Bridgland, Fred.
Jonas Savimbi: A Key to Africa. New York: Paragon, 1987. Bridgland, Fred.
Jonas Savimbi: A Key to Africa. New York: Paragon, 1987.
http://www.cloakanddagger.com/dagger: "More than a biography of Savimbi, this work vividly chronicles the changing social and political face of Africa."
[CA/Africa]
Bridis, Ted. "The CIA Dept. of Quirky Tricks: Agency Reveals Gadgets, but You Can't See Them." Washington Post, 31 Dec. 2003, A17. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
"The CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology is celebrating its 40th anniversary by revealing a few dozen secrets for a new museum inside its headquarters in Langley." In addition to a transmitter disguised as tiger dung (designed for use in the jungles of Vietnam), "the exhibits include a robotic catfish, a remote-controlled dragonfly and a camera strapped to the chests of pigeons released over enemy targets in the 1970s."
[CIA/C&C/S&T]
Bridis, Ted. "FBI Missed Internal Signs of Espionage." Associated Press, 17 Jan. 2006. [http://www.ap.org]
"By the government's own account, FBI analyst Leandro Aragoncillo was spying in plain sight. He rummaged through FBI computers for intelligence reports unrelated to his work and then e-mailed the classified documents to opposition leaders in the Philippines.... Aragoncillo's lawyers and prosecutors are trying to wrap up a plea deal that would secure a guilty plea and his cooperation.... He is not charged with espionage.... Instead, he's charged in court papers with conspiring to reveal government secrets, acting as a foreign agent and improperly using FBI computers."
[SpyCases/U.S./Aragoncillo]
Bridis, Ted. "White House Bows to Pressure from High-Tech Industry Over Encryption." Associated Press, 16 Sep. 1999.
On 16 September 1999, the White House "agreed ... to allow U.S. companies to sell the most powerful data-scrambling technology overseas with virtually no restrictions, a concession to America's high-tech industry over law enforcement and national security objections."
[Cryptography/Encryption]
Brigane, David V. "Credentials -- Bona Fide or False." Studies in Intelligence 4, no. 1 (Fall 1960): 37-49.
"As a tool in the investigation of enemy agents, document analysis can be used to great advantage not only in making an initial detection but in the handling of known agents, inducing them to talk and confirming or refuting their statements.... Document analysis ... can be equally valuable in determining the reliability of one's own agents and in assessing their reports and missions."
[CIA/Components/Tradecraft]
Briggs,
Ralph T. "The Day VADM Yamagata Joined His Honorable Ancestors."
Cryptolog 10, no. 5 (1989): 1-14.
Petersen: "Also in Naval History 3, no. 2 (1989): 29-35." The shotdown of Yamagata's plane was accomplished on the basis of intelligence gathered by Fleet Radio Unit China, according to a letter signed by Emil Levine in NIPQ, Spring 1996.
[WWII/FE/Pac]
Briggs, Thomas.
"The Emperor's New Clothes." Intelligencer 10, no. 1 (Winter
1999): 1-2.
The author argues that the DO is disarray today because "[t]here are too many managers and not enough leaders." The better new recruits are leaving the DO because they become frustrated with the mediocre managers above them.
[CIA/C&C/DO]
Bright, Martin, Ed Vulliamy, and Peter Beaumont. "Revealed: US Dirty Tricks to Win Vote on Iraqi War." The Observer, 2 Mar. 2003.
An NSA memorandum "leaked to The Observer" reveals that the United States is conducting an "aggressive surveillance operation, which involves interception of the home and office telephones and the emails of UN delegates in New York."
Clark comment: The purported NSA document is filled with easily identifiable "Briticisms."
[NSA/03]
Brinkley, David
A., and Andrew W. Hull. Estimative Intelligence: A Textbook on the History, Products, Uses, and Writing of Intelligence Estimates. Columbus, OH: Batelle, 1979.
[Analysis/Estimative]
Brinkley, Douglas.
"The Right Choice for the C.I.A.: Lake Is a Victim of the Far Right."
New York Times, 10 Feb. 1997, A15 (N).
"Mr. Lake has been on the radical right's enemies list since 1970.... But if his detractors examined his record, they would see that he is not the ideological foe they portray him to be."
[CIA/90s/97/Lake][c]
Brinkley, Joel.
[arranged chronologically]
1. "C.I.A. Primer Tells Nicaraguans Rebels How to Kill." New York Times, 17 Oct. 1984, A1.
2. "Democrats Assail C.I.A. Primer for Latin Rebels." New York Times, 18 Oct. 1984, A6.
3. "President Orders 2 Investigations on C.I.A. Manual." New York Times, 19 Oct. 1984, A1.
4. "Nicaraguan Rebel Disputes U.S. Aide." New York Times, 20 Oct. 1984, A1-A3.
5. "Adviser Says Reagan Will Dismiss Officials Linked to Rebel Primer." New York Times, 22 Oct. 1984, A1, A10.
6. "Rebel Asserts C.I.A. Pledge Help in War Against Sandinistas." New York Times, 1 Nov. 1984, A1, A14.
7. "C.I.A. Chief Defends Manual for Nicaraguan Rebels." New York Times, 2 Nov. 1984, A3.
[CIA/80s/Manual]
Brinkley, Joel. "Ex-C.I.A. Aides Say Iraq Leader Helped Agency in 90's Attacks." New York Times, 9 Jun. 2004. [http://www.nytimes.com]
According to "several former intelligence officials," Iraqi prime minister-designate Iyad Alawi "ran an exile organization [the Iraqi National Accord] intent on deposing Saddam Hussein that sent agents into Baghdad in the early 1990's to plant bombs and sabotage government facilities under the direction of the C.I.A."
[CIA/00s/04/Gen; MI/Ops/Iraq/04]
Brinkley, Joel, and Philip Shenon. "Ridge Meeting Opposition from Agencies." New York Times, 6 Feb. 2002, A16.
[Terrorism/DHS]
Briscoe, Charles H., et al. All Roads Lead to Baghdad: Army Special Operations Forces in Iraq. Fort Bragg, NC: USASOC History Office, 2006.
Dugat, Air & Space Power Journal 21.4 (Winter 2007), calls this "an eye-opening account" of Operation Iraqi Freedom. This is "a superb picture of th[e] war and its aftermath.... Written chronologically, the study covers details down to the hour when the planning stage began.... Some portions seem repetitive, however, and several times the authors’ clear recounting of operations makes the summaries unnecessary."
[MI/Ops/00s/Iraq/Books; MI/SpecOps/00s]
Brissaud, André.
Tr. & ed. Ian Colvin. Canaris: The Biography of Admiral Canaris,
Chief of German Military Intelligence in the Second World War. London:
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1970. New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1974.
To Constantinides, this is "a fairly well-researched biography," but he notes that the emphasis is on Canaris' attitude toward the Nazi state rather than his intelligence accomplishments and failures. In addition, the "final and exact picture of Canaris's opposition role is still to be drawn and is not to be found in this work."
Pforzheimer states Brissaud's conclusion thusly: Canaris "was neither a traitor to Germany nor a British agent. Rather, he was an intellectual who deplored Nazi excesses and, thus, occasionally assisted the Allied war effort."
[WWII/Eur/Ger]
Brissaud,
André. The Nazi Secret Police. New York: Norton, 1974. London: Bodley Head, 1974.
Wilcox notes that this book is a "study of the formation of the Nazi SD under Heydrich, 1933-1939." Constantinides sees Brissaud's journalist background showing in the book's episodic organization.
[Germany/Interwar]
Bristow,
Desmond, and Bill Bristow. A Game of Moles: The Deceptions of an MI6 Officer. Boston & London: Little, Brown, 1993.
Surveillant 3.4/5 notes that this book presents the "part Bristow played within Section V -- the counterintelligence arm of MI6." He spent the "wartime years working for MI6 in Gibraltar and Algiers ... [and] retired in 1954.... [He] remains convinced that Roger Hollis of MI5 was a Soviet spy, that Guy Liddell was in the same category, and that David Footman (chief of MI6's political section for Central Europe) was working for the Russians, too."
For West, WIR 13.4, the author's account of his adventures in wartime Spain is "one entertaining anecdote after another." The book "dovetails with Philby's memoirs,... [as] the only detailed recollections in the public domain of Section V's activities.... [It] offers a fascinating insight into a rather obscure corner of the secret war."
Defty, I&NS 10.1, suggests that Bristow's critical stance toward his former employers may be "in no small part the result of his friendship with Peter Wright.... Bristow digresses rather often, apparently unable to contain his anger at 'how badly many worthy people have been treated by the powers that be....' [T]he charges he makes [against Hollis and Liddell] are largely a reiteration of those of his friend Peter Wright, and they are thankfully largely confined to one chapter." Most of the book "offers an engaging, occasionally revealing, and often diverting insight into some of more successful wartime deception operations conducted by SIS in the Mediterranean theatre."
[UK/SpyCases/Debate; UK/WWII/Med, Spain, & Services/MI6]
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