Anderson, Benedict, and Ruth McVey. A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, Coup in Indonesia. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1971.
Anderson, Charles R. Day of Lightning, Years of Scorn: Walter C. Short and the Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2004.
Bath, NIPQ 21.1 (Mar. 2005), notes that the author concludes "that much of the problem [with the surprise at Pearl Harbor] lay in the antiquated system of information-sharing and decision-making among the State, War, and Navy departments ... that precluded effective reaction to modern, rapidly developing international situations."
Anderson, Chris A. "Assassination, Lawful Homicide, and the Butcher of Baghdad." Hamline Journal of Public Law and Policy 13, no. 2 (Summer 1992): 291-322.
Anderson, David. Histories of the Hanged: Britain's Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005.
Bennett, I&NS 21.4 (Aug. 2006), sees this work as "the most complete narrative history yet published on the Mau Mau uprising and the government response." The author "pays substantial attention to the counterinsurgency campaign, including intelligence gathering and analysis operations."
Anderson, David L. "J. Lawton Collins, John Foster Dulles, and the Eisenhower Administration's Point of No Return in Vietnam." Diplomatic History 12, no. 2 (1988): 127-147. [Petersen]
Anderson, Dwayne. "On the Trail of the Alexandrovsk." Studies in Intelligence 10, no. 1 (Winter 1966): 39-43.
The author relates the analytic effort to determine what the cargo of a Soviet merchant ship in October 1962 might have been. A presumptive answer of nuclear warheads was reached, although there is no assurance that such was the case.
Anderson, Dwayne S. "What Makes a Good Intelligence Analyst?" Intelligencer 13, no. 2 (Winter-Spring 2003): 74-75.
A former analyst looks at the question he asks in the title. Brief and representing informed opinion, this is well worth a read.
Anderson, Dwayne. "Yesterday's Weapons Tomorrow." Studies in Intelligence 9, no. 4 (Fall 1965): 13-17.
A preoccupation with Soviet missiles "may have become so great as to skew our appreciation of over-all Soviet capabilities. Factors operating to degrade the theoretical capabilities of modern weapons have been ignored, and important capabilities of older weapons systems have been overlooked or forgotten."
Anderson, Edward C. Confederate Foreign Agent: The European Diary of Major Edward C. Anderson. University, AL: Confederate Publications, 1976.
Anderson, Edward G. "A Dynamic Model of Counterinsurgency Policy Including the Effects of Intelligence, Public Security, Popular Support, and Insurgent Experience." System Dynamics Review 27, no. 2 (Apr.-Jun. 2011): 111-141.
From Abstract: "A system dynamics model of insurgencies is built using the U.S. Army and Marine Counterinsurgency Manual (FM 3-24) as a basis. It must, however, be supplemented by additional theory from outside sources to enable calibration to a historical dataset."
Anderson, Elizabeth E. "The Security Dilemma and Covert Action: The Truman Years." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 11, no. 4 (Winter 1998-1999): 403-427.
The author applies the "security dilemma" theory (which essentially postulates an arms race fueled by a threat/buildup/reaction/threat/buildup spiral) from the field of international relations to covert action as a tool of state policy in the Truman admnistration (1945-1953). Although this is perhaps a little too "IRish" for some tastes, the article's application of the security dilemma to actions short of war is interesting and worth some consideration.
Anderson, Ellery. Banner Over Pusan. London: Evans, 1960.
The author, a British officer, participated in guerrilla/partisan operations in the Korean War.
Anderson, Gaylord W. "Medical Intelligence." In Medical Department, United States Army in World War II, Preventive Medicine in World War II, vol. IX, Special Fields, 251-340. Washington, DC: GPO, 1969.
Anderson, G.S. Charting the Storm: DMA's Role in Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Final Report 10 Feb 92 - 21 Feb 93. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1993.
Surveillant 3.4/5 finds that Charting the Storm illustrates "the impact that the availability or non-availability of cartographic support plays in modern military operations.... The increased dependency on these products was directly related to the increased sophistication of modern weapons systems."
Anderson, Jack. "How the CIA Snooped Inside Russia." Washington Post, 10 Dec. 1973, B17.
Anderson exposes the CIA's operation "Guppy," the listening in to conversations from the limousines of Soviet officials. This is a quick way to dry up a unique source of information. Gee, thanks, Jack.
Anderson, Jack. "U.S. Heard Russians Chasing U-2." Washington Post, 12 May 1960. [Bamford2]
Anderson, Jack. "U.S. Was Warned of Bombing at Beirut Embassy." Washington Post, 10 May 1983, B15.
Anderson, Jack, and Fred Blumenthal. "Trapped at the Washington Monument." Parade, 6 Jan. 1957, 6-8.
According to Pforzheimer, Studies 6.2 (Spring 1962), this article tells the story of two naturalized Americans, Kurt Ponger and Otto Verber, "who became Soviet intelligence agents in Vienna." Ponger was sentenced to 15 years in prison, while Verber received 10 years.
Anderson, Jim [LCDR/USNR (ret)], and Dirk A.D. Smith. "A Tale of Two Semi-Submersible Submarines." Studies in Intelligence 58, no. 4 (Dec. 2014): 31-41. [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol-58-no-4/gimik-and-skiff-a-tale-of-two-semi-submersible-submarines.html]
Two boats one each "at CIA and Fall River are actually the same design." One vessel, "[c]ode-named 'GIMIK,'" was to be an "infiltration asset for a [OSS] clandestine operations program called Project NAPKO, devised and headed by Colonel Carl Eifler." The other boat, "CIA's SKIFF Semi-submersible," "came close to operational use on at least two occasions," in 1959.
Anderson, Jon Lee. Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life. New York: Grove, 1997.
Chapman, IJI&C 10.3, finds much to like in this biography, even though the author's portrayal of the Cuban revolution "is so exclusively from Cuban and pro-Cuban sources." The reviewer was involved with Castro's revolutionaries before they gained power, but it took reading Anderson's book to realize finally "what a mean bastard" Che really was.
The reviewer disagrees with Anderson on a number of points. Among the disagreements is the author's depiction of Che's mother as little more than "a Latina hausfrau"; Chapman recalls her membership in the Argentine Communist Party and speculates that it was from her that Che received his communist indoctrination. Nor does Anderson seem aware that Che's brother, Roberto, was a "bigtime spook" in the Cuban intelligence service (DGI).
Chapman's story of Che's final hours also differs from Anderson's. Chapman cites as his source a Cuban who had accompanied Felix Rodriguez to Bolivia and who spoke to Che immediately prior to his execution by his Bolivian captors. Another point of disagreement is Anderson's claim that the CIA covertly funded Castro in Santiago. Chapman labels that claim "nonsense," stating "That's me in Santiago who would've done it, and I didn't do it."
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