won in Vietnam."
[MI/SpecOps/Counterinsurgency; Vietnam/Gen & Phoenix]
Cable, Larry. Unholy Grail: The U.S. and the Wars in Vietnam. New York and London: Routledge, 1991.
To Surveillant 2.1, Cable presents "well-handled scholarly analysis..., [u]sing recently declassified holdings of the LBJ archives." He illustrates the "inability on the part of the military high command and the administration to accept the findings of intelligence reports, which repeatedly and accurately portrayed the failure of key elements of the American strategy. We expect this work will become a standard addition to MI course required reading lists--and deserves it."
Wirtz, I&NS 8.4, sees Unholy Grail as a "mixed contribution to the literature on the Vietnam War: its occasional brilliant insight and fine description of both the events and arguments of the day are offset by an incomplete analysis of the grand forces that governed the general course of the conflict."
Cacamo, Joseph A. "A Comparison and Analysis of Immunities Defenses Raised by Soviet Nationals Indicted Under United States Espionage Laws." Brooklyn Journal of International law 6, no. 2 (Summer 1980): 259-288.
Calder: "Functional immunity ... is not a defense against charges of espionage."
Cagle, Malcolm W. "Errors of the Korean War." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Mar. 1958, 31-35. [Petersen]
Cahn, Anne Hessing. Killing Detente: The Right Attacks the CIA. College Station, PA: Penn State Press, 1998.
Clark comment: The advertisement for this book at http://www.press.uchicago.edu is muddled. It states: "Killing Detente tells the story of a major episode of intelligence intervention [emphasis added] in politics in the mid-1970s that led to the derailing of detente between the Soviet Union and the United States and to the resurgence of the Cold War in the following decade." The reference is to the Team A/Team B exercise. Calling the furor that followed the leaking of the Team B report, which the advertisement acknowledges was "performed by people outside the government," an "intelligence intervention" is reaching to find something else to blame on U.S. intelligence agencies. The "intervention," if such it was, came from nonintelligence, ideologically motivated individuals.
Macartney, AFIO WIN 35 (14 Sep. 1998), notes that the author "seems to view ... spending on defense or intelligence as total waste. Nevertheless, this is an interesting book with a good explanation of intelligence, the CIA, NIE's, the Committee on the Present Danger and the 1976 B Team exercise." For Zelikow, FA 78.3 (May-Jun. 1999), it seems that the "real and gnawing uncertainities at the time about Soviet capabilities and intentions do not ... evoke [Cahn's] sympathies, or [her] comprehension."
While acknowledging "the sheer depth of research" that Cahn "has mustered," Berkowitz, Survival, Spring 1999, believes that she "gives the hawks too much credit." The argument that the Team B exercise "was part of a planned campaign to attack the CIA in order to kill detente ... is, at best, stretched, and it detracts from an otherwise valuable contribution to the study of intelligence." Warnke, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Jan. 1999, finds this a "highly readable" book that provides "thoughtful analysis," but adds that the Team B "exercise ... delayed -- but did not derail -- detente." Killing Detente is of "historical interest" and will be "useful as a teaching tool."
Harknett, I&NS 15.4, comments that this work "is at its finest when detailing the political and bureaucratic intrigues that led to the creation of Team B." However, "[a]s an attack on defense spending and national security-making in the 1980s, it overshoots; as a treatment of the importance of NIEs to major policy shifts, it underwhelms." To Hahn, JAH, Jun. 2000, Cahn has provided "a useful overview of bureaucratic, ideological, and political rivalries among intelligence experts within and without the federal government.... [Nevertheless,] the author does not convincingly establish a causal link between the widespread opposition to detente and Team B's attack on it."
Cahn, Anne Hessing, and John Prados. "Team B: The Trillion Dollar Experiment." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Apr. 1993, 22-31.
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