Amalrik, Andrei A.
1. "Arrest on Suspicion of Courage: Detention by the KGB." Harper's 253 (Aug. 1976): 37-44 ff. [Petersen]
2. Involuntary Journey to Siberia. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1970. [Petersen]
Amato, Ivan. "God's Eyes for Sale." Technology Review, Mar-Apr. 1999, 36-41.
The focus is on John Hoffman and his company, Aerial Images.
Ambrose, Stephen E.
Ame, Cesar [Gen.]. Guerra Segreta in Italia 1940-1943. Rome: Gherardo Casini Editore, 1954.
The author headed the Italian SIM from 1940.
American Caucus. "Question: Should the CIA Spy on Behalf of American Business? YES: Economic Strength Is National Security. [Stansfield Turner, former director of central intelligence, 1977-81. Reprinted by permission of Foreign Affairs (Fall 1991).] NO: Business Should Do Its Own Research. [Robert M. Gates, director of central intelligence. From a Speech to the Economic Club of Detroit, 13 Apr. 1992]." 1, no. 20 (21 Dec. 1992): 10.
American Bar Association.
American Enterprise Institute. Foreign Intelligence: Legal and Democratic Controls. Washington, DC: AEI, 1980.
Petersen: "Proceedings of a symposium with Les Aspin, Robert Bork, William Colby, John Stattuck, Peter Hackes."
American Intelligence Journal.
American Journal of Bioethics 7, no. 5 (May 2007): 3-26. [http://bioethics.net/]
"Target Article," "Neuroethics and National Security," with "Open Peer Commentaries." Click for relevant portion of Table of Contents.
American Mathematical Monthly. Editors. "Bibliography of Cryptography." 50 (May 1943): 345-346. [Petersen]
American Protective League. American Protective League: The Minute Man Division. Seattle, WA: American Protective League, 1918. [Petersen]
American Society of Photogrammetry. Manual of Photographic Interpretation. Washington, DC: 1960. [Petersen]
Ameringer, Charles D. U.S. Foreign Intelligence: The Secret Side of American History. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990.
Clark comment: Ameringer devotes 15 pages to "The Craft of Intelligence" and the "Art of Espionage," 11 pages to the American Revolution (failing to mention the establishment by Congress of Washington's Contingency Fund), 19 pages to the period from the Revolution to the Civil War (in which explorers are equated to intelligence officers), 14 pages to intelligence during the Civil War (where the presentation can be termed episodic, at best), 25 pages to the period up to World War I, 12 pages to cryptology, 13 pages to intelligence in World War I, and 13 pages to the inter-war period. In contrast, his chapter on "The Rise and Fall of William Casey" contains 24 pages and the chapter on "The Watergate Syndrome" has 15 pages.
Jeffreys-Jones, I&NS 6.4, finds in this book "a fine historical resonance. It is written in clear prose and strikes a balance between narrative and description on the one hand, and interpretation on the other. No matter that everyone will find something to disagree about in Ameringer's book; it will inform and stimulate its readers."
To Ransom, IJI&C 4.3, the author "has succeeded in making ... complex technical subjects clear and interesting," but he "breaks little new ground." As a potential textbook, it "is certainly one of the best of its genre"; overall, this is an "impressive and comprehensive synthesis." For Stempel, IJI&C 20.1 (Spring 2007), 134/fn.4, Ameringer provides "an excellent and readable swift review of U.S. Intelligence from the country's inception through the Reagan adinistration, including covert action."
1. Approach March: A Venture in Autobiography. London: Hutchinson, 1973.
Constantinides says that Amery has provided "an important and interesting contribution to our knowledge of British covert and resistance operations." This is "one of the better books on SOE and particularly on British operations in the Balkans."
2. Sons of the Eagle: A Study in Guerrilla War. London: Macmillan, 1948.
According to Pforzheimer, this is the "story of Albanian Resistance movements during World War II by a British SOE officer who worked with some of them."
Amidon, Mark [LTCOL/USAF]. "Groupthink, Politics, and the Decision to Attempt the Son Tay Rescue." Parameters 35, no. 3 (Autumn 2005): 119-131.
"The Son Tay mission 'go' decision provides a rich lesson in group decision dynamics and political maneuvering. The White House and Pentagon both fell victim to 'groupthink' as they struggled to arrive at a mission launch decision. Unknown to each other, each group weighed different criteria for mission launch, and each group defined ultimate mission success differently."
Amnesty International. "Kosovo: Human Rights Crisis Deepens -- Military Intelligence May Be Vital Deterrent." "Amnesty News" Release, 26 Mar. 1999.
"Monitoring the situation in [Kosovo] is becoming increasingly difficult as the main international monitoring mission, that of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, withdrew its observers last week as a result of the increased likelihood of a military intervention by NATO. In addition, foreign journalists of NATO member states -- who appeared to make up the bulk of the foreign press corps -- have either been expelled by the authorities or have withdrawn for fear for their own security.
"In the absence of international observers on the ground in Kosovo, Amnesty International calls upon states with substantial reconnaissance and intelligence capabilities to monitor the human rights and humanitarian situation in the area, to make public the information available where appropriate, and share fuller details with the relevant international organisations. It may be important that states inside and outside of NATO do this."
Amon, Moshe. "Cultural Clues: The Nature of Intelligence After Rabin's Assassination." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 9, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 1-15.
The author believes the clues pointing toward an assassination attempt by a Jew were clear. The question is why the security forces failed to see the obvious. One reason was that Israeli security forces failed to understand the full significance of the anti-Rabin rhetoric of the extreme right-wing. The argument here is basically one of mirror-imaging as an impediment to seeing the existing situation.
Amort, Cestmir, and I.M. Jedlicka. Tr., Margeret Parker and Roger Gheysens. The Canaris File. London: Wingate, 1970.
Amory, Robert, Jr. "John Andre: Case Officer." Studies in Intelligence 5, no. 3 (Summer 1961): A1-A15.
A nicely detailed synopsis of Arnold's treachery and Andre's role as his case officer.
Amos, John. "Deception and the 1973 Middle East War." In Strategic Military Deception, eds. Donald Daniel and Katherine Herbig, 317-334. New York: Pergamon, 1982.
Amuchastegui, Domingo. "Cuban Intelligence and the October Crisis." Intelligence and National Security 13, no. 3 (Autumn 1998): 88-119.
The author warns that this article is based on his own experiences, rather than on research in original source materials. Given the lack of the latter, this account will have to stand until the documentary record on the Cuban side is fleshed out. The main thrust of the arguments here is that "Cuban intelligence was for the most part able to collect the information necessary to help Cuban leaders make sound political decisions before, during, and immediately after the October crisis, and Cuban intelligence was able to interpret that information with reasonable -- though not perfect -- accuracy."
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