Ambrose, Stephen E. "The Bulge." MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History 1, no. 3 (Jul.-Sep. 1989): 22-33.
The author argues that Allied intelligence, including Ultra, did not warn of the German attack.
Ambrose, Stephen E. D-Day: June 6, 1944 - The Climactic Battle of World War II. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994.
For Surveillant 4.1, Ambrose "makes very clear ... the critical role that intelligence and covert action played in insuring the success of D-Day." He covers intelligence collection, the Allies' massive deception effort, and the sabotage campaign waged by the Resistance with assistance from SOE and OSS.
Ambrose, Stephen E. Eisenhower. Vol. II. The President. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984.
Probably because of his earlier Ike's Spies (see below), Ambrose proves particularly adept at integrating intelligence matters into his biography of Eisenhower.
Ambrose, Stephen E. "Eisenhower and the Intelligence Community in World War II." Journal of Contemporary History 16, no. 1 (Jan. 1981): 153-166.
The author concludes that the Allies' superior intelligence "was a central factor" in their victories in the Atlantic and Normandy.
Ambrose, Stephen E. "Eisenhower, the Intelligence Community, and the D-Day Invasion." Wisconsin Magazine of History 64 (Summer 1981): 261-277. [Petersen]
Ambrose, Stephen E., with Richard H. Immerman. Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1981.
Clark comment: Ambrose is a respected historian and Eisenhower biographer. The focus of the first part of the book is on the World War II years, including Ultra, Torch, and Overlord. Ambrose compares the Allied surprise at the beginning of the Battle of Bulge to the German surprise on D-Day. The second part of the book covers intelligence issues during Eisenhower's presidency.
To Constantinides, the "principal fault of this book is the authors' exaggeration of Eisenhower's direct role and first-hand participation in intelligence matters as distinct from his general responsibilities as commander and president.... Little evidence is produced to show that he took more than a normal leader's interest in intelligence operations and techniques." There are enough errors to "cause the reader to be cautious," but there are "some good passages" as well. Lucas, I&NS 12.3/197, comments that Ike's Spies "illuminated covert action's importance within US strategy" but also "fell prey to the myth of Eisenhower as controlling influence."
[CIA/50s; GenPostwar/50s/Gen; WWII/Gen]
Ambrose, Stephen E. "The Secrets of OVERLORD." MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History 1, no. 4 (Summer 1989): 70-75.
This article deals with the deception plan -- Operation Fortitude -- employed by the Allies in preparation for D-Day: "The problem was not just to fool the Germans about where the D Day landings would take place, but to persuade them that Normandy was merely a diversion."
Ambrose, Stephen E. Undaunted Courage: Meriwether Lewis, Thomas Jefferson, and the Opening of the American West. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996. F5927A49
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