Bageant, Joe. "The CIA's Secret War in Tibet." Military History (Feb. 2004). [http://www.historynet.com/magazines/military_history/3025986.html] Bageant, Joe. "The CIA's Secret War in Tibet." Military History (Feb. 2004). [http://www.historynet.com/magazines/military_history/3025986.html]
"[T]he Tibetans did not simply let the Chinese roll over their country in 1951. For almost 20 years afterward they fought a long, bloody war of resistance.... [T]his largely unknown struggle ... got support from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, which sponsored secret training camps and made arms and equipment drops to aid horse-mounted herdsmen against the bombers and artillery of the largest standing army on the planet."
[CA/Tibet]
Baggett, Candace S. "Fourth Amendment -- Absent Exigent Circumstances, Prior Judicial Authorizatiom of Electronic Surveillance of United States Citizens Abroad Is Constitutionally Required: Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144 (DDC 1976)," Texas International Law Journal 12, no. 2-3 (Spring-Summer 1977): 362-369. [Calder]
[Overviews/Legal/Gen]
Baggett, Charlie.
"Intelligence and Information Systems Security: Partners in the Information
Age." NMIA Newsletter 11, no. 1 (1996): 9-12.
Remarks by the Director of Information, National Computers Systems Security, NSA/ISSO, at Defense Intelligence Status conference, Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, DC, on 8 December 1995. "In the future,... intelligence and information systems security will be more than complementary. They will become integral to each other. This integration will be driven by the threat that has emerged as the down side of the information age -- the threat of information warfare.... At their current stage of development, our Defense and National Information Infrastructures offer minimal defense against unauthorized access and use.... Last year, more than 260 unclassified DoD computer systems were known to have been penetrated by outsiders.... As information systems security and defensive information warfare move from a passive to a more active posture, intelligence will become increasingly critical to their success."
[GenPostwar/Issues/InfoWarfare][c]
Baggett, Lee, Jr. "C3I Requirements within the Atlantic Command." Signal 42 (Jun. 1988): 31-32.
[MI/Overviews]
Bagley, Tennent H. "Bane of Counterintelligence: Our Penchant for Self-Deception." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 6,
no. 1 (Spring 1993): 1-20.
The focus here is deception and its interplay with self-deception. A number of cases are discussed.
[CI/90s; GenPostwar/Deception/Gen]
Bagley, Tennent H. Spy Wars: Moles, Mysteries, and Deadly Games. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007.
Ignatius, Washington Post, 11 Apr. 2007, says that Bagley "has gathered strong evidence" that Nosenko "could not have been who he initially said he was; that he could not have reviewed the Oswald file; that his claims about how the KGB discovered the identities of two CIA moles in Moscow could not have been right."
For Knight, St. Petersburg Times, 18 May 2007, the author "spends most of his book marshalling evidence of Nosenko’s inaccuracies and inconsistencies," but "overlooks circumstances that might explain at least some of the discrepancies." The reviewer concludes that, in the end, "Bagley’s book fails to make a convincing case that Nosenko, who was finally exonerated by the CIA in 1977, was a fake defector."
Gordievsky, Spectator, 19 May 2007, calls this "perhaps the most amazing non-fiction spy book that has ever appeared during or after the Cold War"; it is written by "one of the most respected and knowledgeable experts on Soviet espionage." The author claims "on almost every page that much of what has been written up to now, stated and even asserted under oath by CIA officials, is in fact naive, utterly insensitive, blindly biased, [and] unprofessional." Gordievsky asks: Has Bagley succeeded in proving "that he was right and the Agency was wrong" about Nosenko? His answer: "A new generation of intelligence historians, analysts and operatives, who must read this very exciting book, will have to answer this and many other important professional questions."
In a review that shows how deeply the Nosenko debate continues to burn in the CIA soul, McCoy, CIRA Newsletter 32.2 (Summer 2007), dismisses this book as the author's attempt "to justify the mishandling of the only important operational assignment he had in 22 years of employment in the Clandestine Service of CIA." The reviewer accuses Bagley of resorting "to the same transparently invalid analytical methodology as was used in the original case he made against Nosenko." McCoy argues that "the case against Nosenko, and the painful, unprofessional, fundamentally illegal, disposition of it was actually inspired and stage-managed by [James] Angleton." Bagley, "Letters," CIRA Newsletter 32.4 (Winter 2007): 37-38, takes grave exception to this reviewer's comments and reiterates his argument that Nosenko was a KGB plant.
Thomas, New York Times, 3 Jun. 2007, finds Bagley's account "a provocative new look at one of the great unresolved mysteries of the cold war.... Readers will need to be able to adapt to the mind-set of a counterintelligence officer sifting through the odd coincidences, connecting the dots, to fully appreciate and grasp the case against Nosenko. But this game of real-world Clue is worth it."
To Chapman, IJI&C 21.1 (Spring 2008), this is "a powerful book.... It is the best detailed account of the incredible capabilities of the Soviet Union's KGB." The reviewer seems to accept the author's presentation as the last word in the Nosenko matter (referring to the "ultimate vindication" of Angleton and others' "ultimate vindication"). He is particularly distressed by "the CIA's vilification and denigration of Bagley."
Wilson, Proceedings 134.2 (Feb. 2008), is of the opinion that "[t]he strength of this work is not that it sets the record straight or clears any names associated with the Nosenko file per se, but rather that it explains in minute detail the complexities, pitfalls, risks, impact of individual personalities, and potential controversy associated with most counterintelligence operations and investigations."
For a defense of the CIA's position, see: Richards J. Heuer, Jr., "Nosenko: Five Paths to Judgment," Studies in Intelligence 31, no. 3 (Fall 1987): 71-101. In Inside CIA's Private World: Declassified Articles from the Agency's Internal Journal, 1955-1992, ed. H. Bradford Westerfield, 379-414 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995). [Available as a 300 kb (vice 2.6 mb thanks to Kathrine M. Graham/NMSU) pdf file at: http://intellit.muskingum.edu/alpha_folder/H_folder/Heuer_on_NosenkoV1.pdf]
[CIA/60s/Gen; CIA/Angleton/Related; CIA/Memoirs]
Bagley,
Tennent H. "Treason in the KGB: New Facts from Inside." International
Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 5, no. 1 (Spring 1991):
63-75.
The IJI&C editor notes that "some of Mr. Bagley's comments and observations have been overtaken by events," but the article was published for "its general insights." The focus is on Maj. Gen. Oleg Kalugin and his split with the Soviet leadership.
[Russia/ColdWar]
Bagnall, J. J. "The Exploitation of Russian Scientific Literature for Intelligence Purposes." Studies in Intelligence 2, no. 3 (Summer 1958): 45-48.
The number of available Soviet scientific literature increased significantly from 1947 to 1956. The Air Force and the CIA both have ongoing efforts to exploit this material. There are also efforts outside the intelligence community, including bibliographic guides, specialized indexes, and abstracting services.
[OpenSource]
Bain,
Chester A. "Viet Cong Propaganda Abroad." Foreign Service Journal
45, no. 10 (1968): 18-21, 47. [Petersen]
[Vietnam/Topics]
Bain, Donald.
The Control of Candy Jones. Chicago: Playboy Press, 1976.
NameBase: "Candy Jones was America's leading cover girl during the forties and fifties. In 1960 she fell on hard times and agreed to act as a courier for the CIA. She was also a perfect subject for hypnosis. Without understanding what was happening, she began a 12-year relationship with a CIA psychiatrist who used her to exhibit his mastery of mind control techniques. He nurtured a second personality within Candy, which he could trigger at will. The first personality could not recall later what the second had been doing, as the second traveled to distant countries on courier missions.... In 1972, Candy married New York radio talk-show host Long John Nebel. Concerned over her mood shifts and insomnia, Nebel, an amateur hypnotist, tried to help her sleep. Over many sessions Candy's story emerged and the second personality was exposed. Author Donald Bain, a friend of the couple, compiled this book from more than 200 hours of taped sessions between Nebel and Candy. Although this book is not fiction [?], unfortunately Bain does not reveal the name of the CIA psychiatrist."
[CIA/Accusations]
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