Born, Hans, and Ian Leigh. Making Intelligence Accountable: Legal Standards and Best Practice for Oversight of Intelligence Agencies. Oslo: Parliament of Norway, 2005.
According to Lilliu, I&NS 21.4 (Aug. 2006), the authors "have drafted a concise manual, documenting legal standards for democratic accountability together with best practices and procedures for oversight. Their analysis is based on the legal frameworks of intelligence oversight from a variety of democratic countries."
Born, Hans, and Marina Caparini, eds. Democratic Control of Intelligence Services: Containing Rogue Elephants. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007.
According to Peake, Studies 52.1 (Mar. 2008) and Intelligencer 16.1 (Spring 2008), four Western (France, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and five former Soviet bloc (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Romania) countries are discussed; there are also articles discussing "the fundamental principles of oversight." Although this work "looks closely at what has been and what needs to be done, it does not address the practical problem of the qualifications of those doing the oversight."
[France/Overviews; OtherCountries/Bulgaria; OtherCountries/Czech/PostCW; OtherCountries/Hungary; OtherCountries/Norway; OtherCountries/Poland/PostCW; OtherCountries/Romania; Oversight/00s; UK/PostCW/Gen]
Born, Hans, Loch K. Johnson, and Ian Leigh, eds. Who's Watching the Spies? Establishing Intelligence Service Accountability. Dulles, VA: Potomac, 2005.
From publisher: The authors "examine the strengths and weaknesses of the intelligence systems of Argentina, Canada, Germany, Norway, Poland, South Africa, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States."
Peake, Studies 50.2 (2006), comments that "[t]he experiences of each nation provide an interesting mosaic of desired goals and problems of implementation.... It is a timely topic and worth the attention of all those who must deal with these issues everyday as well as the general public whose civil rights are affected when oversight is too robust or inadequate." To Jacoby, DIJ 16.2 (2007), this work "succeeds greatly as an informative source on the workings of current intelligence oversight systems." However, "[t]he reader is left wanting recommendations and commentary on the ethics of intelligence oversight."
For Winn, Parameters, Summer 2006, this "valuable contribution ... addresses the central criteria that should be taken into account by any nation or international organization that hopes to place intelligence agencies under democratic supervision.... [T]he objectives are to ensure that intelligence and security agencies are insulated from political abuse, but not isolated from executive governance."
Brown, I&NS 21.6 (Dec. 2006), finds this work to be "a diappointment. Most of the material is dry and sometimes soporific. It is also biased toward the advocates of intelligence accountability," in that the "essays all address the positives of such a program, but not the negatives.... A debate format would have been much more appropriate..., and could have easily been accomplished by excluding numerous irrelevant and tedious essays."
[Canada/PostCW/00s; Germany/PostCW/00s; LA/Argentina; OtherCountries/Norway; OtherCountries/Poland/PostCW; OtherCountries/SAfrica; OtherCountries/SKorea; Oversight/00s; UK/PostCW/Gen]
Born, Hans, Ian Leigh, and Aidan Wills, eds. International Intelligence Co-operation and Accountability. London: Routledge, 2010.
Acording to Peake, Studies 56.1 (Mar. 2012), this volume brings together "12 conference presentations by academics, lawyers, and parliamentary participants from various European and Asian nations and Canada" at a 2008 workshop hosted by the Norwegian Parliamentary Intelligence Oversight Committee. "Although no US authors are included, various putative CIA operations and international reactions to them are offered as examples in the analyses of accountability issues. Thus the book is not light reading, but it is a valuable contribution on the issues raised and to the literature of intelligence."
Born, Matt. "Targeting Hearts and Minds." Telegraph (London), 20 Sep. 1999. [http:// www.telegraph.co.uk]
BBC2's "The Spying Game," broadcast on 19 September 1999, identified the agent codenamed "Diana" in the Stasi files as Fiona Houlding.
Borne, John E. The USS Liberty: Dissenting History vs. Official History. New York: Reconsideration Press, 1995.
Fishel, IJI&C 8.3: "Borne's work is especially valuable for findings that have turned up in the years since Ennes's book came out." [Clark comment: The reference is to James Ennes, Assault on the Liberty (1979).]
Borosage, Robert. "What to Do with the Intelligence Agencies." Working Papers for a New Society 4 (Winter 1977): 38-45.
Petersen: "Critic of U.S. intelligence."
Borosage, Robert L., and John Marks, eds. The CIA File. New York: Grossman, 1976.
According to Minnick, NameBase, this "anthology of eleven essays on CIA operations around the world was produced by the Center for National Security Studies during a two-day conference on 'The CIA and Covert Action' in September, 1974. The meeting included many of the biggest names in espionage studies: David Wise, Thomas Ross, Morton Halperin, Victor Marchetti, and John Marks." Former DCI William Colby "presented an essay at the meeting defending CIA activities, and participated in a question and answer session involving Senator James Abourezk."
Pforzheimer notes that the papers are "virtually all hostile to covert action ... and ... American intelligence.... [DCI] Colby ... spoke at the end of the conference.... [His] paper is also included."
Borovik, Genrikh. Ed., Phillip Knightley. The Philby Files: The Secret Life of Master Spy Kim Philby. Boston: Little, Brown, 1994.
West, WIR 13.3, comments that Borovik "has relied on two sources, his taped conversations with Philby combined with his subjective impression ... during dozens of interviews, and access to some documents from Philby's KGB dossier." But he "does not quote from any files dated after August 1945." He has also "accepted many of Philby's assertions that are patently incorrect." For example, Philby was not a "scion of an old aristocratic family," nor would he have become SIS's chief. There are "many minor inaccuracies" and it is "difficult to determine whether the contradictions are deliberate or simply sloppy edit[ing].... Philby's spirit of disinformation is perpetuated."
For Surveillant 4.1, this as "an entirely new portrait of Philby that reveals how much he had previously managed to conceal, and provides a picture of how the KGB recruited and ran its agents.... The focus ... is on the period 1951 to 1956 when Maclean and Burgess had already defected." Economist, 7 Jan. 1995, notes that Borovik "is a novelist, not a historian.... Nor were Philby's reminiscences altogether reliable.... Still, Mr Borovik did get facts out of the files."
Chambers finished the book "still no wiser about the real Philby at the end than at the beginning." According to Kerr, I&NS 11.3, the "main problem ... is to discern where the taped interview or KGB file ends and Borovik's imagination begins.... Borovik was also careless about dates which lessens his credibility, and there are some odd errors which raise doubts about the book."
Borowy, Stefan. "Military Intelligence Behind Enemy Lines." Studies in Intelligence 2, no. 3 (Summer 1958): 107-116.
The author details "the systematic intelligence collection effort carried out [during World War II] in Poland under the direction of the Home Army's Intelligence Division."
Borries, Rudolf von. Spionage im Westen vor dem Kriege [Espionage in the West before the War]. In Weltkriegsspionage [World War Espionage], ed. [Maj. Gen.] Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, 77-84. Munich: Justin Moser, 1931. [H. Roewer]
1. "Why Pinstripes Don't Suit the Cloak-and-Dagger Crowd." Business Week, 17 May 1993, 39.
2. et al. "Should the CIA Start Spying for Corporate America?" Business Week, 14 Oct. 1992, 96.
Borum, Randy, et al. "The Role of Operational Research in Counterterrorism." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 17, no. 3 (Fall 2004): 420-434.
"Research analyses of past plans, operations, and attacks can assist" in the effort to meet the terrorism threat with a response that is intelligence-driven and uses information effectively, "but only if the studies are planned and conducted with an emphasis on operational relevance."
Return to B Table of Contents
Return to Alphabetical Table of Contents