Agabekov, George. Tr., Henry W. Bunn. OGPU: The Russian Secret Terror. New York: Brentano's, 1931. Westport, CT: Hypernion Press, 1975. Agabekov, George. Tr., Henry W. Bunn. OGPU: The Russian Secret Terror. New York: Brentano's, 1931. Westport, CT: Hypernion Press, 1975.
According to Pforzheimer, Agabekov worked for the GPU/OGPU from 1920 to 1930, when he defected; he disappeared in Brussels in 1938. In this book, he "describes the internecine warfare and intrigue between the Foreign Ministry and Soviet intelligence representatives abroad.... This is probably the most important book, from the historical point of view, in the literature of Soviet intelligence operations and organization in the 1920's."
Constantinides finds that the language in the translation "is stilted and awkward" and "much of the book is of primarily historical value."
Rocca and Dziak, p. 29, note that translations of some of Agabekov's other writings, "O.G.P.U.-- Reminiscences of the Chekist, G. Agabekoff," appear in: Hearings before a Special Committee to Investigate Communist Activities in the United States. House of Representatives. 71st Cong., 2d sess., Part I--Volume 5, Dec. 1930, pp. 147-154. "These and other writings by Agabekov are fundamental to an understanding of Soviet security and intelligence organizations and operations in the 1920s, especially in the Near and Middle East."
[Russia/DefectorLiterature]
Agar, Augustus.
1. Baltic Episode: A Classic of Secret Service in Russian Waters. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1963.
Constantinides: This is an "absorbing,... incredible and instructive" account by the commander of British naval coastal motor boats in Finnish waters in 1919. His mission was as a communications link for the illegal head of British SIS in Russia, Sir Paul Dukes [see Paul Dukes, The Story of "ST 25" (1938)], but exceeded that brief by sinking a Soviet cruiser and participating in naval attacks against Kronstadt. An earlier version of this story is included in Agar's Footprints in the Sea (see below).
A current retelling of these events is Harry Ferguson, Operation Kronstadt (2008).
2. Footprints in the Sea. London: Evans Bros., 1959.
Chambers calls this book a "great adventure story typical of the period. Some of the art of covert military support is learned as one reads about support of counterrevolutionaries in Leningrad.
Constantinides notes that in terms of Agar's assignment in support of British SIS activities in Russia in 1919, this is a shorter version of Agar's Baltic Episode (see above). The two accounts "differ on what role the British naval commander, Cowan, played in Agar's decision to attack" the Russian cruiser Oleg. Agar also tells of secret naval command activities in World War II.
[UK/Interwar/To29; Footprints also in UK/WWII]
The
Age (Melbourne). "Editorial Opinion:
Secret Intelligence? Can't Say Too Much." 5 Jul. 2001. [http://www.theage.com.au]
The "immunity provisions" of the "Intelligence Services Bill now before Federal Parliament ... are a profoundly disturbing aspect of a bill that is in other respects a reasonable response to the recommendations of the 1995 commission of inquiry into the intelligence service. ASIS and Australia's electronic intelligence-gathering agency, the Defence Signals Directorate, will be on a statutory footing for the first time, and ASIS will come under the scrutiny of a parliamentary committee, as is already the case with the counter-intelligence agency, ASIO. Greater accountability in intelligence gathering is desirable; the worry is that this bill's immunity provisions will undermine accountability, not enhance it."
[Australia/01]
Agnor, Francis.
"The Interpreter as an Agent." Studies in Intelligence
4, no. 1 (Winter 1960): 21-27. In Inside CIA's Private World: Declassified
Articles from the Agency's Internal Journal, 1955-1992, ed. H. Bradford
Westerfield, 29-34. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995.
This article is not about the technical aspects of the interpreter's art, but rather focuses on the use of interpreters for intelligence collection in both domestic and foreign assignments. The author notes that the immediate information take from such assignments "is likely to be limited," while "the improvement of personal assets can be considerable."
The editor of the Yale University Press collection of articles from Studies in Intelligence stumbles somewhat with a throw-away line in the headnote to this article: "It may be obvious and time-honored ... that language interpreters are used for intelligence collection (and presumably also for some disinformation), yet the literature has neglected this practice." (p. 29) The editor's presumption is erroneous. There is nothing in Agnor's article that would encourage or support such a presumption, so it must originate solely with the editor. The statement betrays a lack of understanding, not just of the methods of intelligence, but of good practice, tradecraft, and common sense.
[CIA/C&C/Culture/Tradecraft][c]
[Agranat Commission.] "The Agranat Report." Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 4, nos. 1 and 2 (1979): 69-90 and 95-128.
Reprint of Israeli commission report on failures in military preparation for the Yom Kippur war.
[Israel/Yom Kippur]
Agrell, Wilhelm. "Sweden and the Dilemmas of Neutral Intelligence Liaison." Journal of Strategic Studies 29, no. 4 ( 2006): 633-651.
From abstract: Despite a declared policy of non-alignment during the Cold War, Sweden "established security links with a number of Western powers, first of all Britain and the US.... Intelligence liaison was of crucial importance for the security of non-aligned Sweden, but also significant for the major Western powers in filling gaps in intelligence collection.... However, intelligence liaison contained policy dilemmas, some of a more general nature, some specific for a country with an overt policy of non-alignment."
[Liaison; OtherCountries/Sweden]
Agrell, Wilhelm. "When Everything Is Intelligence - Nothing Is Intelligence." Occasional Papers 1, no. 4. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, The Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, Oct. 2002. [https://www.cia.gov/library/kent-center-occasional-papers/vol1no4.htm]
"[T]he rapid development of the concept and profession of intelligence analysis ... is facing serious problems and hazards. One of my concerns is the far too broad application of the concept of intelligence.... [I]ntelligence has become regarded as a key element not only in business but virtually in all fields of public and private affairs.... The problem is ... in the application of intelligence analysis in fields where its specific virtues are not adequate, not actually needed, or even might become counter-productive."
[Analysis/Gen]
Agrell, Wilhelm,
and Bo Huldt, eds. Clio Goes Spying: Eight Essays on the History of Intelligence. Lund, Sweden: Scandinavian University Books, 1983.
[Historical]
Aguilar, Luis,
ed. Operation Zapata: The "Ultra-sensitive" Report and Testimony
of the Board of Inquiry on the Bay of Pigs. Frederick, MD: University
Publications of America, 1981.
This is the sanitized version of the report made to President Kennedy by Gen. Maxwell Taylor's Board of Inquiry (with Gen. Taylor, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, Chief of Naval Operations Arleigh Burke, and DCI Allen Dulles).
[CIA/60s/BoP]
Agursky, Mikhail. "Soviet Disinformation and Forgeries." International Journal of World Peace 6, no. 1 (Jan.-Mar. 1989): 13-30.
[Russia/D&D]
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