Aldrich, Richard J. "American Intelligence and the British Raj: The OSS, the SSU and India, 1942-1947." Intelligence and National Security 13, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 132-164. Also: In Knowing Your Friends: Intelligence Inside Alliances from 1914 to the Cold War, ed. Martin S. Alexander, 132-164. London: Frank Cass, 1998.
Abstract: "The scale of OSS reporting on India's economic and political condition is striking. This underlines how OSS always perceived itself as providing long-term political and commercial intelligence beyond 1945."
Aldrich, Richard J. "Beyond the Vigilant State? Globalization and Intelligence." Review of International Studies.35, no.4 (Oct. 2009): 889-904.
Aldrich, Richard J. "Britain's Secret Intelligence Service in Asia during the Second World War." Modern Asia Studies 32, no. 1 (Feb. 1998): 179-217.
"[T]his essay seeks to shed some preliminary light upon ... the troubled Asiatic branch of SIS from the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 to termination of Britain's post-war administrative duties in Southeast Asia in 1946.... [T]he experience of SIS in Asia after 1941 was distinctly different in character" than SIS in London. "[I]t encountered new problems that became more awkward and intractable as the war progressed.... [O]perational problems, peculiar to Asia, were compounded by serious mistakes committed at a higher level, notably by the regional head of SIS, Colonel Leo Steveni, during the period 1942-44."
[UK/WWII/FEPac & Services/MI6]
Aldrich, Richard J. "British and American Policy on Intelligence Archives: Never-Never Land and Wonderland?" Studies in Intelligence 38, no. 5 (1995): 17-26. "Never Never Land and Wonderland: British and American Policy on Intelligence Archives." Contemporary Record 8, no. 1 (Summer 1994): 132-150. [With footnotes]
The author initially looks at the importance of recently released papers, using the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) and Pearl Harbor as a case study. Aldrich finds nothing in the JIC minutes for 1941 to support the revisionist suggestion that Churchill had and withheld foreknowledge of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. In comparing British and American policy on releasing archival material, Aldrich is positive about the briefer de facto waiting period of the U.S. government and the broader U.S. definition of intelligence which includes military intelligence. In addition, there seems to be a profusion of British secret service materials for the period before 1945 available in the U.S. archives.
[RefMats/Release/UK & U.S.][c]
Aldrich, Richard J. "British Intelligence and the Anglo-American 'Special Relationship' during the Cold War." Review of International Studies 24, no. 3 (1998): 331-352.
Aldrich, Richard J. "British Intelligence and the 'Barbarian' Enemy, 1941-1944." Everyone's War 15 (Spring-Summer 2007): 56-60.
Aldrich, Richard J. British Intelligence, Strategy, and the Cold War, 1945-51. New York: Routledge, 1992.
Aldrich, Richard J. "Cold War Codebreaking and Beyond: The Legacy of Bletchley Park." In Action This Day: Bletchley Park from the Breaking of the Enigma Code to the Birth of the Modern Computer, eds. Ralph Erskine and Michael Smith, 403-430, 511-515. London and New York: Bantam, 2001.
Aldrich, Richard J. "Dangerous Liaisons: Post-September 11 Intelligence Alliances." Harvard International Review 24, no. 3 (Fall 2002): 50-54.
The United States "is a massive exporter of technical intelligence while it is also surprisingly dependent on friends for certain kinds of espionage," particularly human intelligence from Africa and the Middle East. Nevertheless, "the overall result has been a mutual dependence that is healthy and ensures a greater reservoir of unique skills in the service of Western policy."
Aldrich, Richard J. GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain's Most Secret Intelligence Agency. London: HarperPress, 2010.
Norton-Taylor, Guardian, 19 Jun. 2010, finds that the author "shows how GCHQ developed into a global intelligence-gathering agency of truly industrial proportions with resources that include the navy's submarines and HMS Endurance, the South Atlantic survey ship based in the Falklands.... GCHQ now supplies timely intelligence to British troops on the battlefield. Its technology is also supplying MI5 and the police with 'real time' intelligence on terror or crime suspects."
A reviewer for The Economist, 8 Jul. 2010, says that "Aldrich skilfully weaves together the personal, political, military and technological dimensions of electronic espionage.... In the internet age, the agency faces two challenges: how to monitor the rivers of digitalised information that flow around the world; and how to maintain political legitimacy for governments to gather and store large quantities of personal data so that the information can be searched for patterns of terrorist and criminal activity. Its work is harder than ever."
West, IJI&C 24.2 (Summer 2011), calls this "by far the best book yet published to cover the organization's postwar history." Nonetheless, the reviewer makes a number of criticisms of the work. For instance, he says that "Aldrich makes some strange, though not very significant, missteps" in dealing with the VENONA material. In addition, "his treatment of GCHQ's role during the 1982 Falkland's conflict is definately suspect."
For Glees, Cryptologia 35.3 (Jul. 2011), there are a number of problems with this "massive book," not the least of which is its length. The story of an organization such as GCHQ "is inevitably going to be dry.... Sexing it up with tales of political failures, scandals and outrages make for a book that is both frustrating and terribly long."
[UK/Overviews/10s & Sigint]
Aldrich, Richard J. "GCHQ and Sigint in Early Cold War, 1945-70." Intelligence and National Security 16, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 67-96. And in Secrets of Signals Intelligence during the Cold War and Beyond, eds. Matthew M. Aid and Cees Wiebes. London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2001.
"[B]y most forms of measurement,... the volume of product, the size of budget, or numbers of personnel, GCHQ was the most important service" of the British secret services during the early Cold War.
Aldrich, Richard J. "'Global Intelligence Co-operation versus Accountability: New Facets to an Old Problem." Intelligence and National Security 24, no. 1 (Feb. 2009): 26-56.
"It is hard to avoid the conclusion that intelligence liaison and accountability have never mixed well.... [T]he acceleration of intelligence liaison over the last decade has brought about a qualitative change in the nature of intelligence. Improved international intelligence cooperation has changed the way in which agencies work. Accordingly, the 'black hole' presented by liaison is now too big to ignore."
Aldrich, Richard J. "'Grow Your Own': Cold War Intelligence and History Supermarkets." Intelligence and National Security 17, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 135-152.
"Ultimately, historians who feast only on the processed food available in the PRO's efficient history supermarket may begin to display a flabby posture. There is no such thing as a free lunch and the hidden tariff at the PRO is a pre-selected menu."
Aldrich, Richard J. The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence. London: John Murray, 2001.
From publisher: "What role did Western secret service play in the Cold War? For British Prime Ministers, secret service helped to sustain post-imperial influence and to protect interests with minimum costs and visibility.... For American Presidents,... secret service allowed the extension of the power of the President over American foreign policy." From http://www.rsars.org.uk/aldrich.htm: This "study reveals that the major British aim in the Cold War was not to contain the Soviet Union, but instead to contain the danger of a hot war provoked by the US Air Force and the CIA."
Deighton, I&NS 17.1, calls this book "a delight to read." The work "is episodic, and only touches on the key moments of [the] period," but the author "combines scholarship with a light touch."
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