Beno - Beq

Ben-Porat, Yeshayahu, et al. Entebbe Rescue. New York: Delacorte, 1977.

[Israel/OtherOps/Entebbe]

Benson, Joseph T. [MAJ/USAF] "Weather and the Wreckage at Desert-One." Chronicles Online Journal, 21 Feb. 2007. [http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/benson.html]

The author suggests "SOF weathermen should have been used in a forward observing role during EAGLE CLAW.... Inserted via helicopter 24 hours or more prior to launching the rescue mission, four two-man SOF weather teams would have been able to provide current weather conditions while determining the diurnal (i.e, over a 24-hour period) weather trends, facilitating mission planning and execution.... Long before the first helicopters lifted off the Nimitz or the lead C-130 departed Masirah, someone should have made the call for SOF weathermen."

[GenPostwar/80s/Iran]

Benson, Pam (CNN).

Benson, Robert Louis.

Benson, Simon. "Spy Agencies in the Middle East to Track Australians Fighting with Terrorist Groups." Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 25 Jun. 2014. [http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au]

Intelligence sources told The Daily Telegraph on 24 June 2014 that agents from Australia's foreign espionage agency ASIS "have been redeployed to the Middle East to track Australians fighting with terrorist groups in Iraq and Syria and monitor their attempts to sneak back into the country."

[Australia/10s]

Benson, Sumner. "The Historian as Foreign Policy Analyst." The Public Historian 3, no. 1 (1981): 15-25.

Petersen: "Staff member, CIA Office of Political Analysis."

[GenPostwar/Issues/Policy]

Bentley, Elizabeth. Out of Bondage: The Story of Elizabeth Bentley. New York: Devin-Adair, 1951. "Afterword" by Hayden Peake. New York: Ivy Books, 1988.

[SpyCases/U.S./Bentley; WWII/OSS/Security]

Bentley, Stewart W. [CAPT/USA] "Intelligence During Operation Market-Garden." Military Intelligence 20, no. 2 (Apr.-Jun 1994): 15-18.

Bentley argues that the presence of the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions, "[m]ore than any other factor,... contributed to the ... strategic failure of Market-Garden." He looks at the use of intelligence in planning the operation, and finds that Montgomery and/or his staff did not "agree with intelligence reports ... on the composition and disposition of armor units in the area of operations." Bentley also notes that "[i]ntelligence analysts had vastly underestimated the recuperative powers of the German logistic system."

[WWII/Eur/Gen][c]

Bentley, Stewart W. [MAJ/USA] "Of Market-Garden and Melanie: The Dutch Resistance and the OSS." Studies in Intelligence 41, no. 5 (Spring 1998): 105-118.

Noting that the "Dutch Resistance command and control hierarchy was decentralized and compartmented," Bentley reviews the main Resistance organizations in Holland. The OSS mission in Holland, codenamed "Melanie," began operating in Eindhoven in September 1944. It quickly established a "reporting network [that] began yielding excellent information almost immediately."

[WWII/Eur/Resistance/Dutch]

Benton, Kenneth. "The ISOS Years: Madrid, 1941-3." Journal of Contemporary History 30 (1995): 366-370.

Benton, Peggie. Baltic Countdown. London: Centaur, 1984.

Peggie Benton went with her SIS officer husband, Kenneth Benton, from Vienna to Riga in 1938. After the outbreak of war, she worked alongside her husband and Leslie Nicholson until the Soviet takeover of Latvia in September 1940.

[UK/Interwar & Memoirs]

Ben-Zvi, Abraham. "Between Warning and Response: The Case of the Yom Kippur War." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 4, no. 2 (Summer 1990): 227-242.

[Analysis/Surprise; Israel/YomKippur][c]

Ben-Zvi, Abraham. "The Dynamics of Surprise: The Defender's Perspective." Intelligence and National Security 12, no. 4 (Oct. 1997): 113-144.

The author uses three cases studies -- Pearl Harbor (1941), the Chinese attack on India (1962), and the Yom Kippur War (1973) -- to illustrate his point that misunderstanding the enemy's intentions may not be the cause of a nation being "surprised" by an attack. Rather, he argues that a tendency to misunderstand -- to undervalue -- the enemy's capabilities seems to be more important in explaining why surprise was achieved.

[Analysis/Surprise; Israel/YomKippur; WWII/PearlHarbor][c]

Ben-Zvi, Abraham. "Hindsight and Foresight: A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Surprise Attack." World Politics 28, no. 3 (Apr. 1976): 381- 395.

Whaley, Bibliography of Counterdeception (2006), finds that the author's "approach offers foresight." However, Ben-Zvi's use of only three case studies (Barbarossa, Pearl Harbor, and Yom Kippur) as the basis for his "conceptual framework" weakens the analysis.

[Analysis/Surprise; Israel/YomKippur; Russia/Inerwar; WWII/PearlHarbor]

Ben-Zvi, Abraham. "The Outlook and Termination of the Pacific War: A Juxtaposition of American Preconceptions." Journal of Peace Research 15, no. 1 (1978): 33-49. [Petersen]

[WWII/FEPac]

Ben-Zvi, Abraham. "Perception, Misperception and Surprise in the Yom Kippur War: A Look at the New Evidence." Journal of Conflict Studies 15, no. 2 (Fall 1995): 5-29.

[Israel/YomKippur]

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