Bowman, M. E. "Collective Security v. Personal Privacy." Intelligencer 14, no. 2 (Winter-Spring 2005): 39-47.
The author discusses "the social and legal predicates for the laws, regulations and even the social compact we work under today." He notes that "for the United States and other common law nations it can be very difficult to know how to fit modern technology into our present legal regime." He concludes: "From colonial days, the average United States citizen has considered privacy, in particular, the right to be free of government intrusion, to be an integral part of security. Even so, government must be able to provide both security and privacy. In an age of widespread terrorism, this demands innovative methods of compiling and sharing information, coupled with equally innovative methods of protecting it."
Bowman, M. E. "Spike." "The Drumbeats for Clemency for Jonathan Jay Pollard Reverberate Again." Intelligencer 18, no. 2 (Winter-Spring 2011): 7-10.
"Taken in the aggregate, and without analysis," the arguments for Pollard's release "seem logical; however, if one looks behind the sound bites, the issues are far from simple and explain why clemency continues to be ill-advised.... Pollard is not a sympathetic character when one is given the full picture of his activities against this country. He was neither a U.S. nor an Israeli patriot. He was a self-serving, gluttonous character seeking financial reward and personal gratification."
Bowman, M. E. "Dysfunctional Information Restrictions." Intelligencer 15, no. 2 (Fall-Winter 2006-2007): 29-37.
The author looks at the underlying theory and structure of the formal classification system, as well as "undefined caveats" designed to control unclassified information, and concludes that the system "has become dysfunctional in the face of current needs of national security." What is needed is "an updated philosophy of information restriction and disclosure."
Bowman, M. E. "The Fall of the Wall: Peace Dividend or Inheritance Tax." Intelligencer 16, no. 1 (Spring 2008): 27-35.
"[T]he world remains poitically organized on a system nearly 400 years old, but the threats to that order are 21st century -- which is to say, transnational and multi-national."
Bowman, M. E. "Intelligence Contributions to American Law: The Early Years." Intelligencer 13, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 2002): 31-43.
"[I]ntelligence and intelligence-related matters have always been among the catalysts for law and for policy, even from colonial days.... This article briefly describes the influence of intelligence on law and policy in the formative years of the Republic."
Bowman, M. E.
1. "Intelligence and International Law." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 8, no. 3 (Fall 1995): 321-335.
"Whatever else may be said of the intelligence function in international affairs, the fact that it exists, is tolerated, and has limits of behavior is demonstrable. These attributes create definable customary international norms. Occasionally, to explain the perceived pattern may be difficult, and it may be impossible consistently to demarcate the limits of tolerance, but that does not belie the existence of norms, however ephemeral and transitory they may appear."
2. "Intelligence, Law Enforcement and International Law." American Intelligence Journal 28, no. 1 (2010): 59-66.
"There is no rational reason why the decisions of Westphalia, now more than four centuries past, must be thought to control issues for which they were not intended.... [T]he world community needs to revisit the concept of sovereignty and consider the need to accommodate threat remediation efforts that will inhere to the benefit of all."
Bowman, M. E. "The Legacy of the Church Committee." Intelligencer 14, no. 1 (Winter-Spring 2004): 27-34.
The system of legislative and regulatory compromises that followed the Church Committee investigations "has served the nation well for more than two decades." However, "terrorism represents an unprecedented confluence of phenomena that belies the traditional separation of law enforcement and intelligence.... What we have seen thus far in the war on terrorism is unlike any other domestic crisis response in our history. Authorities have been broadened to meet the new challenge, but there have been no concessions of [the] rights" of U.S. Persons.
Bowman, M. E. "The Lessons of SHAMROCK." Intelligencer 16, no. 2 (Fall 2008): 7-11.
This is not a revisit of the details of NSA's SHAMROCK, but rather a carefully argued discussion of privacy vs. security. "Today we have a bewildering array of new technologies that leave in the dust both traditional and evolutionary thought processes of the Fourth Amendment.... SHAMROCK is, today, a crude example of the technological means to be intrusive, but it remains an important benchmark to illustrate the ease with which the use of technology can morph into activitiy not originally contemplated."
Bowman, M. E. "Privacy, Technology, Security, and Surveillance." Intelligencer 20, no. 1 (Spring-Summer 2013): 7-17.
This article "is about the way technology has changed and is changing the way the way we live our lives and, perhaps, the way the 4th Amendment is understood."
Bowman, M. E. "Prosecuting Spies: An Uneasy Alliance of Security, Ethics, and Law." Defense Intelligence Journal 4, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 57-81.
"[P]rosecution involving classified information is one of the most difficult undertakings of our legal system." The author identifies six basic issues which underlie the problems of espionage prosecution: the charges, discovery, the evidence, using classified information (the author discusses the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA)), defenses (diplomatic status, the national security standard, reliance on apparent authority, extra-territorial acts, promises), and sentencing. An earlier version of this article, "Prosecuting Spies: An Uneasy Alliance of Security, Ethics and Law," appears in American Intelligence Journal 11, no. 2 (1990): 29-39.
Bowman, M. E. "Some-Time, Part-Time and One-Time Terrorism." Intelligencer 13, no. 2 (Winter-Spring 2003): 13-18.
"The challenge to prevent terrorism from the unaligned terrorists is perhaps the greatest challenge ever given to the law enforcement (LE) and intelligence communities (IC)."
Bowman, M. E. "The 'Worst' Spy: Perceptions of Espionage." American Intelligence Journal 18, no. 1/2 (1998): 57-62.
The author finds a "counter-productive pattern" to perceptions surrounding each new espionage case from the Walkers in 1985 to Nicholson and Pitts in 1996. We "have had a tendency either to characterize every instance of espionage in superlatives or to pay scant attention at all." Neither approach produces positive results.
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