Bruce D. Berkowitz

Ing - Z

Berkowitz, Bruce D. "Intelligence for the Homeland." SAIS Review 24, no.1 (Winter-Spring 2004): 1-6.

[DHS/04]

Berkowitz, Bruce D. "Intelligence in the Organizational Context: Coordination and Error in National Estimates." Orbis 29 (Fall 1985): 571- 596.

[Analysis/Estimates]

Berkowitz, Bruce. "Intelligence Reform: Less Is More." Hoover Digest 2004, no. 2 (30 Apr. 2004). [http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/6809]

Over the past decade there have been several commissions to investigate U.S. intelligence. "[C]ommissions often have the opposite of their intended effect -- they stall reforms rather than facilitate them.... The problem is not that U.S. intelligence is poorly organized; the problem is that it lacks the specific capabilities it needs to deal with new threats such as terrorism, rogue states, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.... Intelligence reform ought to concentrate on creating new capabilities and removing obstacles that keep us from using our existing capabilities effectively."

[Reform/00s/04/Gen]

Berkowitz, Bruce. "Is Assassination an Option?." Hoover Digest 2002, no. 1 (30 Jan. 2002). [http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/7926]

Because "assassination is an act of war, such activities should always be considered a military operation. American leaders need to resist the temptation to use intelligence organizations for this mission. Intelligence organizations are outside the military chain of command. Intelligence operatives are not expected to obey the rules of war and thus are not protected by those rules. At the same time, intelligence organizations are also not law enforcement organizations. In many situations, having intelligence organizations kill specific individuals looks too much like a death sentence without due process."

[Overviews/Legal/Assassination]

Berkowitz, Bruce D. "Learning to Break the Rules." New York Times, 19 Dec. 2003. [http://www.nytimes.com]

"President Bush made special mention of our intelligence analysts in his address after the capture" of Saddam Hussein. In large part, the mission was successful "because analysts were allowed to ignore many long-held beliefs about how intelligence is 'supposed' to work.... Everyone involved in finding Saddam Hussein should pay close attention to the changes in strategy that allowed the achievement -- such practices should be the routine, not the exception."

[Analysis/Critiques & Gen]

Berkowitz, Bruce D. "Operation Backfire: Covert Action Against Milosevic Is Neither Secret Nor Smart." Washington Post, 18 Jul. 1999, B1.

"Almost any operation that can be carried out as a covert operation -- propaganda, support of insurgents, political action -- also can be carried out overtly. Covertness usually makes operations harder, not easier, and much more risky. It makes sense only when deniability is essential for the success of an operation.... In the case of Serbia, ... it is hard to understand why an effort to overthrow Milosevic needs to be covert."

[GenPostCW/90s/Kosovo]

Berkowitz, Bruce. "Secrecy and National Security." Hoover Digest 2004, no. 3 (30 Jul. 2004). [http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/8014]

"The whole purpose of intelligence is to give us an information advantage over our adversaries. Secrecy protects this advantage by keeping our opponents from knowing what we know. But poorly designed systems for protecting secrecy can give away any advantage we gain when they prevent us from using our intelligence effectively."

[GenPostwar/NatSec]

Berkowitz, Bruce. "Spying in the Post-September 11 World." Hoover Digest 2003, no. 4 (30 Oct. 2003). [http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/6728]

"[T]he September 11 intelligence failure was really a new problem, reflecting the emergence of a new kind of threat. Solving this new problem requires a new kind of solution. Most of the proposals offered so far would not provide this new solution and likely would not have prevented the September 11 intelligence failure.... Threats such as Al Qaeda -- and rogue states that use terrorist tactics -- present a new problem for intelligence organizations, as do narco-traffickers and states that use covert networks to develop weapons of mass destruction.... [W]here the old intelligence problem required organizations to focus in order to separate signal from noise, the new intelligence problem depends more on intelligence organizations' agility, their ability to adapt and deal effectively with a changing threat."

[GenPostCW/00s/Gen; Reform/03]

Berkowitz, Bruce D. "U.S. Intelligence Estimates of the Soviet Collapse: Reality and Perception." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 21, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 237-250.

Those uninterested in the truth should avoid this article. Berkowitz's conclusion? "Only the most convoluted reasoning can turn the summaries and key judgments of the Intelligence Community's analysis of the Soviet Union in the 1980s into a case that the IC 'missed' the Soviet collapse."

[Analysis/Sov]

Berkowitz, Bruce. "War in the Information Age." Hoover Digest 2002, no. 2 (30 Apr. 2002). [http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/6781]

"U.S. military forces have changed radically in the past decade. They will likely change even more -- and at a faster pace -- in the next few years."

[Terrorism.00s/02/War]

Berkowitz, Bruce D.  "War Logs On: Girding America for Computer Combat."  Foreign Affairs 79, no. 3 (May-Jun. 2000): 8-12.

[GenPostCW/00s/Gen]

Berkowitz, Bruce D.  "We Collected A Little, and Assumed a Lot." Washington Post, 1 Feb. 2004, B1.[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

The author uses David Kay's testimony on Capitol Hill to suggest that the Iraqi WMD debacle was mainly an intelligence collection failure, combined with a misunderstanding all around about how intelligence works.

[GenPostCW/00s/WMD/04]

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