Baker

Baker, Bob.

1. "The Easter Offensive of 1972: A Failure to Use Intelligence." Military Intelligence 24, no. 1 (Jan.-Mar. 1998): 40-42, 60.

The author concludes that U.S. and South Vietnamese commanders "had prior knowledge of NVA activity in preparation for the attack, but did not use that information to the maximum extent possible."

2. "Warning Intelligence: The Battle of the Bulge and the NVN Easter Offensive." American Intelligence Journal 17, no. 3/4 (1997): 71-79.

The author compares and discusses the role of warning intelligence in the Battle of the Bulge in 1944 and the North Vietnamese Easter Offensive of 1972. He concludes: "Though the location, numbers and types of forces were not the same, the command assumptions, the weather and the use and misuse of intelligence had almost the same catastrophic effects in both clashes....

"In studies of both campaigns, analysts and historians often cite the failure of intelligence to properly inform and alert the commanders of enemy intentions and capabilities as the chief reason for the successful 'surprise' achieved by the assaults. Upon closer examination, the 'cause' lies elsewhere....

"'It was not intelligence (evaluated information of the enemy) that failed. The failure was the commanders and certain G-2's, who did not act on the intelligence they had,' stated one of Patton's subordinates regarding the Bulge. It could just as easily have been written about Easter offensive of 1972."

[Analysis/Surprise; Vietnam; WWII/Eur/Bulge][c]

Baker, Caleb. "Deception Techniques Put Target in Eye of the Beholder." Defense News, 4 (30 Oct. 1989): 12. [Seymour]

[MI/Deception]

Baker, Carol M., and Matthew H. Fox. Classified Files: The Yellowing Pages. New York: Twentieth Century, 1972.

[RefMats/Release/U.S./To97]

Baker, James E. In the Common Defense: National Security Law for Perilous Times. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

From publisher: "This volume focuses on the legal issues surrounding the war on terror.... The book is about national security government and why it is dependent on good process and the moral integrity of those who wield its power."

Keiser, Proceedings 133.11 (Nov. 2007), finds that "[t]he author has given us a superb -- and not too arduous -- guide to comprehending the complexities of our laws and how they relate to national defense."

[GenPostwar/NatSec/00s; Overviews/Legal/Gen]

Baker, Jeffrey L. "Domestic and National Security Wiretaps: A Fourth Amendment Perspective." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 12, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 1-17.

"Throughout the twentieth century, a well-balanced process of coordinating electronic surveillance evolved out of both legislation and Supreme Court decisions."

[Overviews/Legal/Gen]

Baker, John C., Kevin O'Connell, and Ray A. Williamson, eds. Commercial Observation Satellites: At the Leading Edge of Tranparency. Washington, DC: Rand, 2001.

[Recon/Sats/Books]

Baker, Kristin M. "Operation Joint Endeavor: Joint Stars in the Balkans." Military Intelligence 22, no. 4 (Oct.-Dec. 1996): 27-29.

[MI/Ops/90s/Bosnia][c]

Baker, Lafayette C.

1. Daring Exploits of Scouts and Spies. Chicago: Thompson & Thomas, 1894.

2. History of the United States Secret Service. Philadelphia: L.C. Baker, 1867. Philadelphia: King & Baird, 1868.

Petersen notes that the "Federal 'secret service,' run first by the Pinkerton detective agency and then by Lafayette Baker, was essentially a counterintelligence organization. Baker's writings are considered unreliable by experts."

Fishel, Secret War, pp. 25-26, says that Baker "grossly inflates" his Civil War activities. But no matter how much Baker's saga "stretches credulity," there is sufficient evidence available that "it cannot be entirely written off."

[CivWar/Un/Gen]

Baker, Peter. "Russian Researcher Convicted of Spying; Defense Says Information Was Public." Washington Post, 6 Apr. 2004, A11. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Igor Sutyagin, a researcher at the Institute for the Study of the United States and Canada in Moscow, "was found guilty of treason and espionage [on 5 April 2004] for selling information on nuclear submarines and missile warning systems to a British company [Alternative Futures] that prosecutors alleged was a front for U.S. intelligence."

On 7 April 2004, Sutyagin was sentenced to 15 years in prison. At the sentencing, Sutyagin continued to protest his innocence. "The data he gave to the British firm, he said, were publicly available.... [D]efense attorneys vowed to appeal the conviction on grounds that the judge tilted the closed proceedings toward the prosecution." Peter Baker, "Russian Researcher, Asserting Innocence, Given 15 Years," Washington Post, 8 Apr. 2004, A17. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

[Russia/00s]

Baker, Peter, and Charles Babington. "General Formally Named to Lead CIA; Official Who Quit Under Goss Would Be Hayden's No. 2." Washington Post, 9 May 2006, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 8 May 2006, the White House moved "to defuse concern over the nomination of Gen. Michael V. Hayden for CIA director, promising to balance the leadership of the nation's premier civilian spy agency with a well-known and popular veteran of the organization in the No. 2 position.... Under the plan, Vice Adm. Albert M. Calland III would be replaced as deputy director by retired CIA official Stephen R. Kappes."

Kappes is a "low-key former Marine and 23-year CIA veteran who served in the Near East, South Asia and Europe." He "had risen to chief of the agency's clandestine service and was seen as a future director." Kappes "traveled secretly to Libya in 2004 to persuade its leader, Moammar Gaddafi, to renounce weapons of mass destruction. But Kappes clashed immediately with Patrick Murray, the former Capitol Hill aide whom Goss installed as his chief of staff at the CIA. After one month on the job, Murray demanded that Kappes fire his deputy, Michael Sulick, for challenging Murray's authority. Kappes refused and he and Sulick resigned, triggering an unprecedented flood of resignations."

[CIA/00s/06/Gen; CIA/DCIAs/Hayden/Confirmation]

Baker, Peter, and Helen Dewar. "Clinton Pushes Senate to Confirm Lake in Sign He'll Fight for CIA Choice." Washington Post, 14 Feb. 1997, A9.

[CIA/90s/Lake]

Baker, Peter, and Walter Pincus. "Bush Signs Intelligence Reform Bill: President Now Must Find an Experienced Hand to Guide 15 Agencies." Washington Post, 18 Dec. 2004, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 17 December 2004, President Bush signed into law "the broadest reorganization of the nation's intelligence community in more than half a century.... [T]he legislation left many recommendations of the Sept. 11 commission still unfulfilled, including restructuring congressional oversight as well as broader strategic efforts to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Nor did it address commission recommendations to rethink U.S. relations with Saudi Arabia or to expand diplomatic efforts to win friends in the Muslim world."

[Reform/00s/04/Act]

Baker, Russell. "The Other Mr. Dulles--Of the CIA." New York Times Magazine, 6 Mar. 1958, 17, 96-97. [Petersen]

[CIA]

Baker, Stewart. "Should Spies Be Cops?" Foreign Policy 97 (Winter 1994-1995): 36-52.

ProQuest: The BNL affair "centered on charges that the Justice Department and the CIA covered up the Bush administration's channeling of prewar military assistance to Iraq. Whether the CIA should expand its traditional beat to become cops is discussed."

[CIA/90s; CIA/Liaison/Domestic]

Baker, Stewart A., and Paul R. Hurst. The Limits of Trust: Cryptography, Governments, and Electronic Commerce. Cambridge, MA: Kluwer Law International, 1998.

Kruh, Cryptologia 23.3, finds that this work will "provide an invaluable reference book for lawyers, business people, technologists, and others interested in being up-to-date on the crypto policy debate, international initiatives, and encryption regulations around the world."

[Cryptog/Encryption]

Return to B Table of Contents

Return to Alphabetical Table of Contents