Aldrich, Richard J. "Soviet Intelligence, British Security and the End of the Red Orchestra: The Fate of Alexander Rado." Intelligence and National Security 6, no. 1 (Jan. 1991): 196-218.
From January to July 1945, Alexander Rado -- the GRU chief in Switzerland from 1940 to 1943 -- was in the hands of British Security Intelligence Middle East (SIME) in Cairo. Aldrich mines the available material for the conclusion that, contrary to popular legend, Rado neither tried to defect to the British nor did the British repatriation of Rado to the Soviets represent anything other than the routine treatment of him as a Displaced Person. The author suggests that the failure of the British to recognize who and what they had in their hands argues against the kind of relationship between British intelligence and Rado's network that some writers have put forward.
Aldrich, Richard J. "Transatlantic Intelligence and Security Cooperation." International Affairs 80, no. 3 (Jul. 2004): 733-753.
From Abstract: "If cooperation is to improve, we require a better mutual understanding about the relationship between privacy and security to help us decide what sort of intelligence should be shared.... While most practical problems of intelligence exchange are ultimately resolvable, the challenge of agreeing what the intelligence means in broad terms is even more problematic. The last section of this article argues that shared NATO intelligence estimates would be difficult to achieve and of doubtful value."
Aldrich, Richard J. "The UK Security State." In The Oxford Handbook of British Politics, eds. Matthew Flinders, Andrew Gamble, Colin Hay, and Mike Kenny, 752-770. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
Aldrich, Richard J. "The UK-US Intelligence Alliance in 1975: Economies, Evaluations and Explanations." Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 4 (Aug. 2006): 557-567.
From abstract: New archival releases appear "to show that, partly because of the contraction of defence dispositions, UK intelligence activities were called upon to compensate and therefore became relatively more important as a substantive contribution to the alliance."
Aldrich, Richard J. "Unquiet in Death: The Post-war Survival of the 'Special Operations Executive,' 1945-1951." In Contemporary British History, 1931-1961: Politics and the Limits of Policy, eds. Anthony Gorst, Lewis Johnman, and W. Scott Lucas. London: Pinter Pub Ltd, 1991.
Aldrich, Richard J. "US-European Intelligence Co-operation on Counter-terrorism: Low Politics and Compulsion." British Journal of Politics and International Relations 11, no.1 (Feb. 2009): 122-139.
The author suggests intelligence cooperation can be viewed "as a rather specialist kind of 'low politics' that is focused on practical arrangements." It allows countries "to work together in one area even while they disagree about something else. Meanwhile, the pressing need to deal with a range of increasingly elusive transnational opponents ... compels intelligence agencies to work more closely together, despite their instinctive dislike of multilateral sharing. Therefore, transatlantic intelligence co-operation will continue to deepen, despite the complex problems that it entails."
Aldrich, Richard J. "The Value of Residual Empire: Anglo-American Intelligence Cooperation in Asia after 1945." In Intelligence, Defence and Diplomacy: British Policy in the Post-War World, eds. Richard J. Aldrich and Michael F. Hopkins, 226-258. London and Portland, OR: Cass, 1994.
Aldrich, Richard J. "The Waldegrave Initiative and Secret Service Archives: New Materials and New Policies." Intelligence and National Security 10, no. 1 (Jan. 1995): 192-197.
Aldrich, Richard J. "Whitehall and the Iraq War: The UK's Four Intelligence Enquiries." Irish Studies in International Affairs 16, no.1 (2005): 73-88.
"During a period of twelve months, between July 2003 and July 2004, Whitehall and Westminster produced no less than four different intelligence enquiries.... Although the intensity of the debate about connections between Britain's intelligence community and members of the core executive was considerable, the overall results were less than impressive.... [Nonetheless,] these enquiries generated fascinating material. Imperfect as they are, they tell us much about the current UK intelligence system."
Aldrich, Richard J., ed. British Intelligence, Strategy and the Cold War, 1945-1951. London & New York: Routledge, 1992.
Clive, Gov't & Opposition 28.4, notes that the main themes of this "collection of essays by academics ... have been perceptibly and accurately presented." However, "the absence of an overall conclusion distilled from the findings of fourteen different contributors" is a serious fault. It seems to Stafford, I&NS 9.1, that Aldrich had "sufficient editorial command to ensure" that the essays "all march in roughly the same direction and [sound] similar tunes." This is a "valuable addition to the literature."
Aldrich, Richard J., ed. Espionage, Security and Intelligence in Britain, 1945-1970. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press; 1998. New York: St. Martin's, 1998.
Kruh, Cryptologia 24.2, calls this work "a solid review of postwar developments, activities and the significance of the British secret service from the end of World War II through 1970.... Aldrich provides a fascinating insight to intelligence developments during the early Cold War,... offer[ing] details from a variety of remarkable sources." To Scott, I&NS 15.3, Aldrich "has succeeded admirably in producing a fascinating collection, replete with authoritative introduction and relevant commentaries."
Aldrich, Richard J., and Michael Coleman. "The Cold War, the JIC and British Signals Intelligence, 1948." Intelligence and National Security 4, no. 3 (Jul. 1989): 535-549.
The authors suggest that Soviet subjects predominated the Joint Intelligence Committee's signals intelligence priority list in 1948, but that evidence of success against the top strategic targets is "thin."
Aldrich, Richard J., Rory Cormac, and Michael Goodman, eds. Spying on the World: The Declassified Documents of the Joint Intelligence Committee, 19362013. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014.
Peake, Studies 58.4 (Dec. 2014), finds that the editors "have done more than edit this work. In addition to valuable introductory and summary chapters, they have contributed documented prefatory analysis to each of the 20 chapters that examine the functions of the JIC since its origin in 1936."
Aldrich, Richard J., and Michael F. Hopkins, eds. Intelligence, Defence, and Diplomacy: British Policy in the Post-War World. London: Frank Cass, 1994.
According to Surveillant 3.6, this book contains "twelve essays" that review "British defense policy and diplomatic activity ... region by region." The book closes "with a thematic section ... on intelligence and security matters."
Aldrich, Richard J., Gary Rawnsley, and Ming-Yeh Rawnsley, eds.
Click for Table of Contents.
1. "Special Issue on 'The Clandestine Cold War in Asia, 1945-65: Western Intelligence, Propaganda and Special Operations.'" Intelligence and National Security 14, no. 4 (Winter 1999): entire issue.
2. The Clandestine Cold War in Asia, 1945-65: Western Intelligence, Propaganda and Special Operations. Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2000.
Kruh, Cryptologia 24.4, comments that "[a]nyone interested in intelligence, propaganda, special operations and security in Asia's Cold War will find this comprehensive account thought-provoking." For Cohen, FA 79.6 (Nov.-Dec. 2000), this is a "dense but fascinating collection of essays.... Not a book for the general reader, but one definitely of interest to students of the subject."
To Knaus, Journal of Cold War Studies 4 (2002), the authors have, for the most part, "done a creditable job of trying to place the covert operations in context by scrutinizing the historical records available to them.... [T]his book can well serve as a valuable guidebook for policy makers when they weigh the potential benefits of using covert intelligence operations and as a manual for those who may be ordered to carry them out."
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