Blas, Anne K. [LTCOL/USAF] "Intelligence in Afghanistan: Why Is It Hard?" American Intelligence Journal 27, no. 1 (Fall 2009): 49-54.
"The Intelligence Community is fully engaged in Afghanistan, pouring resources into the effort, yet complaints about U.S. policy in Afghanistan frequently cite the lack of intelligence.... After eight years in Afghanistan, why do we still struggle with intelligence? Intelligence challenges in Afghanistan can be framed around three key areas." First, there is the sheer size of the problem. Second, there is the problem of supporting multiple and disparate customers in an ill-defined operational structure. And third, there is no real "intelligence organization" in Afghanistan, but rather "a collection of pieces of other organizations."
Blash, Edmund Charles II. "Strategic Intelligence Analysis and National Decisionmaking: A Systems Management Approach." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 6, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 55-68.
Blasi, Walter. "Die Anfänge des militärischen Nachrichtendienstes in Österreich." [The Beginnings of the Military Intelligence Service in Austria] In B-Gendarmerie, Waffenlager und Nachrichtendienste: Die militärische Weg zum Staatsvertrag [B (Federal)-Gendarmery, Ordnance Depot and Intelligence Service: The Military Way to the State Treaty], eds. Walter Blasi, Erwin A. Schmidl, and Felix Schneider, 128-138. Vienna: Bohlaus Verlag, 2005.
Kahn, I&NS 23.2 (Apr. 2008), notes that this work discusses the "origins of Austria's postwar intelligence."
Blaufarb, Douglas S. The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance, 1950 to the Present. New York: Free Press, 1977.
"The crime of Phoenix was not the use of harsh methods to apprehend or destroy the enemies of the GVN. Its crime was ineffectiveness, indiscriminateness, and, in some areas at least, the violation of the local norms to the extent that it appeared to the villagers to be a threat to them in the peaceful performance of their daily business. The Americans involved erred in not appreciating the extent to which the pathology of Vietnamese society would distort an apparently sound concept. The GVN was guilty of both misfeasance and malfeasance in executing the program." (p. 276)
Ahern, Rural Pacification, p. 421, says this "is an excellent analysis of US reaction to the post-World War II phenomenon of Communist-led revolution in the agrarian former colonies of Western powers."
Blaufarb, Douglas S. Organizing and Managing Unconventional War in Laos, 1962-1970. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Studies, 1972. [http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2006/R919.pdf]
Blaufarb, Douglas S., and George K. Tanham. Who Will Win? A Key to the Puzzle of Revolutionary War. Bristol, PA: Crane Russak, 1989.
Bleakley, Jack. The Eavesdroppers. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1991.
For Unsinger, FILS 11.5, this work on Australian SIGINT in World War II is an "excellent" and "well-written" book. The I&NS 9.4 reviewer comments that the book describes "how signals intelligence was collected on a day-to-day basis and how it was applied on a daily basis by lower level commanders." Bleakley's "account is lively" and a "splendid and easy read," but it is not footnoted.
Blechman, Barry M. "Lessons in Intelligence Reform." Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 6, no. 1 (Winter 2005): 139-145.
Bledowska, Celina, and Jonathan Block. KGB-CIA: Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Operations. New York: Exeter, 1987.
Badrich, NameBase, comments that "[t]his looks like yet another oversized coffee-table picture book.... In fact, the book's well-chosen pictures tell a story in themselves." But the authors "have also produced a literate, fast-moving narrative that succinctly lays out their well-informed, independent perspective on forty-odd years of spooking.... For a beginning reader on the world of 'intelligence,' this is a reliable overview."
Bleich, H.L. "Alan Turing: The Machine, the Enigma, and the Test." MD Computing 12, no. 5 (1995): 333-334.
Bleicher, Hugo. Ed., Ian Colvin. Colonel Henri's Story: The War Memoirs of Hugo Bleicher, Former German Secret Agent. London: Kimber, 1954.
Constantinides comments that "Bleicher does not give a full story of the operations he does treat and leaves others obscure"; he does, however, provide "some valuable views of the counterintelligence war from the other side."
Blevins, Don. "The Forgotten Peacemaker, Nicholas Trist." American History Illustrated 14 (Jun. 1979): 4-8, 42-47. [Petersen]
Blewett, Daniel K. American Military History: A Guide to Reference and Information Sources. Englewood, CO: Libraries Unlimited, 1995.
Surveillant 4.4/5 says that this work is "[n]ot exhaustive, but ... includes separate chapters on terrorism, intelligence, espionage, and arms control and disarmament, making this dictionary [sic] worth a look" by readers interested in intelligence issues.
Bley, Wulf [pseud. W.H. Hartwig]. "Lord Kitchenes Ende" [Lord Kitchener's End]. In Weltkriegsspionage [World War Espionage], ed. [Maj. Gen.] Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, 486-489. Munich: Justin Moser, 1931.
H. Roewer: "A not very plausible story about the death of Lord Kitchener [in 1916] as the work of the British secret service."
Blight, James G.
Bliss, Jeff. "Allen Leaves CIA to Lead Homeland Security Intelligence Shakeup." Bloomberg News, 15 Mar. 2006. [http://www.bloomberg.com]
CIA veteran Charlie Allen is now in charge of organizing the DHS's intelligence service. He will need to "meld nine separate intelligence operations into one cohesive unit.... Allen heads an operation that includes Coast Guard officers feeding information on waterborne threats, federal air marshals keeping suspicious plane passengers under surveillance, Customs and Border Patrol workers scanning overseas letters and Secret Service agents tracking down threats to the president and foreign dignitaries."
Blitzer, Wolf. "Pollard: Not a Bumbler, but Israel's Master Spy." Washington Post, 15 Feb. 1987, C1.
Blitzer, Wolf. Territory of Lies, the Exclusive Story of Jonathan Jay Pollard: The American Who Spied on His Country for Israel and How He Was Betrayed. New York: Harper & Row, 1989.
Chambers characterizes Territory of Lies as "an experienced journalist tak[ing] a less than flattering look at a credulous twerp." The reviewer in FA 68.4 (1989) calls Blitzer's prose "occasionally offhand," but adds that the journalist "knows his two countries in detail and is careful not to venture beyond his evidence."
In a review essay, Richard R. Valcourt, "Misplaced Loyalties: The Pollards and 'Friends,'" International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 3, no. 3 (1990): 425-431, suggests that while the author "understands American politics and the structure of the Washington establishment," he abandons some of his objectivity by championing Anne Pollard's case in seeking early release. "Blitzer concludes that 'the benefits to Israel did not outweigh the costs." This is "an estimable book ... [and the] best and most comprehensive account of the affair to date."
Sinclair, I&NS 6.2, sees the book as "excessively earnest and at times tedious.... Crippled by a lack of substantive information, Blitzer's book is an unconvincing attempt to vindicate an unfascinating subject.... Territory of Lies does manage to give an interesting, though unflattering, view of the Naval Intelligence Service (NIS).... We learn little about the mysterious LAKAM, though its leadership is examined."
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