Braun, Otto. A Comintern Agent in China, 1932-1939. Tr., Jeanne Moore. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982. London: Hurst, 1982.
From "Introduction" by Dick Wilson: Braun was "Comintern military adviser to the Chinese Communist Party" and was the only Westerner to take part in the Long March. He "was less accepted in the decision-making circles of the Chinese Communist Party after Mao's ascendancy in 1935."
Braunschweig, Pierre Th. Tr., Karl Vorlathen and Frances Stirnemann-Lewis. Secret Channel to Berlin: The Masson-Schellenberg Connection and Swiss Intelligence in World War II. Havertown, PA: Casement, 2004.
Peake, Studies 49.2 (2005), finds that the author has thoroughly documented the complex details that make up this story. The work deals with "the controversial clandestine relationship between two World War II intelligence officers, SS Brigadier General Walter Schellenberg, head of the Nazi Reich Security Central Office (RHSA), and Colonel-Brigadier Roger Masson, head of Swiss military intelligence."
For Kruh, Cryptologia 29.3 (Jul. 2005), the author "tells the fascinating story of the most controversial Swiss intelligence operation" of World War II. "This is a superb book that fills in a large gap in our knowledge of a largely unknown aspect" of the war. Foot, I&NS 20.3 (Sep. 2005), comments that this "thoroughly scholarly work" is presented in an "effortlessly clear" translation. The "book, crammed with minutiae, gets more and more interesting as its main narrative goes on."
Bray, Ann. "Undercover Nisei." In Military Intelligence: Its Heroes and Legends, 29-45. Arlington Hall Station, VA: USA Intelligence and Security Command, 1987.
http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usamhi/RefBibs/intell/ww2/genmisc.htm: Hawaiian Japanese-Americans are recruited by the CIC in 1941 for work in the Philippines.
[WWII/FE/Pac/Nisei & Philippines]
Bray, Jeffrey K. Ultra in the Atlantic. 4 vols. Laguna Hills, CA: Aegean Park Press, 1994.
Vol. I: Allied Communications Intelligence and the Battle of the Atlantic.
Vol. II: U-Boat Operations.
Vol. III: German Naval Communications Intelligence.
Vol. IV: Technical Intelligence from Allied Communications Intelligence.
Surveillant 4.1: These are "reprinted, edited" versions of publications from the National Archives -- SRH-009, SRH-024, and SRH-025.
Breaks, Katherine. "Ladies of the OSS: The Apron Strings of Intelligence in World War II." American Intelligence Journal 13, no. 3 (Summer 1992): 91-96.
Although this is a heavily edited (that is, shortened) version of the author's Senior Essay in the History Department, Yale University, it is an excellent introduction to the contribution made by women to the work of OSS. The author concludes: "The role of women in OSS was limited. OSS worked within the gender constraints of the period, hiring most women for gender-specific work and eschewing a leading role in promoting women with skills. But OSS was not regressive either, giving outstanding candidates meaningful work in Research and Analysis and Morale Operations. The work of the women in OSS was a mixed bag, not a treasure trove of opportunity but nevertheless provided one of the few ways women could play a direct role in World War II."
Brecher, Michael, and Benjamin Geist. Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967 and 1973. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1980.
Breckinridge, James G. "Designing Effective Teaching and Learning Environments for a New Generation of Analysts." International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 23, no. 2 (Summer 2010): 307-323.
"The IC looks to academic institutions to assist with the preliminary preparations of aspiring analysts. If these institutions are to be effective, evaluation standards and measures of effectiveness, as established by the IC, should be fully integrated into the academic curricula."
Breckinridge, Scott D. The CIA and the Cold War: A Memoir. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993.
Periscope 18.2 provides the following biographic data on Breckinridge: "For three years, 1954-1957, he was the CIA briefing officer for the White House Staff. He represented CIA before the 1975-1976 congressional investigating committees. He was on the Inspector-General Staff at CIA from 1962-1979. He dealt extensively with the Church Committee on Covert Action issues." IJI&C 8.1 adds that "Breckinridge ... served for six years as [CIA's] Deputy Inspector General."
Mapother, CIRA Newsletter 14.2, believes that "[i]ntelligence officers will find the book illuminating.... The author's prose ... is not sprightly, but it is sober.... The author has done considerable service: to the CIA ... and to the reader." Surveillant 3.6 comments that there are "[m]any stories by those on the sidelines but their 'facts' are not always correct. Just because someone was in the vicinity he may not have known what was going on above and below him."
Breckinridge, Scott D. The CIA and the U.S. Intelligence System. Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1986.
Strong, I&NS 2.1, is displeased with the lack of critical commentary with regard to the more controversial aspects of the CIA, but concludes, nonetheless, that the author "has largely succeeded in producing a simplified basic textbook suitable for use by the teacher in the classroom, as well as individuals without direct knowledge or experience in intelligence matters."
Breckinridge, Scott D. "CIA's Inspector General -- The DCI's Independent Eye: Another View." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 3, no. 3 (Fall 1989): 419-424.
This article takes issue with Kaiser, "The Watchers' Watchdog...," IJI&C 3.1:55-75, noting that the tenor of Kaiser's article is "the CIA IG function has been ineffective.... This was the apparent basis for proposals to change the operation. A variety of legislative proposals were discussed.... I take exception with the premises Mr. Kaiser offers in support of the proposals, on the basis that they are badly grounded factually." This amounts to an effort to "use misrepresentation as a basis for extending congressional involvement into detailed internal management of the Executive."
Clark comment: I served on the Inspector General Staff in the mid-1980s. My experience in that timeframe has produced a view of the IG function that is much closer to that of Breckinridge than Kaiser. However, neither Breckinridge (whose tenure with the Inspector General predates mine) nor I have current, first-hand experience in that arena. Hints that have made their way into public view from the lengthy tenure of Fred Hitz, the CIA's first statutory IG, suggest significant changes in a number of ways in that function.
Breckinridge, Scott D. "Post-Cold War Intelligence." World Intelligence Review 13, no. 4 (1994): 1-2.
The author points to major cuts projected in CIA and Defense Department intelligence positions and dollars. He expresses concern that further cuts, given the continuing absence of policy guidance from either the White House or Congress, "may fail to preserve the capabilities needed to provide the information required.... Major comprehensive planning must be done ... before tinkerers rearrange pieces and reassign missions so that they differ materially from those already in the process of change."
Breckinridge, Scott D. "Post Iran-Contra Question." Foreign Intelligence Literary Scene 12, no. 3 (1993): 1-2.
The author asks: Why -- if the summaries of the joint congressional report on the Iran-Contra Affair are correct -- was the rationale of the Boland Amendment and the cut-off of support to the Contras that the CIA had failed to notify Congress of the harbor-mining program?
Breckinridge, Scott D. "The Shape of Post-Cold War Intelligence." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 8, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 1-10.
"[I]f done soundly the main benefit [of restructuring] will prove to be a realignment of the pieces of the Intelligence Community so as to reduce redundancies." However, it would be realistic to recognize that a "new system will bring limited change in the community functioning and the basic product, assuming that the principle of 'national intelligence' is protected.... [G]reat care is critical to avoid damage to the intelligence community during the period of adjustment, [but] doubt exists that the requisite care is being or will be exercised by Congress or the president."
Clark comment: Making the assumption that the principle of "national intelligence" will be protected does not guarantee its fulfillment. This is an area of concern to those who favor continuation or strengthening of centralized, civilian control of American intelligence: Diminishing military resources has the services beginning to cast covetous looks toward control of "national" assets.
Breckinridge, Scott D. "Truman, the Church Committee and Covert Action." Periscope 18, no. 2 (1993): 1.
Breede, Christian. "Intelligence Lessons and the Emerging Canadian Counter-Insurgenry Doctrine." Canadian Army Journal 9, no. 3 (2006): 24-40.
Breede, Walter J., Jr. "The Military Attaché: Master of Strange Trades." Marine Corps Gazette 67 (Jul. 1983): 70-74. [Petersen]
Breemer, Jan S. "Soviet Naval Capabilities." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 1, no. 4 (1986): 119-132.
Problems in intelligence estimates.
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