Berkowitz, Bruce. "Better Ways to Fix U.S. Intelligence." Orbis 45, no. 4 (Fall 2001): 609-619.
The author argues that while investing in communications capacity may seem more like a logistical detail than a major policy reform, such a strategy is essential to improving intelligence operations.
Berkowitz, Bruce. "Deep Cover." Hoover Digest 2002, no. 4 (30 Oct. 2002). [http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/6520]
"In the new wars against terrorist organizations and rogue states, the United States often needs effective 'cover' -- the ability to send military forces and intelligence officers overseas without our adversaries knowing who they are. Unfortunately, this has rarely been a particular strength for the United States, and the approaches we have used in the past are poorly suited for today."
Berkowitz, Bruce. "Democracies and Their Spies." Hoover Digest 2003, no. 1 (30 Jan. 2003). [http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/8004]
The author asks the question, "Are secret intelligence operations compatible with democracy?" He finds that: "Intelligence policies are not fundamentally different from other kinds of policies, and intelligence operations are not inherently different from other kinds of operations democracies carry out." In addition, "[t]he current oversight system for U.S. intelligence ... provide[s] an approach for reconciling democracy and secrecy and, thus, intelligence."
Berkowitz, Bruce. "The DI and 'IT': Failing to Keep up with the Information Revolution." Studies in Intelligence 47, no. 1 (2003): 67-74.
The author was a Scholar-in-Residence at the Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis during 2001-2002. He looked at how the DI uses information technology and how it might use such technology more effectively. He "came away from this experience impressed by the quality of DI analysts, but also concerned about their lack of awareness of and access to new information technology that could be of critical value to their work."
Berkowitz, Bruce D. "Facing the Consequences: As El Shifa Shows, It Takes More than Intelligence to Make Smart Decisions." Washington Post, 5 Sep. 1999, B1. "In the Intelligence Game, Keep a Poker Face." Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 13 Sep. 1999, 21.
With regard to "the flap over the intelligence used to justify the bombing of the El Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries Co. in Khartoum, Sudan,... the problem seems to have been not just faulty intelligence but in the judgment of officials using it.... [A]s we have since discovered,... the link between bin Laden and El Shifa was not as close as officials first suggested....
"Officials have often used intelligence to account for their actions after the fact.... The problem is that, after the strike on El Shifa, U.S. officials tried to use intelligence as though it were evidence in a court case, and intelligence is usually poorly suited for that task.... Officials need to use intelligence, make their best judgments -- and then accept the public consequences.... Intelligence will always have gray cases where officials must exercise judgment. El Shifa may or may not have been an intelligence failure. But the record certainly suggests a failure by policy makers."
Berkowitz, Bruce. "Fighting the New War." Hoover Digest 2002, no. 3 (30 Jul. 2002). [http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/7135]
In using lethal force to combat terrorism, an option to covert action "is direct action.... [I]n direct action the United States does not conceal its responsibility. Soldiers wear uniforms and insignia, which is an important difference between a covert paramilitary operation and direct action.... [U]sing the CIA as a quick-response arm of the DOD is a bad idea.... It makes more sense to better prepare U.S. military forces for direct action. The defense department must develop small, highly mobile combat forces to attack the new threats we face. It must also develop the specialized infrastructure it needs for logistics, communications, and supplies."
Berkowitz, Bruce D. "Information Age Intelligence." Foreign Policy 103 (Summer 1996): 35-50.
The author argues that incremental change or reform in the U.S. intelligence apparatus is and will be insufficient to meet the needs of the "information age." He suggests a more decentralized model, and offers some examples of how such a system might work.
Berkowitz, Bruce D. "Information Technology and Intelligence Reform." Orbis 41, no. 1 (Winter 1997): 107-118.
Efforts to reform the U.S. intelligence are missing the point. The focus should be on effective information technology development, organization, and management.
Berkowitz, Bruce. "The Information War." Hoover Digest 2003, no. 2 (30 Apr. 2003). [http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/6535]
"September 11 suggests that, unless we develop new ideas about how intelligence organizations are supposed to work, we will likely see additional intelligence failures. Indeed, abandoning many traditional ideas will be as important as formulating and adopting new ones." During the Cold War, most of the questions for intelligence "were evolutionary"; therefore, "the intelligence community could change incrementally, too. Most new threats, on the other hand, are much more dynamic."
Berkowitz, Bruce D. "Information Warfare: Time To Prepare." Issues in Science & Technology 17 (Winter 2000-2001): 37-44.
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