Bohlen,
Celestine. "An American and a Russian Held as Spies in Moscow."
New York Times, 6 Apr. 2000. [http://www.nytimes.com]
On 5 April 2000, the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) announced that it had "arrested an unidentified American citizen and a Russian described as his accomplice on spying charges." The FSB statement described the American as "the head of a private company."
[Russia/00s/00/U.S.Spy]
Bohlen,
Celestine. "Putin Tells Why He Became a Spy." New York Times,
11 Mar. 2000. [http://www.nytimes.com]
In a lengthy interview published in the 10 March 2000 issue of the daily newspaper Kommersant, Russia's acting president Vladimir V. Putin describes "how, in ninth grade, he was smitten by the romance of working for the secret service. The movie, 'The Sword and the Shield,' depicted the heroic deeds of a Soviet double agent in Nazi Germany." The interview is "one of six installments that will be published in book form next week."
See also, David Hoffman, "Putin Discusses His Life as Russian Spy," Washington Post, 11 Mar. 2000, A14.
[Russia/00s/00]
Bohlen,
Celestine. "Yeltsin Dismisses Another Premier; K.G.B. Veteran Is In."
New York Times, 10 Aug. 1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]
[Russia/90s/99]
Bohlen, Charles
E. Witness to History, 1929-1969. New York: Norton, 1973.
Bohlen was U.S. Ambassador to Moscow from 1953 to 1957. Although it is certainly not the focus of his discussion of his time in the USSR, the author provides some coverage of intelligence-related matters.
[GenPostwar/50s; Russia]
Bohn, Kevin, and Kelli Arena. "With 300,000 Names on List, Terrorist Center Always on Alert." CNN, 25 Sep. 2007. [http://www.cnn.com]
At the Terrorist Screening Center, "a highly secure" facility "in a classified location in northern Virginia," dozens of operations specialists use a "secret terror watch list" to respond to queries about possible terrorists. Officials said that "the consolidated watch list has 300,000 names.... The center's director, Leonard Boyle, said about 5 percent of the names on the list are U.S. citizens.... The majority of calls to the center come from border agents, Boyle said.... [T]he 4-year-old center ... is staffed 24 hours a day, seven days a week by FBI personnel, along with others on loan from various government agencies."
[FBI/00s/07; Terrorism/00s/Gen]
Bohn, Michael K. Nerve Center: Inside the White House Situation Room. Washington, DC: Brassey's, 2003.
Jonkers, AFIO WIN 13-03, 2 Apr. 2003, comments that the author, who was Situation Room Director during the Reagan administration, provides an "anecdotal" narrative that draws on "the recollections of over a hundred people.... Bohn traces the development of the facility, explains its functions,... and ... covers the various crises and principals." The reviewer found the book "informative, interesting and well-written." For Mazzafro, NIPQ 19.1/2, Bohn does "a good job of describing generic I&W [Intelligence and Watch] situations." The work "is mostly anecdotal and written in a popular magazine-like style, and is very readable."
[GenPostwar/Orgs/SitRoom]
Bohnen,
John, and Anthony Kimery. "Red-Handed: Caught in the Act, Several Chinese
Spies Have Yet to be Brought to Justice." Sources, 12 May 1999.
[http://www.dso.com]
"The FBI and the CIA have investigated numerous suspected Chinese spies during the last ten years, and across administrations. These investigations even involved stings against spies who paid thousands of dollars for what they thought was top secret information. No arrests were made, however. Foreign policy appears to have gotten in the way."
[CIA/90s/99/ChinaFallout]
Boifeuillette, Louis. "A Staff Agent's Second Thoughts." Studies in Intelligence 11, no. 1 (Winter 1967): 61-65.
The author provides some thoughts about his four and a half years under non-official cover (NOC) in West Africa. He points to the strain associated with a NOC's "being cut off from the mainstream of his life's work." However, "all the agents and nearly all of the contacts" he developed were persons he "met and developed through [his] cover activity." But there were other groups of people who he could never have met in the cover position.
[CIA/Components/DO]
Boissier-Sporn, Monique. "Precepts for Covert Action." National Security Studies Quarterly 3, no. 4 (Winter 1997): 51-59.
[CA/90s]
Bok,
Sissela. "Secrets and Deception: Implications for the Military."
Naval War College Review 38 (Mar.-Apr. 1985): 73-80. [Petersen]
[MI/Deception]
Bok, Sissela.
Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life. New York: Vintage,
1979.
Wilcox: "Includes discussion of espionage and intelligence work."
[Overviews/Ethical]
Boland,
Edward. "The Role of the Intelligence Committee." First Principles
10, no. 1 (1984): 14-16. [Petersen]
[Oversight]
Boldrick, Michael R. "Information Warfare: The Next Major Change in Military Strategies and Operational Planning." Soldier-Scholar 3 (Fall 1996): 11-19.
[GenPostwar/InfoWar]
Bolfrone, Kenneth
E. "Intelligence Photography." Studies in Intelligence
5, no. 2 (Spring 1961): 9-16.
Westerfield: Even amateurs may have occasion "to photograph a scene that may be useful to intelligence. Here is how to do it, with ordinary equipment."
[CIA/C&C/Tradecraft]
Bolia, Robert S. "Overreliance on Technology in Warfare: The Yom Kippur War as a Case Study." Parameters 34, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 46-56.
This article offers an interesting take on Israeli unpreparedness in 1973, which goes well beyond the intelligence aspects. "That the Yom Kippur War began as a surprise to the IDF was a testament not so much to the ability of the Arab armies to conceal their actions as to the arrogance of the Israeli leadership.... [T]he IDF placed great confidence in AMAN, its military intelligence service. But AMAN suffered the same delusions of invincibility as the remainder of the IDF, and held the same disdainful view of the Arab forces. This led to misuse of the considerable intelligence technology AMAN could bring to bear on the Egyptian and Syrian deployments, and consequently a failure to predict the war in a timely fashion."
[Israel/YomKippur]
Bolin, Robert
L. Technical Intelligence Bibliography. Athens, GA: University of
Georgia, Political Science Department, 1985. [Petersen]
[RefMats/Topics]
Bollinger, Marty. "Did a Soviet Merchant Ship Encounter the Pearl Harbor Strike Force?" Naval War College Review 60, no. 4 (Autumn 2007): 93-110.
The author addresses the notion that "a Soviet merchant vessel detected and reported the Imperial Japanese Navy strike force en route to the Pearl Harbor attack." He concludes that there is "no evidence to support the view ... that the Japanese strike force heading for Hawaii encountered a Soviet merchant ship on 5 December 1941 (Hawaii time).... Likewise, no evidence places a Soviet merchant ship in the vicinity of the Japanese fleet in the period 13 December.... Therefore, it seems probable the Japanese did manage to maintain operational security during the tense voyage to Hawaii."
[WWII/PearlHarbor]
Bollinger, Ray. "Spies Who Changed History: Mrs. Elizebeth Fr[ie]dman, A Coast Guard Secret Weapon." Naval Intelligence Professional Quarterly 23, no. 3 (Jun. 2007): 26-27, 31.
Detailed from the Treasury Department to the Coast Guard, Mrs. Friedman broke the codes of the "rumrunners" during the Prohibition era. Additional and updated information on the S/V I'm Alone incident is provided in "Boats" [pseud. Ray Bollinger], "Spies who changed History: Boatswains of the Rum War." Naval Intelligence Professional Quarterly 24, no. 1 (Jan. 2008): 51-53.
[MI/CG]
Bomford, Andrew. "Global Spy Network Revealed." BBC News Online, 2 Nov. 1999. [http://news.bbc.co.uk]
Australian Inspector General of Intelligence and Security Bill Blick "has confirmed to the BBC that [Australia's] Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) does form part of the [Echelon] network." The article also quotes journalist Duncan Campbell; a former U.S. army intelligence officer, Col. Dan Smith; U.S. Republican Congressman Bob Barr; and British Liberal Democrat MP Norman Baker.
[NSA/Echelon/99]
Return to B Table of Contents
Return to Alphabetical Table of
Contents