Aldrich, Richard J. "Imperial Rivalry: British and American Intelligence in Asia, 1942-46." Intelligence and National Security 3, no. 1 (Jan. 1988): 5-55.
Aldrich, Richard J. "Intelligence and International Security." In The International Studies Encyclopedia Vol. VI, ed. Robert A. Denemark, 3824-3842. Oxford: International Studies Association/Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.
Aldrich, Richard J. Intelligence and the War Against Japan: Britain, America and the Politics of Secret Service. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
According to Jonkers, AFIO WIN 23-00 (9 Jun. 2000), this work explores "the complex wartime connections between the politics of secret service and the politics of empire.... Readable ... and expertly done, for the scholar and student of political science and history." To Wiant, Studies 46.1, the author's "trenchant treatment of the achievement of strategic surprise against the British in Malaysia and Singapore and the Americans at Pearl Harbor is among the best summations in indications and warning literature."
Bath, NIPQ 16.4, notes that the geographic scope of this work is more limited than the title suggests. The work covers only Mountbatten's South East Asia Command and Stillwell's China-Burma-India Theater. Nonetheless, the author "has produced a thoughtful study of a previously unexplored aspect of Anglo-American wartime intelligence.... [I]t is not an easy read, but one that is destined to become a cornerstone of future research."
For Kruh, Cryptologia 25.2, this is a "comprehensive, scholarly history of the development of the British secret intelligence and its relations with its American counterparts during the war against Japan." The author supplies "a cogent analysis of the role of intelligence in Far Eastern developments."
Best, I&NS 16.1, notes that Aldrich's work is divided into two parts. The first, shorter portion deals with "the development of British intelligence in East and South-East Asia in the period up to December 1941." The reviewer wonders whether the author "goes a little too far in his efforts" to show that British estimates of Japanese ambitions and capabilities were not as skewed as is usually accepted. Nonetheless, "Aldrich has provided a most interesting account of the run-up to war." The second, longer portion of the work "analyses the activities of the various British and American intelligence services in the Indian, Chinese and Southeast Asian theatres during the war." Aldrich's "is clearly an important work.... There are few books that describe the activities of the intelligence community in such detail and demonstrate so clearly that intelligence is a vital aspect of decision-making."
Aldrich, Richard J. "Intelligence Co-operation in Theory and Practice." In International Intelligence Co-operation and Accountability, eds. Hans Born, Ian Leigh, and Aidan Wills, 18-41. London: Routledge, 2010.
Aldrich, Richard J. "Intelligence within BAOR and NATO's Northern Army Group." Journal of Strategic Studies 31, no. 1 (2008): 89-122.
Aldrich, Richard J. The Key to the South: Britain, the United States, and Thailand During the Approach of the Pacific War, 1929-1942. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1993.
According to Surveillant 3.2/3, Aldrich "examines the accelerating Western struggle with Japan for control over 'independent' Thailand.... Many clandestine aspects of this struggle are explored for the first time." Kruh, Cryptologia 18.1, notes that "[a]lthough this excellent, meticulously researched study ... does not focus on espionage or other types of intelligence, it contains numerous references to clandestine activities."
[Interwar/U.S.; OtherCountries/Thailand; UK/Interwar/30s; UK/WWII/FEPac]
Aldrich, Richard J. "Legacies of Secret Service: Renegade SOE and the Karen Struggle in Burma, 1948-50." Intelligence and National Security 14, no. 4 (Winter 1999): 130-148.
During World War II, it proved relatively easy for secret services to foment insurgencies. However, in the postwar period, the issue became one of how to handle such forces. The Karens had worked loyally alongside SOE during the war, and in its aftermath some former SOE officers returned in a "private" capacity to aid the hill tribes against the central Rangoon government.
[OtherCountries/Burma; UK/Postwar/CW/I&NS & Gen][c]
Aldrich, Richard J. "OSS, CIA and European Unity: The American Committee on United Europe, 1948-1960." Diplomacy and Statecraft 8, no. 1 (Mar. 1997): 184-227.
Aldrich, Richard J. "Persuasion: British Intelligence, the History Policeman and Official History." In Spooked: Britain, Empire and Intelligence Since 1945, eds. Patrick Major and Christopher Moran, 29-50. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars, 2010.
Aldrich, Richard J. "Policing the Past: Official History, Secrecy and British Intelligence since 1945." English Historical Review 119 (Sep. 2004): 922-964.
Aldrich, Richard J. "'A Profoundly Disruptive Force': The CIA, Historiography and the Perils of Globalization." Intelligence and National Security 26, no. 2 & 3 (Apr.-Jun. 2011): 139-158.
The CIA "is fundamentally unsuited to address many of the new security problems which are transnational, messy, networked and violent. Admittedly, this is an organizational problem of a meta kind, but one that bureaucratic reform alone cannot fix."
Aldrich, Richard J. "Putting Culture into the Cold War: The Cultural Relations Department (CRD) and British Covert Information Warfare." Intelligence and National Security 18, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 109-133. Also: In The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe 1945-1960, eds. Giles Scott-Smith and Hans Krabbendam, 109-133. London: Frank Cass, 2003.
By 1945, the Foreign Office's Cultural Relations Department (CRD) "was at the cutting edge of Britain's information Cold War, focused upon the twin issues of culture and organized youth and working closely with MI5 and to a lesser extent the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS)." The formation of the Soviet-organized World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) led to the "launch of the first covertly-run British front organization, the World Assembly of Youth" (WAY). Also in 1948, Britain "set up a proper covert political warfare section, the Information Research Department" (IRD). The British effort suffered continually from a lack of funding; and "[b]y 1955 the International Secretariat of WAY was becoming a largely an American-funded body."
Aldrich, Richard J. "Review Article: Intelligence, Anglo-American Relations and the Suez Crisis, 1956." Intelligence and National Security 9, no. 3 (Jul. 1994): 544-554.
Aldrich reviews five books on the Suez Crisis: Lucas, Divided We Stand; Calhoun, Hungary and Suez; Hahn, United States, Great Britain and Egypt; Kunz, Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis; and Kyle, Suez. He notes that "one critical aspect of intelligence-gathering is conspicuous by its near absence from all these ... accounts.... This is signals intelligence.... Lucas is the only author who attempts even a brief foray into this important subject."
Aldrich, Richard J. "Regulation by Revelation? Intelligence, Transparency and the Media." In Spinning Intelligence: Why Intelligence Needs the Media, Why the Media Needs Intelligence, eds. Robert Dover and Michael S. Goodman, 13-37. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009.
Mansfield, Studies 84.1 (Mar. 2010), notes that is the lead essay in this anthology and it "sets the scene for several other pieces." At the same time, however, the reviewer, a former CIA public affairs officer, takes issue with what he sees as Aldrich's view that U.S. intelligence agencies have enjoyed a close relationship with the press. [Clark comment: At least one element of the U.S. Intelligence Community, the FBI, has over time certainly enjoyed remarkably close relations with the media.]
Return to Ald-Alh