Best, Richard A., Jr. Covert Action: An Effective Instrument of U.S. Policy? Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1996.
Best, Richard A., Jr. Covert Action: An Effective Instrument of U.S. Policy? Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1996.
[CA/90s]
Best,
Richard A., Jr. Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance
(ISR): The U-2 Aircraft and Global Hawk UAV Programs. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2000. Available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL30727.pdf.
[Recon/Planes & UAVs]
Best, Richard A., Jr. Homeland Security: Intelligence Support. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Updated 6 Aug. 2003. Available at: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rs21283.pdf.
"Legislation creating a homeland security department ... proposed an analytical office within DHS that would draw upon the information gathering resources of other government agencies and of the private sector.... The Administration appears to prefer a modification to the approach originally envisioned in the legislation that created DHS. TTIC [Terrorist Threat Integration Center], under the direction of the DCI, will provide the integrative analytical effort.... Whether TTIC is consistent with the intent of Congress in passing the Homeland Security Act and whether it is ultimately the best place for the integrative effort is current[ly] a matter of discussion in Congress."
[DHS/03; Terrorism/00s/03/TTIC]
Best, Richard A., Jr. Imagery Intelligence: Issues for Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 12 Apr. 2002. Available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31369.pdf.
The importance of imagery intelligence "has been growing significantly in recent years. The challenge is to design organizations to obtain, analyze, and disseminate the result of new technologies to support an evolving defense and national security structure while remaining within budgetary constraints. The mixture of cutting-edge technologies, complex organizational structures, and budgetary limitations complicate decision-making."
Includes useful appendices focused on the NRO and NIMA.
[MI/NGA/02; NRO/02; Recon/Imagery]
Best, Richard A., Jr. The Intelligence Community and 9/11: Proposals for An Independent Commission. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Updated 6 Nov. 2002. Available at: http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/31581.pdf.
"In separate legislation, the House and Senate have endorsed proposals for an independent commission [to assess the performance of the U.S. Intelligence Community in regard to the 9/11 attacks]. Proponents argue that an investigation by persons without ties to intelligence agencies could provide greater assurance of an impartial assessment that could lead, if necessary, to improvements in the nation's intelligence effort. Opponents argue that it would usurp the responsibilities of congressional intelligence committees, burden senior intelligence officials, and risk exposure of intelligence assets deeply involved in the current struggle against terrorism."
[GenPostCW/00s/Commission/02]
Best, Richard A., Jr. Intelligence Community Reorganization: Potential Effects on DoD Intelligence Agencies. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 6 Aug. 2004.
[Reform/00s/04/Debate]
Best, Richard A., Jr. Intelligence Estimates: How Useful to Congress? Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 21 Nov. 2006. Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33733.pdf.
"In the past, Congress was not a principal consumer of NIEs but now appears increasingly interested in obtaining NIEs on key security issues despite or perhaps because of the experience with the 2002 Iraq NIE. The FY2007 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 109-364) specifically requests a comprehensive NIE on Iran. Some observers assert, however, that public discussion on specific NIEs may not adequately reflect the process by which they are prepared or their inherent limitations."
[Analysis/Estimative; Oversight/00s]
Best, Richard A., Jr.
1. Intelligence Issues for Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Updated 9 May 2006. Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/IB10012.pdf.
2. Intelligence Issues for Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Updated 27 Feb. 2007. Updated 16 Oct. 2007. Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33539.pdf.
These are straight-forward descriptions of the issues of the moment. They are worth a close reading.
[1. GenPostCW/00s/06/Gen; 2. GenPostCW/00s/07/Gen]
Best, Richard A., Jr. Intelligence Spending: Public Disclosure Issues. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Updated 15 Feb. 2007. Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/94-261.pdf.
"Central to consideration of the issue is the composition of the 'intelligence budget.' Intelligence authorization bills have included not just the 'National Intelligence Program' -- the budgets for CIA, DIA, NSA et al. [--] but also a wide variety of other intelligence and intelligence-related efforts conducted by the Defense Department. Shifts of tactical programs into or out of the total intelligence budgets have hitherto been important only to budget analysts; disclosing total intelligence budgets could make such transfers matters of concern to a far larger audience. Legislation reported by the Senate Intelligence Committee in January 2007 (S. 372) would require that funding for the National Intelligence Program be made public but it does not address other intelligence activities."
[GenPostwar/Budgets/Gen/00s]
Best, Richard A., Jr. Intelligence to Counter Terrorism: Issues for Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Updated 27 May 2003. Available at: http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/21217.pdf.
[Terrorism/00s/03/Gen]
Best, Richard A., Jr. The National Intelligence Director and Intelligence Analysis. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 30 Sep. 2004.
"Some observers believe" that placing the National Intelligence Council under the National Intelligence Director "will complicate a position that has essentially managerial responsibilities."
[Reform/00s/04/Debate]
Best,
Richard A., Jr. The National Security Agency: Issues for Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 16 Jan. 2001.
Aftergood, Secrecy News, 15 Jun. 2001, comments that this CRS report "break[s] little new analytic ground, but ... offers [a] reliable summar[y] of complex issues in relatively concise and readable form."
[NSA/01]
Best, Richard A., Jr. Peacekeeping: Intelligence Requirements. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1994.
[GenPostwar/Peacekeeping]
Best, Richard A., Jr. Proposals for Intelligence Reorganization, 1949-2004. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 24 Sep. 2004. Available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32500.pdf.
"Proposals for the reorganization of the United States Intelligence Community have repeatedly emerged from commissions and committees created by either the executive or legislative branches. The heretofore limited authority of Directors of Central Intelligence and the great influence of the Departments of State and Defense have inhibited the emergence of major reorganization plans from within the Intelligence Community itself."
[Reform/04]
Best,
Richard A., Jr. Reforming Defense Intelligence. Congressional Research
Service Report for Congress. Rev. ed. Washington, DC: Library of Congress,
22 Jan. 1992.
[Reform/MI/Gen]
Best, Richard A., Jr. U.S. Intelligence and India's Nuclear Tests: Lessons Learned. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1998.
[CIA/90s/98/IndNukes]
Best, Richard A., Jr. "What the Intelligence Community Got Right about Iraq." Intelligence and National Security 23, no. 3 (Jun. 2008): 289-302.
The U.S. Intelligence Community provided a "bleak description of likely postwar Iraq realities.... [B]ased on the assessments of the Intelligence Community, American policymakers were in a position to know what they were up against in a post-conflict Iraq. In this instance, intelligence analysts earned their pay."
[MI/Ops/Iraq/08]
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