Bohn, Kevin, and Kelli Arena. "With 300,000 Names on List, Terrorist Center Always on Alert." CNN, 25 Sep. 2007. [http://www.cnn.com]
At the Terrorist Screening Center, "a highly secure" facility "in a classified location in northern Virginia," dozens of operations specialists use a "secret terror watch list" to respond to queries about possible terrorists. Officials said that "the consolidated watch list has 300,000 names.... The center's director, Leonard Boyle, said about 5 percent of the names on the list are U.S. citizens.... The majority of calls to the center come from border agents, Boyle said.... [T]he 4-year-old center ... is staffed 24 hours a day, seven days a week by FBI personnel, along with others on loan from various government agencies."
Bohn, Michael K.
1. "Former Staffers Remember the White House Situation Room on 9/11." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 28, no. 1 (Jan. 2012): 50-52.
On 9/11, the call was made in the Situation Room to remain at work while the remainder of the White House was evacuated.
2. Nerve Center: Inside the White House Situation Room. Washington, DC: Brassey's, 2003.
Jonkers, AFIO WIN 13-03, 2 Apr. 2003, comments that the author, who was Situation Room Director during the Reagan administration, provides an "anecdotal" narrative that draws on "the recollections of over a hundred people.... Bohn traces the development of the facility, explains its functions,... and ... covers the various crises and principals." The reviewer found the book "informative, interesting and well-written." For Mazzafro, NIPQ 19.1/2, Bohn does "a good job of describing generic I&W [Intelligence and Watch] situations." The work "is mostly anecdotal and written in a popular magazine-like style, and is very readable."
1. America's Special Forces: Seals, Green Berets, Rangers, USAF Special Ops, Marine Force Recon. St. Paul, MN: MBI, 2002.
2. America's Special Forces: Weapons, Missions, Training. St. Paul, MN: MBI, 1998.
Boifeuillette, Louis. "A Staff Agent's Second Thoughts." Studies in Intelligence 11, no. 1 (Winter 1967): 61-65.
The author provides some thoughts about his four and a half years under non-official cover (NOC) in West Africa. He points to the strain associated with a NOC's "being cut off from the mainstream of his life's work." However, "all the agents and nearly all of the contacts" he developed were persons he "met and developed through [his] cover activity." But there were other groups of people who he could never have met in the cover position.
Boissier-Sporn, Monique. "Precepts for Covert Action." National Security Studies Quarterly 3, no. 4 (Winter 1997): 51-59.
Bok, Sissela. "Secrets and Deception: Implications for the Military." Naval War College Review 38 (Mar.-Apr. 1985): 73-80. [Petersen]
Bok, Sissela. Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life. New York: Vintage, 1979.
Wilcox: "Includes discussion of espionage and intelligence work."
Boland, Edward. "The Role of the Intelligence Committee." First Principles 10, no. 1 (1984): 14-16. [Petersen]
Boldrick, Michael R. "Information Warfare: The Next Major Change in Military Strategies and Operational Planning." Soldier-Scholar 3 (Fall 1996): 11-19.
Bolfrone, Kenneth E. "Intelligence Photography." Studies in Intelligence 5, no. 2 (Spring 1961): 9-16.
Westerfield: Even amateurs may have occasion "to photograph a scene that may be useful to intelligence. Here is how to do it, with ordinary equipment."
Bolger, Daniel P. "Special Operations and the Grenada Campaign." Parameters 18 (Dec 1988): 49-61.
Bolia, Robert S. "Overreliance on Technology in Warfare: The Yom Kippur War as a Case Study." Parameters 34, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 46-56.
This article's interesting take on Israeli unpreparedness in 1973 goes well beyond the intelligence aspects. "That the Yom Kippur War began as a surprise to the IDF was a testament not so much to the ability of the Arab armies to conceal their actions as to the arrogance of the Israeli leadership.... [T]he IDF placed great confidence in AMAN.... But AMAN suffered the same delusions of invincibility as the remainder of the IDF, and held the same disdainful view of the Arab forces. This led to misuse of the considerable intelligence technology AMAN could bring to bear on the Egyptian and Syrian deployments, and consequently a failure to predict the war in a timely fashion."
Bolin, Robert L. Technical Intelligence Bibliography. Athens, GA: University of Georgia, Political Science Department, 1985. [Petersen]
Bolkcom, Christopher. Potential Military Use of Airships and Aerostats. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1 Sep. 2006. Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RS21886.pdf.
"Summary": "The Department of Defense (DOD) has a history of using lighter-than-air (LTA) platforms. Aerostats have recently been fielded to protect deployed U.S. troops. Contemporary interest is growing in using airships for numerous missions. This report examines the various concepts being considered and describes the issues for Congress."
Bollinger, Marty. "Did a Soviet Merchant Ship Encounter the Pearl Harbor Strike Force?" Naval War College Review 60, no. 4 (Autumn 2007): 93-110.
The author addresses the notion that "a Soviet merchant vessel detected and reported the Imperial Japanese Navy strike force en route to the Pearl Harbor attack." He concludes that there is "no evidence to support the view ... that the Japanese strike force heading for Hawaii encountered a Soviet merchant ship on 5 December 1941 (Hawaii time).... Likewise, no evidence places a Soviet merchant ship in the vicinity of the Japanese fleet in the period 13 December.... Therefore, it seems probable the Japanese did manage to maintain operational security during the tense voyage to Hawaii."
Bollinger, Ray. "Spies Who Changed History: Mrs. Elizebeth Fr[ie]dman, A Coast Guard Secret Weapon." Naval Intelligence Professional Quarterly 23, no. 3 (Jun. 2007): 26-27, 31.
Detailed from the Treasury Department to the Coast Guard, Mrs. Friedman broke the codes of the "rumrunners" during the Prohibition era. Additional and updated information on the S/V I'm Alone incident is provided in "Boats" [pseud. Ray Bollinger], "Spies who changed History: Boatswains of the Rum War," Naval Intelligence Professional Quarterly 24, no. 1 (Jan. 2008): 51-53.
Bolton, John. "Let's Take Bureaucracy Out of Intelligence: Groupthink Products Like National Intelligence Estimates Make Us Vulnerable." Wall Street Journal, 10 Jan. 2010. [http://online.wsj.com]
Bolton argues that achieving "more effective communication and analysis within the IC ... does not require more centralization of authority, more hierarchy, and more uniformity of opinion. The IC's problem stems from a culture of anonymous conformity. Greater centralization will only reinforce existing bureaucratic obstacles." Better assessing the implications of the intelligence we collect requires "creating a culture that rewards insight and decisiveness. To create that culture we should abolish the DNI office and NIEs. Eliminating the DNI should be accompanied by reversing decades of inadequate National Security Council supervision of the intelligence function."
Bomford, Andrew. "Global Spy Network Revealed." BBC News Online, 2 Nov. 1999. [http://news.bbc.co.uk]
Australian Inspector General of Intelligence and Security Bill Blick "has confirmed to the BBC that [Australia's] Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) does form part of the [Echelon] network." The article also quotes journalist Duncan Campbell; a former U.S. army intelligence officer, Col. Dan Smith; U.S. Republican Congressman Bob Barr; and British Liberal Democrat MP Norman Baker.
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