Berlin, Don L.
"Why Intelligence Estimates Won't Mislead Us Anymore." Defense
Intelligence Journal 3, no. 2 (Fall 1994): 21-35.
Department of Defense Futures Intelligence Program (DoDFIP), approved by D/DIA, 18 Oct. 1993.
[Analysis/Estimates][c]
Berliner
Morgenpost International. "The Stasi
Sat Right Up Front: Photos of the Munich Olympics Massacre Found in the
Files of the Gauck Agency." 15 Nov. 1997. [Tr., Stephen Krug.]
"Even at the Olympics massacre in Munich in 1972, East German spies sat right up front. The Berlin agency responsible for the Stasi files reports that this knowledge has been filtered out of the shredded documents of the former East German Ministry for State Security.... According to the agency's recently presented third progress report, 273,000 pages have been reconstructed so far out of 15,250 sacks of paper shreds. That corresponds to only 40 to 50 sacks.... Information on Stasi-minister Erich Mielke's knowledge at the time about the bloodbath perpetrated by Palestinian terrorists is not yet included in the report.... Among the reconstructed files were needle-sharp photographs taken at close range of the attack on Israel's Olympic team."
[Germany/PostCW/Stasi Files]
Berman, Jerry J. "FBI Charter Legislation: The Case for Prohibiting Domestic Intelligence Investigations." University of Detroit Journal of Urban
Law 55 (Summer 1978): 1041-1078. [Petersen]
[FBI/Topics]
Berman,
Jerry J. "Political Surveillance in the Reagan Years." First
Principles 10, no. 4 (1985): 1-3. [Petersen]
[FBI/DomSec]
Berman, Jerry
J., and Morton H. Halperin, eds. The Abuses of Intelligence Agencies. Washington, DC: Center for National Security Studies, 1975. [Petersen]
[CIA/Accusations]
Berman, Larry. Perfect Spy: The Incredible Double Life of Pham Xuan An, Time Magazine Reporter and Vietnamese Communist Agent. New York: Collins, 2007.
According to Hampson, AFIO WIN 13-07 (2 Apr. 2007), "the North Vietnamese Communist Party sen[t] Pham Xuan An to California [in 1957] to study journalism." He later worked at the Sacramento Bee, traveled the United States, and returned to South Vietnam as a reporter for Reuters and Time. An was a North Vietnamese agent, "feeding Hanoi with valuable information, some of it classified."
Pribbenow, Washington DeCoded (11 Aug. 2007) [http://www.washingtondecoded.com] [reprinted in Intelligencer 15.3 (Summer/Fall 2007)], says that this "fascinating new book" makes "a formidable contribution to untangling the twisted skeins of truth and lies that made up the life, and the myth, of a man whom the Vietnamese Communists now proclaim as their most important and productive spy during the Vietnam Wars American phase." Nevertheless, "[d]espite the authors conscientious efforts ... much about Pham Xuan Ans life still remains shrouded in mystery."
For Peake, Studies 51.4 (2007), the author "tells a remarkable story based on access" to An's "diaries and hours of interviews with An and those that knew him.... Berman has given us a sympathetic but engrossing biography that also says a great deal about North Vietnamese and American intelligence. It is very worth reading."
[Vietnam/Gen]
Berman, Paul. Terror and Liberalism. New York: Norton, 2003.
According to Singer, Parameters 34.2, most of the author's "argument takes place on the theoretical plane." He argues that the totalitarian ideologies of the past "have been planted in fertile ground in the Middle East.... [L]ike Fascism, the ideology of al Qaeda and radical Islam is driven by a fear and hate of liberal ideals of tolerance." Berman offers an interesting point of view, but he "attempts to cover too much ground with little grounding and offers too few tangible solutions."
[Terrorism/00s/Gen]
Berman, Robert P., and John C. Baker. Soviet Strategic Forces: Requirements and Responses. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1982.
[Analysis/Sov; Russia/MI]
Bermudez,
Joseph.
1. North Korean Special Forces. London: Jane's. 1988. 2d ed. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998.
Commenting on the second edition, Moran, I&NS 14.1, describes this work as "basically an excellent handbook for those dealing with or analysing the North Korean state's subversive capabilities. However for those with a more political or sociological bent it may be too limited, as the context is very narrow."
2. "North Korea's Intelligence Agencies and Infiltration Operations." Jane's Intelligence Review, Jun. 1991, 269-274.
[OtherCountries/NKorea]
Berndorff, H.R.
Tr., B. Miall. Espionage. London: 1930.
[WWI/Other]
Berntsen, Gary, and Ralph Pezzullo. Jawbreaker: The Attack on Bin Laden and Al Qaeda: A Personal Account by the CIA's Key Field Commander. New York: Crown, 2005.
Clark comment: Berntsen replaced Gary Schroen as head of the CIA's JAWBREAKER operation in Afghanistan in early November 2001, and headed the CIA effort through the fall of Kabul and in the hunt for Osama bin Laden at Tora Bora and beyond. He left in mid-December. The success of the CIA-led war against the Taliban certainly makes the decision not to give all covert operations to the military look pretty good. The speed at which the CIA was able to move and the flexibility shown in responding to the ever-changing situation is impressive. Berntsen's frustration, even anger, over the failure "to finish the job" -- that is, kill Osama bin Laden -- is clearly stated and heartfelt. Whether he is correct in his assessment of that "failure" is open for discussion. His book needs to be read in conjunction with Gary C. Schroen, First In: An Insider's Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan (Novato, CA: Presidio, 2005). Taken together, the two books are a stunningly detailed view of a major paramilitary operation.
John Lehman, Washington Post, 12 Feb. 2006, says that this book "provides a valuable new account by a major participant that fills in many blanks" in the new kind of war waged in Afghanistan. At various times, CIA veteran Berntsen "had elements of the Delta Force, Army Rangers, Navy SEALs and tactical air units reporting to him." The "best aspect" of the book "is its day-by-day account of the execution of an aggressive strategy that originated at the most senior levels of the White House, the Pentagon and the CIA."
For the reviewer, a former Secretary of the Navy and 9/11 Commission member, the author "recounts very credibly how he and others pleaded with Gen. Tommy Franks and the Pentagon brass to put in blocking forces so that bin Laden and the remnants of al Qaeda's leadership could not flee into Pakistan. But for reasons that remain unclear to Berntsen..., the Bush administration or Franks decided to depend instead on local Afghan warlords rather than put U.S. forces on the ground to block bin Laden's escape." This "was a huge blunder."
To Peake, Studies 50.3 (Sep. 2006) and Intelligencer 15.2 (Fall/Winter 2006-2007), "Berntsen offers highly detailed and, if they are to be accepted, disturbing perspectives of numerous events.... Published with many parts blacked out in the Agencys classification review, it still tells an important story and should be read by all those who want to learn about CIA counterterrorism analysis at Headquarters and operations in the field."
See Richard Leiby, "Knocking on Osama's Cave Door: The CIA Operative Says He Was There at the Right Time. His Ex-Bosses Insist No One Was Home," Washington Post, 16 Feb. 2006, C1, for an interview with Berntsen.
See also Dana Priest, "Suing Over the CIA's Red Pen: Retired Operative Says Agency Unfairly Edited His Book," Washington Post, 9 Oct. 2006, A15, for a report on Bertsen's legal efforts to get redacted portions of his book restored.
[CIA/00s/Gen; MI/Ops/Afghanistan/Books; Terrorism/00s/Gen]
Berridge,
G.R. "The Ethnic 'Agent in Place': English-Speaking Civil Servants
and Nationalist South Africa, 1948-57." Intelligence and National
Security 4, no. 2 (Apr. 1989): 257-267.
[OtherCountries/SAfrica][c]
Berry,
A.G. "The Beginnings of the Office of Naval Intelligence." U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings 63, no. 1 (Jan. 1937): 102-103. [Petersen]
[MI/Navy]
Berry,
Jessica. "Norway and Russia Expel Envoys in Row over Nuclear Spying."
Electronic Telegraph, 22 Mar. 1998. [http://www.telegraph.co.uk]
Norway "expelled two Russian diplomats on espionage charges last week and declared three others persona non grata. Russia retaliated, expelling two Norwegians from their embassies in Moscow and Murmansk." The Russians were accused of attempting to recruit Norwegian government employees "to steal environmental secrets about Russian dumping of defunct nuclear submarines."
[OtherCountries/Norway; Russia/After89]
Berry, Scott.
Monks, Spies and a Soldier of Fortune: The Japanese in Tibet. New
York: St. Martin's, 1995.
Surveillant 4.2 says that Berry follows the exploration of Tibet from 1937 to 1950 by two Japanese travelers. Was one of them a Japanese spy? See Hiseo Kimura, as told to Scott Berry, Japanese Agent in Tibet: My Ten Years of Travel in Disguise (London: Serindia Publications, 1990).
[WWII/FEPac/Japan]
Bert, Wayne. The Reluctant Superpower: United States Policy in Bosnia, 1991-1995. New York: St. Martin's, 1997.
[MI/Ops/Bosnia]
Berton, Pierre.
The Invasion of Canada. Vol. I. 1812-1813. Boston: Little, Brown,
1980.
[Historical/U.S./To61]
Bertrand, Gustave.
ENIGMA ou la plus grande énigma de la guerre, 1939-1945. Paris:
Librairie Plon, 1973.
Bertrand was the "[l]eading French cryptologist of the World War II era," whose efforts helped to break the ciphers of the German Enigma machine. After the war, he rose to the rank of general in the French intelligence services. Polmar and Allen, Spy Book.
Constantinides sees Bertrand's book as "one of the most important works ... on the history of Allied cryptologic successes against Enigma.... [T]he latest evidence ... supports the author's story." Bertrand gives "the Poles the main credit for the early successes against the Enigma machine,... [and] also credits the aid provided by French intelligence."
To Sexton, these memoirs are "somewhat self-serving but generally accurate."
[UK/WWII/Ultra; WWII/Eur/Fr/Gen]
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