Alvarez, David. "American Clandestine Intelligence in Early Postwar Europe." Journal of Intelligence History, 4, no. 1 (Summer 2004). [http://www.intelligence-history.org/jih/journal.html]
From abstract: Early postwar OSS/SSU operations "were seriously compromised by insufficient staff, bureaucratic bickering in Washington..., inadequate guidance ... from headquarters, and the need ... to create from little or nothing a clandestine intelligence apparatus. The result was a cautious and rather lackluster approach to intelligence collection.... Only in early 1946, when the Soviet Union emerged as the primary target, did American clandestine intelligence in Europe begin to reacquire the resources, focus and energy necessary to serve the needs of American policy makers."
Alvarez, David. "Axis Sigint Collaboration: A Limited Partnership." Intelligence and National Security 14, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 1-17. And i2n Allied and Axis Signals Intelligence in World War II, ed. David Alvarez, 1-17. London: Frank Cass, 1999.
Alvarez, David. "Behind Venona: American Signals Intelligence in the Early Cold War." Intelligence and National Security 14, no. 2 (Summer 1999): 179-186.
A collection of documents at the National Archives from the records of the Chief of Naval Operations in the period 1947-1949 suggests that "there remains a range of still secret Sigint operations that were central to the intelligence history of the early Cold War."
Alvarez, David. "Diplomatic Solutions: German Foreign Office Cryptanalysis, 1919-1945." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 9, no. 2 (Summer 1996): 169-185.
This article follows the work of the Z Branch of the Foreign Ministry's Personnel Division. There are a substantial number of "may haves" in the part of the article discussing interwar activities. The unit's organization during World War II is detailed. "Cooperation between Pers Z and the separate cryptanalytic services of the Army, Navy, and Air Force did not exist."
Alvarez, David. "Faded Lustre: Vatican Cryptography, 1815-1920." Cryptologia 20, no. 2 (Apr. 1996): 97-131. And in Selections from Cryptologia: History, People, and Technology, eds. Cipher A. Deavours, David Kahn, Louis Kruh, Greg Mellen, and Brian J. Winkel, 191-225. Boston, MA: Artech House, 1998.
"Between 1815 and 1920 the Vatican lagged behind other states in responding to developments in cryptographic practice."
Alvarez, David. "A German Agent at the Vatican: The Gerlach Affair." Intelligence and National Security 11, no. 2 (Apr. 1996): 345-356.
Monsignor Rudolf Gerlach was a Bavarian priest and "private chamberlain and confidant of Pope Benedict XV." He was also "a conduit for covert German subsidies" to anti-interventionist newspapers during the period before Italy entered World War I. It is also likely that he engaged in espionage activities while at the Vatican.
Alvarez, David. "Italian Diplomatic Cryptanalysis in World War I." Cryptologia 20, no. 1 (Jan. 1996): 1-10. And in Selections from Cryptologia: History, People, and Technology, eds. Cipher A. Deavours, David Kahn, Louis Kruh, Greg Mellen, and Brian J. Winkel, 181-190. Boston, MA: Artech House, 1998.
From abstract: After its entry into World War I in May 1915, "Italy established a cryptanalytic unit to attack the military and diplomatic cryptosystems of other governments. This unit retrospectively solved an Austrian diplomatic system and currently read an American system, but it succeeded mainly against the codes and ciphers of minor powers."
Alvarez, David. "Left in the Dust: Italian Signals Intelligence, 1915-1943." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 14, no. 3 (Fall 2001): 388-408.
The Italians began their cryptanalytic efforts in the fall of 1915, and by the last year of the war (1918) were enjoying some successes. In the interwar period, signals intelligence "contributed significantly to Rome's diplomacy and military operations" in the Ethiopian crisis. But "Rome's services failed to adapt to the new cryptologic world created" by World War II and "were left in the dust" of the services that participated in the "organizational and technological revolution" that began in the 1930s and was accelerated by the war.
[OtherCountries/Italy; WWI/Other; WWII/Eur/Italy]
Alvarez, David. "Most Helpful and Co-operative: GC&CS and the Development of American Diplomatic Cryptanalysis, 1941-2." In Action This Day: Bletchley Park from the Breaking of the Enigma Code to the Birth of the Modern Computer, ed. Michael Smith and Ralph Erskine, 152-173. London: Bantam Press, 2001.
Alvarez, David. "No Immunity: Signals Intelligence and the European Neutrals, 1939-45." Intelligence and National Security 12, no. 2 (Apr. 1997) : 22-43.
The Allied powers "systematically attack[ed] the cryptosystems of all the neutrals.... Axis Sigint operations against the neutrals seem fitful and unsystematic.... This situation was, in large part, the result of inadequate or poorly-exploited human resources.... For the European neutrals the brutal reality was that there was no protection against the communications war.... While some neutrals (the Vatican) were better able to evade this surveillance than others (Turkey), none proved invulnerable."
Alvarez, David. "The Papal Cipher Section in the Early Nineteenth Century." Cryptologia 17, no. 2 (Apr. 1993): 219-224. And in Selections from Cryptologia: History, People, and Technology, eds. Cipher A. Deavours, David Kahn, Louis Kruh, Greg Mellen, and Brian J. Winkel, 155-160. Boston, MA: Artech House, 1998.
Alvarez, David. "Research Note: American Signals Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis." Intelligence and National Security 15, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 169-176.
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