Bain, Chester A. "Viet Cong Propaganda Abroad." Foreign Service Journal 45, no. 10 (1968): 18-21, 47. [Petersen]
Bain, Donald. The Control of Candy Jones. Chicago: Playboy Press, 1976.
NameBase: "Candy Jones was America's leading cover girl during the forties and fifties. In 1960 she fell on hard times and agreed to act as a courier for the CIA.... [S]he began a 12-year relationship with a CIA psychiatrist who used her to exhibit his mastery of mind control techniques. He nurtured a second personality within Candy.... The first personality could not recall later what the second had been doing, as the second traveled to distant countries on courier missions.... In 1972, Candy married New York radio talk-show host Long John Nebel. Concerned over her mood shifts and insomnia, Nebel, an amateur hypnotist, tried to help her sleep. Over many sessions Candy's story emerged.... Author Donald Bain, a friend of the couple, compiled this book from more than 200 hours of taped sessions between Nebel and Candy. Although this book is not fiction [?], unfortunately Bain does not reveal the name of the CIA psychiatrist."
Bajll, Magdalena. "Homeland Security Intelligence: Regional Fusion Centers." American Intelligence Journal 27, no. 1 (Fall 2009): 61-66.
"A myriad of fragmented and inadequately coordinated efforts have been ... undertaken by various federal agencies to support the [state and urban intelligence] fusion centers. However, no comprehensive strategy has been developed to establish the most effective and efficient organizational structure to network the fusion centers and fit them into the broader national intelligence and homeland security frameworks."
Bakeless, John. "Spies in the Revolution." American History Illustrated 6 (Jun. 1971): 36-45. [Petersen]
Bakeless, John. Spies of the Confederacy. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1970. New York: Dover 1997. [pb]
Constantinides notes that the "purist will object to the inclusion of combat intelligence personnel in a book with 'Spies' in the title. The space given to their efforts might better have been devoted to other intelligence activities, such as those of Confederate agents abroad, which are not addressed." Pforzheimer adds that "some spy memoirs on which [Bakeless] draws are often exaggerated, and ... many of the original records were destroyed in 1865."
Bakeless, John. Turncoats, Traitors and Heroes: Espionage in the American Revolution. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1959. New York: Da Capo, 1998. New York: Da Capo, 2005. [pb]
Pforzheimer notes that this is "considered to be the best general work" available on intelligence aspects of the Revolutionary War. While "somewhat fragmented and choppy," it is "loaded with information." For Constantinides the book is "a history of espionage in the main theater of war.... [F]or the area of operations covered, it is one of the best works available.... [I]t gives a vivid picture of General Washington's interest in intelligence and deception and the value he placed on effective intelligence."
Commenting on the 1998 reprint, Kruh, Cryptologia 24.3, finds the work "still relevant today.... Based on almost 20 years of research, the author provides a thorough study of the espionage, counterespionage, and other military intelligence services in the Continental and British armies."
Bakeless, John E. "General Washington's Spy System." Manuscripts 12, no. 2 (1960): 28-37. [Petersen]
Bakeless, Katherine (Little), and John Bakeless. Confederate Spy Stories. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1973.
Balachandran, V. "Intelligible Intelligence: An Alchemy of Collation & Coordination." The Times of India, 21 Sep. 2000. [http://www.timesofindia.com]
The author is a former Special Secretary in the Indian Cabinet Secretariat. Here, he argues for stronger central coordination of Indian intelligence, for clear charters for the Indian intelligence agencies, for the Indian government to seek to learn from the Brown Commission Report of 1996 in the United States, and for upgrading of India's technical collection capability.
Balachandran, V. "Spy Who Went Cold." Asian Age, 10 Jul. 2002.
The author of this Op-ed piece in an Indian daily suggests that the U.S. Intelligence Community is suffering from a bad case of being over scrutinized. He notes that "[s]ome of the Aspin-Brown Commission's recommendations on the creation of posts resulted in a needless gridlock between the Congress and the Executive. The Scowcroft panel still wants to create a separate post of Director CIA who, with other directors of NIMA, NRO, NSA will work under the DCI. Many of these 'reorganisations' were meaningless knee-jerk exercises.... The American IC is now worried that they may be subjected to another dose of 'reorganisation' as a result of the present Congressional hearing."
Balano, Randy Carol. "Operation Iraqi Freedom: The Role of the Office of Naval Intelligence." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 19, no. 3 (Sep. 2003): 9-10.
"ONI's initial contributions included intelligence preparation of the battle space and the establishment of a 24 by 7 analysis and production operation.... In addition, teams of specially-trained ONI reservists provided critical support to HUMINT collection efforts and the exploitation of captured enemy material."
Balano, Randy [CDR/USNR]. "T.B.M. Mason and the Office of Naval Intelligence." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 21, no. 3 (Sep. 2005): 30-33. Originally published in full as "U.S. Navy Owes T.B.M. Mason," Naval History (Jun. 2005).
Mason was the first commanding officer in 1882 of the newly established ONI.
Balasevicius, Tony [MAJ]. "A Look Behind the Black Curtain: Understanding the Core Missions of Special Operations Forces." Canadian Military Journal 7, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 21-30.
"[T]he first step in understanding SOF is to comprehend the core missions they undertake." This article examines "the evolution of these forces during and immediately following the Second World War." It identifies "the SOF's core missions and examine[s] the creation and early development of pioneering units....[A]s the training of these units ... is closely linked to mission requirements, a general examination of this element" is also covered. "The reality is that SOF units are organized, trained and equipped to carry out one of the core missions, and although they have an ability to move away from their field of specialist capability, that ability is, in reality, limited."
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