Bell

Bell, Christopher M. "The Royal Navy, War Planning, and Intelligence Assessments of Japan, 1921-1941." In Intelligence and Statecraft: The Use and Limits of Intelligence in International Society, eds. Jennifer L. Siegel and Peter J. Jackson, 139-156. New York: Praeger, 2005.

[UK/Interwar/Gen]

Bell, Ernest L. An Initial View of Ultra as an American Weapon. Keene, NH: TSU Press, 1977.

Petersen identifies this work as "[t]hree released U.S. official documents on use of Ultra." Constantinides comments that it "is interesting to learn of the tight controls on Ultra dissemination even within the War Department."

[UK/WWII/Ultra; WWII/Magic]

Bell, Griffin. Taking Care of the Law. New York: Morrow, 1982.

[FBI/To90s; GenPostwar/70s/Gen]

Bell, J. Bowyer. "Aspects of the Dragonworld: Covert Communications and the Rebel Ecosystem." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 3, no. 1 (Spring 1989): 15-43.

Terrorists' actions are limited by their available communication systems -- both interpersonal and technical. Whaley, Bibliography of Counterdeception (2006), calls Bell "the world’s leading authority on terrorist organizations, particularly the IRA and the major European and Near Eastern groups."

[Terrorism/80s][c]

Bell, J. Bowyer. "Assassination in International Politics: Lord Moyne, Count Bernadotte, and the Lehi." International Studies Quarterly 16, no. 1 (1972): 59-82.

[Israel/Hist]

Bell, J. Bowyer. "Dragonworld (II): Deception, Tradecraft, and the Provisional IRA." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 8, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 21-50.

Bell, J. Bowyer. The Myth of the Guerrilla: Revolutionary Theory and Malpractice. New York: Knopf, 1971.

[MI/SpecOps]

Bell, J. Bowyer. Terror Out of Zion: Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Palestine Underground, 1929-1949. New York: St. Martin's, 1977.

[Israel/Hist]

Bell, J. Bowyer. "Toward a Theory of Deception." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 16, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 244-279.

"Despite the theoretical difficulties in any model of the deception process, there is, indeed, a process or cycle, from concept through creation to reaction, that focuses on an effective illusion that largely simulates reality or dissemulates it for the planner's purpose. Force and fraud in war -- and in much else -- are the cardinal virtues."

[MI/Deception]

Bell, June B. “Invisible-ink Formula Stays Invisible.” National Law Journal 24, no. 26 (4 Mar. 2002).

"U.S. District Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson rejected" an FOIA request from the James Madison Project "for 16 pages of documents on how to create and detect invisible ink." The documents being sought "were produced between 1917 and 1930. Attorneys representing the CIA … argued that though secret ink may seem an unsophisticated espionage technique compared to 21st-century encryption, it could nonetheless be valuable to America's foes." [James Madison Project v. National Archives & Records Administration, No. 98-2737 (D.D.C.).]

[CIA/00s/02; Overviews/Legal/FOIA]

Bell, Kevin. "Vint Hill Farms Closes." INSCOM Journal, Jul.-Aug. 1997, 12ff. Soldiers, Jul. 1998, 26.

[MI/Army][c]

Bell, Leslie. Sabotage! The Story of Lt. Col. J. Elder Wills. London: T.W. Laurie, 1957.

Wilcox: "Account of British sabotage expert."

[UK/?]

Bell, Roger J. Unequal Allies: Australian-American Relations and the Pacific War. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1977. [Petersen]

[WWII/Australia]

Bell, Stewart. Cold Terror: How Canada Nurtures and Exports Terrorism Abroad. Toronto: Wiley, 2004.

Gendron, IJI&C 18.2 (Summer 2005), finds that the author "draws on archival material, interviews, and insights based on his investigative work around the globe to illustrate how lack of will and political opportunism effectively signalled that Canada was soft on terrorism."

[Canada/00s; Terrorism/00s]

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