Brown, Andrew. "The Viennaese Connection: Engelbert Broda, Alan Nunn May and Atomic Espionage." Intelligence and National Security 24, no. 2 (Apr. 2009): 173-193.
The author explores the linkages between Austrian expatriate scientists May and Broda (who may have recruited May for espionage) in relation to their work for Soviet intelligence.
Brown, Anthony Cave.
Brown, Arthur O. "Les Jedburghs: Un coup de maître ou une occasion manquée" [The Jedburghs: A master stroke or a lost opportunity?]. Guerres Mondiales et Conflits Contemporains 174 (1994), 127-142.
Brown, Bryan D. ("Doug") [GEN/USA] "U.S. Special Operations Command: Meeting the Challenges of the 21st Century." Joint Force Quarterly 40 (1st Quarter 2006): 38-43. [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/issue40.htm]
The Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, (USSOCOM), traces the early history of U.S. special forces from OSS through the years of ups and downs in terms of attention paid to such forces. Why such inaction? General Brown states that it was due to the fact that "the services did not view Special Operations as vital to national defense, and they could not agree on its substance, funding, or how it would be controlled." The turning point was the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 and the Nunn-Cohen amendment in 1987. Dramatic change has followed Defense Secretary Rumsfeld's designation of USSOCOM as the lead element in planning the war on terror.
Brown, Charles H. Agents of Manifest Destiny. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1980. [Petersen]
Brown, Cody M. The National Security Council: A Legal History of the President's Most Powerful Advisers. Washington, DC: Project on National Security Reform, Center for the Study of the Presidency, 2008. [Available at: http://www.pnsr.org/data/images/the%20national%20security%20council.pdf]
Brown, Dallas C. "Combat Intelligence Today." Armor 73 (Oct. 1964): 20- 23. [Petersen]
Brown, David. "SpecOps Chief Wants More Active PSYOPS, Civil Affairs Companies." Air Force Times 63 (24 Mar. 2003): 22.
Gen. Charles Holland (USAF), Commander, Headquarters U.S. Special Operations Command, wants to increase the number of active-duty soldiers in civil affairs and PSYOPS units.
Brown, Donald C. "Another View of S&T Analysis." Studies in Intelligence 19, no. 2 (Summer 1975): 25-28.
This is a response to an earlier article by Robert M. Clark.
Brown, Donald C. "On the Trail of Hen House and Hen Roost." Studies in Intelligence 13, no. 2 (Spring 1969): 11-19. [Richelson, Wizards (2002)]
Brown, Drusilla. "Psychological Operations (PSYOP): United States-Soviet Union." Military Intelligence 8, no. 4 (1982): 46-48.
Brown, F.C. "The Phoenix Program." Military Journal 2 (Spring 1979): 19-21, 49. [Petersen]
Brown, F.C. "Xenophon Kalamatiano: America's 'Ace of Spies.'" Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 12, no. 4 (Oct. 1996): 1-3.
This is a brief, factual account. It is unfootnoted but, nonetheless, is reasonably accurate (even if the author does place Culver Academy in Illinois). If your interest in the subject is limited, this is probably the article to read.
Brown, George E., Jr. "Politics and Secrecy: Easing the Tension." American Intelligence Journal 9, no. 1 (1988): 30-31.
Former HPSCI member.
Brown, George W. Baltimore and the Nineteenth of April, 1861. Chicago: U.S. Publishing, 1895. [Petersen]
Brown, Harold. "The Military Planner's Challenge: Reconciling Technology with Policy." Foreign Affairs 45, no. 2 (Spring 1967): 277-290.
Brown is a former Secretary of Defense. The section of the article that is of direct interest is: "Section II: The Utility of Intelligence Estimates."
Brown, Janet Welsh, ed. In the U.S. Interest: Resources, Growth, and Security in the Developing World. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1990.
Brown, Jason M. [MAJ/USAF] "To Bomb or Not to Bomb? Counterinsurgency, Airpower, and Dynamic Targeting." Air & Space Power Journal 21, no. 4 (Winter 2007): 75-85.
Abstract: "Air strikes, independent from ground operations, are known as 'dynamic targeting.'" Such "strikes have typically been counterproductive in counterinsurgency campaigns" due to real or perceived collateral damage. However, Brown "asserts that commanders and planners who integrate dynamic targeting into the counterinsurgency campaign using careful target selection; quick, precise employment; and solid assessment of the enemy and population will produce positive, tangible results."
Brown, J. Willard. The Signal Corps U.S.A. in the War of the Rebellion. Boston: U.S. Veteran Signal Corps Assn., 1896.
Brown, Kathryn. "Intelligence and the Decision to Collect It: Churchill's Wartime American Diplomatic Signals Intelligence." Intelligence and National Security 10, no. 3 (Jul. 1995): 449-467.
Churchill was receiving intercepts of U.S. diplomatic traffic in the second half of 1941. Britain had read State Department codes during World War I and continued to do so in the interwar period. The author concludes, using circumstantial evidence and logic, that it is probable that Churchill no longer received this material after Pearl Harbor. For the author, the question remains of why the British continued their intercept activity in the period immediately before Pearl Harbor. Ultimately, Brown concludes, the decision to do so should not come as a surprise.
Brown, Kathryn E. "The Interplay of Information and Mind in Decision-Making: Signals Intelligence and Franklin D. Roosevelt's Policy-Shift on Indochina." Intelligence and National Security 13, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 109-131.
From abstract: "In 1945, after a severe decline in Roosevelt's already poor health..., his staff ... [gained] much greater influence over policy towards Indochina. As a result, intelligence on Indochina played a role in the Roosevelt administration's policy-shift toward the colony."
Brown, Lorne, and Caroline Brown. An Unauthorized History of the RCMP. Toronto: James Lorrimer, 1978.
Brown, Louis. A Radar History of World War II: Technical and Military Imperatives. Bristol, UK, and Philadelphia, PA: Institute of Physics Publishing, 2000.
Beard, I&NS 16.2, notes that most of the book traces developments in Britain, the United States, and Germany. The focus is on "three campaigns...: the Battle of the Atlantic, the bombing of German cities, and the Allied sweep across the Pacific." The author's "narrative is straightforward, his style workmanlike, his documentation meticulous.... [I]t is hard to believe that anyone will write a better book on this subject."
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